

RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY of opinion and discussion

VOL. XXVI

Autumn, 1957

NO. 4

CONTENTS

Editorial	482
Religion in Higher Education	
The Christian and Responsible Scholarship.....JOHN W. DIXON, JR.	483
The Christian and History Teaching.....PAUL L. WARD	490
On Being a Christian Sociologist.....WILLIAM L. KOLB	501
Are There Religious Perspectives in the Physical Sciences?.....IAN G. BARBOUR	513
Meditation on the Gospels.....J. CALVIN KEENE	526
Theology and the University Student.....DEANE W. FERM	533
Church-Affiliated Colleges and Academic Freedom.....LOYD D. EASTON	544
Is a Humanistic Grounding of Democracy Adequate?.....PETER A. BERTOCCI	550
The New Testament and Myth.....MARIA F. SULZBACH	560
Meditation on a Particular Death.....ANONYMOUS	572
Biblical Theology and the Church's Point of View.....MACK B. STOKES	580
Our Obligation to the Gospel.....EUGENE L. SMITH	592
The Personnel of the Twelve Disciples.....CHARLES F. NESBITT	602
Book Reviews	611
Book Notices	636
Index to Volume XXVI.....	637

Editorial

IT IS BECOMING increasingly clear that the problem of Christianity and higher education must be carefully thought through. The hit or miss responses—often vague, often uncertain, often ambiguous—of Protestant thinkers to this problem reveal not only a failure to grasp its seriousness, but point up the fact that, to the present time, the Christian idea of education has not been satisfactorily worked out.

The articles of this issue present a number of the questions involved.

The reader will quickly note that in our philosophy and practice of higher education in America we are still most deeply concerned for the principle of free inquiry, with its presupposition of academic freedom in which the scholar's quest for the truth shall be sustained in its integrity.

It is not generally realized that this principle is of fairly recent acquisition. (John Locke's *Essay concerning the Human Understanding* was once excluded from Oxford. There are similar instances of much more recent date!) We have had to fight for it. Educators have learned through much travail to shun authoritarian absolutes. Dogmatism—whether "Christian" or "Communist," Decency Leagues or un-American activities committees—stifle authentic inquiry and corrupt the culture to authoritarian ends.

But there is an irony here. Free inquiry, which arose with the Renaissance, received its deepest impetus and justification from the Protestant appeal *beyond dogma* to the non-intellectualist conception of faith. Free inquiry and the primacy of faith go hand in hand: academic freedom and theological absolutes do not. Free inquiry must always resist the dogmatic fixations of religion just because it must remain "open" to fresh disclosures within the providence of God. Unfortunately the Protestant principle quickly congealed into orthodoxies of its own. Education understandably shied away, refusing the ecclesiastical closure. Since then its principle (of free inquiry) has floated uncertainly in the precarious ether of a "suspension" of belief. Thus the ecclesiastical threat is often replaced by less obvious ones—vested interests, ideologies, academic bureaucracies; or, less obvious still, free inquiry makes unwitting alliance with "science" or instrumentalism or positivism, and excludes from its consideration (thereby becoming itself dogmatic) the principle which was always the undisclosed secret of its strength. Thus it sponsors new fictions and pseudo-hypotheses, and radical falsehood, undetected, creeps in.

The Protestant principle must always protest against its own idolatries, just as free inquiry must always refuse the premature foreclosure of its search for the true; but the two working together must press *all* claims upon the boundary of the human situation. For it is there, and there only, that "beliefs" and "methods" become ventures of faith, and truth is transformed into a Way and a Life.

S. R. H.

Religion in Higher Education

1. *The Christian and Responsible Scholarship*

JOHN W. DIXON, Jr.

I

ONE OF THE deepest insights of the Christian faith, revived in the consciousness of the Church, is that the calling of a Christian is not only the calling to service in the Church but the calling to service in his work whatever it might be. Caught up in this whole movement is the scholar and teacher seeking to determine the meaning of being a Christian in the academic life; seeking to determine the meaning of Christian teaching and Christian scholarship; seeking to determine how to guide students into a Christian understanding of their own chosen work.

The title of this article has a double aspect. It concerns a responsibility that exists between the Christian scholar and his scholarship; it concerns also the responsibility of the Christian scholar for the use of his scholarship. The very word, "responsibility," has a comparable doubling of meaning. In its primitive sense it means the ability to respond, to answer *to*. It has come to bear as its primary meaning, to answer *for*, to be accountable, to receive praise or blame based on the possession of power and free choice to use that power. One without power is not responsible. One without free choice is not responsible.

This has a primary legal and moral bearing. I possess a car. I am not permitted to use it unless I have the power and free choice to do so. I am responsible to society for the safe and proper operation of that car. I am similarly responsible to society for the right exercise of the power of choice whenever that affects others and in many cases where it affects only myself.

To speak, then, of responsible scholarship is to assume the existence of a power in scholarship and freedom of choice in the use of that power. What is the power of the scholar?

It is, first of all, power over the tools of his scholarship and of the

JOHN W. DIXON, JR., B.A., Ph.D., has just completed his term of office as Executive Director of the Faculty Christian Fellowship. He is now teaching art history at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

results achieved by the use of those tools. Inevitably, since research and teaching seem indissolubly united, this means power over the transmission of these results. Ultimately this means considerable power over men's minds, for it is ideas and emotional images that control the minds of men. Ideas and images are not generated in scholarship alone, but ever since the birth of the university, scholarship has been a power in the thought of man.

Granting the existence of this power does not, finally, define this responsibility, for there is yet another question to answer: To whom is the scholar responsible? Who asks the questions the scholar must answer? Who lays on him the accountability for his acts?

Russian Communists, obviously, reply that he is responsible to the whole people as embodied in the State. Many Americans would make a comparable statement, and in fact have made some progress in making all thought subservient to the State. Others answer that he is responsible to some smaller element of society. For example, in one area, scholarship would be held responsible to "the Southern way of life." Others say it is to a particular doctrine of social order, whether it is radical liberalism or free enterprise economics. It matters little whether the scholar is a prisoner of liberal or conservative, capitalist or socialist, the avant-garde or the reactionary. If he is being held accountable by those without authority to do so, he is a prisoner.

Elsewhere the answer to the question of the Christian scholar would be "to the Church." It then becomes the task of the scholar to make his work subservient to the work of the institutional church.

The scholar adamantly and stubbornly asserts that his responsibility is to the evidence. He knows well that his whole existence as a scholar rests on his ability to maintain that assertion. Yet the Christian must always answer to the question in any area of existence, "I am in all things responsible to God." The will of God is laid on us as a gift and as a command. The Christian is one who loves his Lord with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his mind. The gift of God is the power to obey him. The command of God is to serve him in all things, neither looking back nor turning aside.

There are a number of good Christians who are good scholars. Yet few of them have reconciled the demands of scholarship with the demands of faith. They see no way of being obedient to God in their professional work except through obedience to the visible institution or to some proximate doctrinal formulation of the faith. Since they know this to be the death of scholarship and all it stands for, they put the two in compartments

isolated from each other. This is an intellectual schizophrenia that is the academic equivalent of "business is business."

The scholar may be responsible in his professional work and usually is, for scholarship in this country is in good health. The Christian may be responsible in his personal and parish life, and certainly the Church does not lack for dedicated laymen. Yet, these meet only peripherally by the accident of the two existing in the same person. This is certainly not responsible Christian scholarship. The task, then, is to see if the two responsibilities can be related to each other in a way that preserves the integrity of each.

The thesis offered here is that the responsibility to the evidence and the responsibility to God are the same for the scholar, provided the proper conditions are met. Thus, the command of God for the scholar would be obedience in his scholarship according to the essential structure of scholarship. This means that the *essential* structure of scholarship must be determined. This, then, is a sketch of the nature of scholarship as it would appear to be in its responsibility both to the evidence and to the faith.

The subject matter of scholarship is the whole of God's creation. The primary datum in the understanding of Christian scholarship is that God created all things and is sovereign over all creation and all history. How this sovereignty is manifested is a subject for legitimate dispute. That it exists cannot be disputed by the Christian. The proper work of scholarship is response to this reality, being faithful to it and not to the desires of the scholar for it. The work of scholarship is the penetration, description, analysis and responsive understanding of a selected segment of creation. There are fundamental flaws in scholarship that is not defined in this way.

Secular scholarship (that which is carried on without reference to God) falsely defines the nature of man, and thus falsely limits the evidence. Secular scholarship at its best (which is good enough to deserve the title of one of man's great creations) recognizes the limits of man's work, but they are physical limits, defined by time, strength and other physical factors. Basically, the position centers around the word "objectivity," the assumption that the evidence is available completely to the exercise of the proper techniques. In its most extreme form (e.g. positivism) this means defining the evidence as that which is available to a given set of techniques.

The flaw in non-responsible scholarship is the use of scholarship as a tool. The first flaw in non-responsible Christian scholarship is this same use of scholarship as a tool. The characteristic flaw in non-responsible Christian scholarship (an obvious contradiction in terms) is the uncritical

extension of apprehension. If positivism errs in premature limitation of data and method, mysticism errs in a sentimental supernaturalism that blurs the distinctions and definitions that are the essence of scholarship.

Thus an emendation in the original definition is necessary. The subject matter of scholarship is the whole of God's creation, including man in it. The work of scholarship is responding to this created reality in responsible relation to it.

This responsible relation means being ever more sensitive to all of that reality and all dimensions of that reality. Thus, the object of scholarship is in part the perceiving subject. This takes scholarship in its fullest definition. The bulk of a scholar's work will still be taken up with the determination of the things that are, quite irrespective of who perceives them. Yet, if scholarship were to be defined as this alone, there would be no attention to the aspect of relation or the dimension of meaning which is of the substance of the scholarly task.

This conception of the subject matter and the work ought to have a profound effect on the scholar's attitude toward his material. It lays on him not only the right but the duty to love his material and his work. The command to love his neighbor as himself is not simply an ethical but a metaphysical obligation, for his "neighbor" (his material conceived as a living reality, not inert object) is so closely involved with himself that violence done to the material is violence to himself. Violence to the material lessens his own humanity.

Full consciousness of the involvement of the perceiving self in the material of creation means it is essential for the scholar to define the self more adequately and more nearly completely than he has done before. This definition he can make only on the basis of his faith and only in fully creative relation to his colleagues in other fields. Out of his faith the Christian determines the relevant doctrines: man is created in the image of God, has sinned and fallen, and is redeemed.

As created and not creator, he is limited and finite. These limits are not simply physical limits that can be overcome but are limits in the nature of man himself. Thus there will always be an element of the unknown, the uncomprehended. As created in the image of God, man has the power to make and to understand. He is not simply an element in the natural order of creation, but was placed in the garden to have dominion over it. This authority means he is not only a creature but a creature with the particular capacity to understand.

As sinner, as fallen, he is faced with the inevitability of corruption

and distortion. His dominion is not absolute, for his sin reduces him to the partial status of a victim. It is part of his nature that he should attempt to distort his work to be an instrument of his passions and his own selfish desires. As redeemed, he can know the purpose of scholarship in the divine economy. He can have the key, not to greater wisdom, but to greater compassion in his work. And he may be able to derive from his faith not only attitudes but insights that can order his work in meaningful relation to the whole.

Out of this love for the evidence and awareness of his own nature should come a different attitude toward the method of scholarship. Instead of the slavish idolatry for the method which characterizes uncritical objectivity, there should be the most scrupulous and precise respect for the method as the means for relating himself to reality and as a limiting fence against inevitable perversion, a fence built up by generations of mutual responsibility toward the material.

Out of this there could come a stronger sense of the whole body of scholarship and the responsibility of any part of this whole. If the first necessity of scholarship is an accurate definition of the nature of the self, no scholar can get along without the work of his colleagues in other fields. The work of the psychologist is essential to all other fields; but the psychologist cannot achieve full definition of the self without the others; without understanding the act of creation in the arts, the sense of abstract order in mathematics, the involvement of the person in society and history, etc. Similarly the other fields interact with each other to make a coherent and meaningful whole.

A full analysis of responsible Christian scholarship would have to include a discussion of the scholar's responsibility for the transmission and the uses of his scholarship. Briefly put, this would appear to involve extending the love and respect for created reality, including all men in it. Thus, the scholar's duty as teacher and citizen is to help lead other men into an equally responsible relation to reality. It must free and enlighten, not bind and darken. He has a similar responsibility to see that his work is not mishandled, for to distort the social order through the misuse of scholarship is to corrupt man and prevent scholarship.

Yet full exploration of this subject must wait on a full definition of scholarly responsibility. This article has attempted to state the basic elements of responsibility common to all areas of scholarship. These general principles cannot, however, become fully fleshed out until the nature of responsibility in the particular disciplines is defined. A scholar is not a

scholar in the abstract. He is a historian, or a sociologist, or a critic, or a physicist. Only as he knows what responsible history or physics is, can he know the full nature of responsible scholarship.

II

This contemporary concern for the defining of Christian responsibility in academic life had its origin at many points and its expression through many channels. The most widespread influence was, perhaps, through the numerous books published in the 1940's. Of these, the most influential were probably Sir Walter Moberley's *The Crisis in the University*, Arnold Nash's *The University and the Modern World*, and John Coleman's *The Task of the Christian in the University*. There were others, both in this country and abroad, that are too numerous to mention here,¹ but which built up a valuable literature embodying a serious Christian critique of the university.

At the same time (and sometimes earlier) a number of agencies and foundations were at work in the field. One of the oldest is the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, which began by granting fellowships for graduate study to young, committed Christians, and has held these men and women in a close fellowship, which over the years has significantly fertilized the work of the persons participating in the work and provided much of the leadership for the whole movement.

The Hazen Foundation has contributed through more individual projects than can be detailed here. The best known and most influential of these was "the Hazen pamphlets," as they are known, under the general title, "Religious Perspectives in College Teaching." In this an important scholar in each of the major academic disciplines explored the relation between that discipline and religion. These have continued to exert a strong effect on the thinking of the movement.

The Danforth Foundation has also worked in a variety of ways. Its most important project has been the "Danforth seminars" where each summer a group of twenty-five teachers meet with two or three recognized leaders of the movement in a seminar lasting two or three weeks. Some of these have been general seminars for teachers in all disciplines and they consider the relation between Christianity and higher education generally. Others have concentrated on specific disciplines.

The Faculty Christian Fellowship began as a concentration of a number

¹ A complete bibliography and historical survey can be found in J. Edward Dirks, *A Guide to the Faculty Christian Fellowship*, published by FCF, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York.

of interests. The literature published in the years following the war encouraged the formation of informal faculty groups on local campuses all over the country. In some states these groups drew together in loose association, with short annual meetings.

At the same time there were stirrings among a number of agencies connected with the life of the church. The United Student Christian Council conducted serious conversations to explore the issue of faculty work. The Committee on Religion in Higher Education of the National Y.M. and Y.W.C.A. contributed to this kind of discussion as well as holding conferences and providing study material. The churches, both through their own boards of education and through the National Council of Churches, began to be increasingly concerned and to work more actively.

Thus, in 1952-53, the Faculty Christian Fellowship was formed out of consultation between teachers and relevant officials. It neither replaces nor competes with any of the other agencies but is intended to serve as a focus for membership, "a definable community of Christian concern in the academic world." It is not a formal or rigid organization but is "a community of people in the academic life whose concern is the relation of Christian faith to the vocation and discipline of the teacher and scholar."

By its place as a related movement in the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches it is intended to be the voice of college and university teachers in the work of the institutional church. It works among the teachers in two principal ways. First, it encourages and promotes the general discussion of the issues that gave rise to the movement. This means the formation of groups on local campuses, promoting or co-operating with various conferences, publishing a periodic *Bulletin*, etc. It has, further, instituted a program of research in the relation between Christianity and the academic disciplines. Initially, this program is being carried on by small groups of carefully selected scholars in each discipline who work by consultation and correspondence on the problems that face them in their own discipline.

Although the present writer is connected with the Faculty Christian Fellowship, what has been said above represents simply one man's attempt to define the principles that motivate this study. It is not an official document, since the Faculty Christian Fellowship is not committed to any one position in this general discussion. The three articles that follow give an indication of the kind of thinking that is going on in the different research committees.

2. *The Christian and History Teaching*

PAUL L. WARD

I

ANYONE WHO TEACHES HISTORY and also claims to be a Christian may find it difficult to clarify the relation between his two roles. He can uncover quite as much in print, probably, about the nature of history and its relation to Christian faith, as about any other single academic field. But he finds almost no agreement at all on these matters among his historian colleagues. Even the discussions recently initiated within a small working group set up by the Faculty Christian Fellowship have uncovered no clear prospect of such agreement.

The reason for this, most of us would say, is intimately related to the working historian's stubborn preference for particulars rather than general statements. To take a key example, historians do agree pretty much on the books which best illustrate good history, but at the same time they have virtually no accepted definition of "good history" in general terms. They feel no need for any, I gather. They are quite content that their several explanations of why Thucydides was a great historian are all somewhat different—as if such interpretations were just as well left various, so long as the essential data referred to are recognizably the same.

This is the way historians behave. Their talk may be slightly less bold, and their students continue to read elaborate explanations of why history must be rewritten in every generation, explanations that apologetically cover only an arbitrary few of the actually acceptable variations in interpretations of identical data. I myself should prefer to put it plainly that in academic history the particulars are counted on to convey meanings more solidly than the attached more general interpretations do. But this would be, perhaps, too bold a flouting of the rationalistic and "scientific" canons of Western thought. There are certainly some honest historians within the profession who are ready to join with academicians in related fields in saying, almost indignantly, that history should *not* be so unconcerned about its general statements.

There is a whole issue of logic involved in this. Ever since Aristotle,

PAUL L. WARD, A.M., Ph.D., is Professor of History and Head of the Department of History at Carnegie Institute of Technology, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

after all, Western scholars have found reason to believe that the general proposition is more valuable than the single instance and—as very much part of the same belief—that deduction, operating with general propositions, is the standard pattern for trustworthy thought. It follows that history, whenever proceeding soundly, must be operating from basic assumptions; and the relationship between history and Christian faith is therefore the relationship between these basic assumptions and the general statements of Christian theology. Since the historian is inarticulate about the “basic principles” of history—the argument runs ahead on its own momentum—the expert for him to turn to on this is the theologian who has reflected soberly on history.

Though there is certainly some force in this argument, it is at every point an unsatisfactory account of the relationship of academic history, as currently studied and taught, to Christian truth. The conclusion just now arrived at is obviously not wholly acceptable to professional historians, who have experienced the peculiar cogency of historical thinking and tend to take pride in its integrity. More importantly, logical analysis today under the influence of Wittgenstein recognizes at long last that deduction is only one of many modes of sound thinking and also that it is a mistake to assume, before listening closely, that another's process of thought ought to fit any preconceived standards. The basic assumptions of history, whatever they are, may be of a very different order from those that theologians or philosophers are used to dealing with. This is in simple fact probable enough, for the quantities of books about history produced so far by men in these latter camps have yielded remarkably little to help earnest and bewildered professional historians.

It is not at all surprising that most academic historians of today who have discussed the relation of history to Christian faith consider the problem best dealt with by Professor Herbert Butterfield in his small volume called *Christianity and History* (1949). For Professor Butterfield is a professional historian at Cambridge University, and, from the first chapter on, this book offers a defense of the distinctive character and value of academic history. “The cry for an interpretation of the human drama,” Mr. Butterfield comments by the way, “is a cry not for technical history but for something more like ‘prophecy.’”¹ It is consistent with this comment that the professional historians in England and America, with remarkable unanimity, have judged Arnold Toynbee's great *Study of History* as, in effect, “magnificent, but not history.” That many-volumed work is certainly about history, but

¹ Butterfield, H., *Christianity and History*, Charles Scribner's Sons, (1949) 1950, p. 24.

in its concern for interpretation and general summation, for the recurrences in human affairs, it manages to escape the effective control of the historian's disciplines.

This does not mean, of course, that technical history has nothing to say about the history with which theologians are concerned, the drama of God's actions from the Creation to the Day of Judgment. Mr. Butterfield's book is largely devoted to presenting the hints as to such larger matters that he has as a Christian gathered during his study as a historian. These are of a quality to impress some of us as valuable supports to theological understanding, but he carefully presents them as only hints and suggestions. The corollary is clear that his Christian belief offers him no more than similar hints and suggestions, at most, for his historian's work of determining more mundane particulars. His knowledge of history, Mr. Butterfield judges, could never of itself bring him to Christian faith. Christian faith could never, we gather, of itself yield any knowledge within academic history.

This position may be understood, I suggest, as radically unmedieval, stemming from that great change in modes of thought which was among other things the Renaissance in Italy. The ability to follow in integrity the logic of one specialized form of vision right alongside another (as the humanist alongside the practical), or even superimposed upon another (as in a single painting), involved—as I understand it—a new mode of harmony in independence, of mutual support solely through suggestions and overtones. The separation of Church and State, wherever it works well, seems a particularly clear example of this type of relation and itself derives historically from the Renaissance period.

If this mode of relation resembles that actually existing between academic history and Christian pursuits, it is worth noting further that mature history, showing historical perspective, first appeared in the sixteenth century and was ushered in by Lorenzo Valla and Erasmus. The great Greek historians were by contrast, were they not, one-time performers, each a different combination of qualities brought out by his occasion, rather than exponents of an established form of vision? The development of academic history, as far as I understand it from my own study, has been continuous from about A.D. 1500 and, except perhaps for the period of its temporary decline during the Enlightenment, seems to have supported Christian development rather than opposed it. All these very general considerations add up to the suggestion that any attempt now to have theology dictate either style or content of the historian's vision would be

to return to medieval assumptions and quite possibly to risk the death of history as we know it. Not that I mean to suggest that there is any prospect of such a return: the new scholasticism that has now and then seemed a threat to the independence of history and the other humanities has arisen out of the prestige of natural science, and in secularist circles.

II

Everything that I have said so far has been to support one main suggestion: that our difficulty today in making clear the relation between academic history and Christian faith lies in the special character of the historian's method of operation, his form of vision. It is time now to speak more directly about this. Only one central feature has been mentioned so far: the historian's characteristic preference for making particulars do the work of general statement. One other, the historian's insistence on using common-sense argument and nontechnical language, has been well examined in Mr. Patrick Gardiner's small volume, *The Nature of Historical Explanation*. Now, does a method, or a way of seeing things, that stresses particulars and holds to common sense seem of merely trivial interest from the angle of Christian faith?

I think it fair to answer first, that to the self-conscious historian these two features of his method seem effortful forms of self-discipline. It would be easier for him to lapse now and again into general statement, unsupported by particulars, and easier also to borrow or develop a technical jargon. But the superabundance of human facts before his eyes, no two of which are exactly alike, forces him to simplify, and also to use the least objectionable stereotypes he knows, from the very start of his work, if only in order to see without confusion. The door is open to partiality, to bias—necessarily. The prejudices and beliefs which the human material characteristically evokes in him are so strong, he also knows, that he needs a maximum of discipline in the initial step of observation and constantly thereafter. So the rule that he is to focus on and note down, not the stereotype or belief, but the particulars which spring to his eyes because of it, means that he formulates what elements of pattern he sees in the shape of stubbornly individual details. He is guarding above all against the danger of not doing justice to the unique individuality of the human matters before him—and at the same time, by holding to the language of common-sense discourse he develops and retains a sense of being in personal relation with them, and so of being constrained to judge responsibly.

This sense of personal relation, of valuing highly the uniqueness of

the person, groups, or concerns being studied, has shown up so very plainly in the behavior of successful historians that there can be little questioning that it has some intimate connection with the essentials for good work. But the two rules just mentioned hardly seem sufficient to produce it. Without something like the Christian imperatives to love the man he deals with and to remain soberly aware of his own sinfulness, the historian would get nowhere with these rules, I am inclined to think. All the same, the profession's so-often-repeated experience of the distinctly better observation that comes from following these rules, and from following them in just that sort of spirit, seems in actual practice to be quite enough to produce and maintain the historian's equivalent of the Christian imperatives—habitual insistence on sympathetic understanding, and on the maximum of disciplinary self-criticism.

The novice should have the lesson driven home by experience with honors paper or doctoral dissertation. Ideally it is driven home both by the resulting bursts of illumination that carry him beyond initial misconceptions, and also by his teachers' care that he not get away with being indifferent either to the human qualities of his subjects or to his own liability to err in judgments. The Christian may from his angle be quite correct that this posture is essentially Christian, and also Christian in historical origin. Yet the maintenance of it within the profession may be necessarily autonomous.

The significance and character of the historian's method may stand out more clearly if we look at it as constituting a special form of vision. The historian prefers particulars, and tries to make his statements about particular and unique events do the work of general statements. At the same time, the implicit general propositions, the actual facts of recurrences in human affairs, remain very nearly as important for the quality of his observation and presentation as they might be if more openly accented.² The historian, we may say, works on the assumption that particularity and regularity are, at least in his field, never to be safely divorced, and so, at his best, he never presents a particular without responsible attention to the general propositions that it carries and suggests as overtones. The uniqueness of the event is firmly in the foreground, but the significance of the event, for all that is regular and recurrent, is implicitly developed with whatever art he is capable of. This, with the preference for holding

² See Gardiner, P., *The Nature of Historical Explanation*, Oxford University Press, 1952. A more general survey of historical method, and equally able and up-to-date, is H.-I. Marrou, *De la connaissance historique*, Paris, 1954.

to common-sense language, amounts therefore to a distinct way of seeing what is, one way of reducing the perceivable to manageable order. In the process of working to this goal, the historian presumably has to act just like the scientist in alternating between empirical observation and logical reflection, between the two poles of particularity and regularity. But he ends up with a form of vision or statement at the former pole, and one that is his own.

But not exclusively his own, of course. Defined in this way, this is the form of vision in which much of art has traditionally presented what it has had to say on the issues of moment; it is also, and quite exactly, the form of statement that Anglo-American law insists upon for its rules—the precedents of case law—as contrasted with Continental law. If any Christian theologian or logician is still inclined to ask how the selected particular can possibly be thought to be as valuable as the fully refined general statement, the Christian historian may point simply to what lies at the center of our common belief. The Christian creeds, and all the accumulated volumes of systematic theology, are secondary to the unique fact of Jesus Christ, to the unique events of his life and teachings, which were so consistently cast first in the mold of common sense. The former, the theology needed for logical and comparative thinking, is found embodied in the latter, and with care it can be “unpacked out of” the latter. The mode of particularity can therefore be considered a logical alternative to the scientific mode which emphasizes uniformities, and each, I am suggesting, represents one aspect or element of what is. The method of history is one of at least several carefully developed ways of looking at complex reality with this accent on particularity.

Let me illustrate. There has been all too much tendency in our time to suppose that the simple alternatives posed by Adam Smith, which developed in the nineteenth century as the great contest over Socialism, are the timeless and essential alternatives for any interrelating of government and business in developed society. Now economists are beginning to see that this may very soon be a dead issue, the policies associated with Keynesian analysis having made those alternatives increasingly irrelevant to practical decisions, while the battles to be waged shift over onto rather different fronts.

History as an academic discipline has had the function, in relation to this contest, of maintaining some discriminating awareness of the shifts and changes in it over the decades since the 1770's, and of regarding this movement of thought as a unique and human thing rather than as a product of fundamental laws of economic and political behavior. Historians may not

have done this as well as they might. In their textbooks they have tended to sound quite uncritical of the concept of "mercantilism," which was Adam Smith's own reading back of his alternatives—arbitrarily, I feel—upon the preceding centuries of Europe's economic growth. And one of the most powerfully thought-out criticisms of this concept of "mercantilism" did in fact come from the distinguished economist Joseph Schumpeter.³ But Schumpeter's work here was a model of historical thinking, and historians can feel that the tool of historical method is, if anything, slowly becoming sharper and better able to stand up against insistent presuppositions of today.⁴

III

The historian's vision has more than the value of helping us to see change where we should like to see permanence. Let me instance now the hackneyed argument between free will and determinism. This is primarily, I should insist, a philosopher's question, one which comes into the historian's ken as part of that rather miscellaneous collection of logical reflections on history which is called "the philosophy of history." The writer of history may refer to the matter for rhetorical effect, to underline the significance of something, in the course of his narrative or description. But it hardly comes otherwise into his work, simply because it is so largely precluded by his distinctive form of vision. Each act that he examines he must consider, and then present, from both of the two angles: first, the angle of the preceding factors that (if he has been able to complete his investigation) all but completely explain what then happened; and second, the angle of the actor, and of what that man felt and knew, allowing full weight to whatever sense of freedom of decision was then felt. If the historian has developed any skill at all, the chances are that he is skillful at seeing and presenting, as if both equally present, the logically opposed factors of determinism and free will. His mode of particularity is suited to this, and it is his job to do full justice to each of the two types of determination, in their interplay and also in their separate integrities, as best he may. His work otherwise does not read like mature and perceptive history.

A recent monograph by Mr. Isaiah Berlin, entitled *Historical Inevitability*, reminds us of the strong grounds we have for accepting this coexistence of determinism and free will as a characteristic of the human world in which we live. It also illustrates, I feel, how difficult this coexistence is to grasp and make intelligible within the vision of rationalist philosophy.

³ Schumpeter, J. A., *Business Cycles*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939, I, 233-234.

⁴ See Hexter, J. H., "The Historian and His Day," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXIX (1954), 219-233.

The historian's work does gain in depth and sensitivity if he has himself wrestled with this problem in logical reflection and then remains aware of it as he does his historical study. But his own form of vision has the distinctive value for human understanding of allowing an important feature of reality to come out clearly. And this is only one example. History, as a form of vision, seems often to have special value for the Christian's attempt to see himself and others more clearly.

But the matter just mentioned is also an illustration of the value, within the historian's form of vision, of two or more distinct—and all but conflicting—interpretations of the same particular. The particular, large or small, is in the foreground, firmly under the spotlight. To examine it from the angle of determinism, and then from the angle of free will, is of real value to the historian only if these interpretations are in fact so different that different features stand out, giving him a binocular perspective, so to speak, in which the particular gains human depth and solidity. To revert to an earlier example, he is happy to have several distinctly different interpretations of Thucydides' greatness, since each will help to bring out more of richness and human meaning of this unique "event," Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War. Each interpretation simply has to have been built up out of the available data with all the solid discipline of which the historian developing it is capable.

But the separate development of different interpretations, by different historians at different times, seems to me less significant as a characteristic of history than the similar tendency of each historian by himself to shift from one interpretation on to others, and back and forth between them, like a stepping back and forth in front of a statue to see it better. It is common enough for a historian to feel uncomfortable, to feel in fact that he is being attacked somewhat unfairly, when a critic with a scientific turn of mind seizes aggressively upon an incidental interpretation advanced only for its suggestiveness in rounding out a picture. He is, he must admit, responsible for seeing that each such is firmly grounded and properly qualified. But he has to advance so many such, and this is simply not one that has seemed worth spending much time on. The critic who understands history is so much more satisfactory to deal with: he criticizes each interpretation with due regard for the amount of weight it actually carries as part of the total account.

IV

We have come far enough into the subject, at last, to face more directly the question: is there, or should there be, a Christian interpretation of

history for academic history? I have offered some reasons for thinking it inappropriate for Christian belief to dictate by way of basic assumptions the elements of pattern to be used. The chief reason is simply that the form of thought or vision employed by academic history is to a significant extent distinctively its own, and one that the Christian must thoroughly respect. I can now put it that Christian belief, by deduction or otherwise, properly does suggest a great wealth of specific interpretations that should be of help in any historian's work. I say "any" historian, for it is rather hard to see in what sense this should be more true for a devout Christian than for an agnostic or even for a Western-educated Confucian.

To suppose that there should be one and only one Christian interpretation of an event like the French Revolution is quite plainly to go against the character of historical discipline, at least as I have described this. To suppose that one or several Christian interpretations or judgments on a smaller scale—to do with, for example, the capture of the Bastille—should have a special claim on the Christian historian, just because they are Christian, is hardly very different. What I have said implies that any interpretation should, in good work, be held lightly, tentatively, subject to frequent interchanges with others that are substantially different in order to see if the meaning and character of the particular event will come out better. This is, of course, very much the way in which Professor Butterfield in his book presents his interpretations, the ones which he has found both fit the facts best and accord with Christian teachings—they are hints and suggestions only.

So also all reasons for strong belief on grounds of faith must be deliberately shelved until after working hours, or looked at only for what they may possibly suggest indirectly as new questions. The earnest Christian can and probably will feel that his body of belief and religious experience is the most valuable source he has of insights, pertinent questions, ways of understanding human behavior—of all that I have been referring to as "interpretations." But if he is fully meeting the standards of academic history, can his work be recognized as "Christian" by anything more than the higher incidence in it of interpretations that sound Christian? And in our post-medieval culture even this is unlikely, since he is much more likely to use words that convey no hint of such an origin.

But I have been suggesting that there is an equally profound and active connection between historical study and Christian faith through the method the historian uses, the very form of his vision. This is a large subject, of course: what I have said about it has not attempted, for one

thing, any explanation for the degrees of certainty that historians do satisfyingly achieve at different levels of their work. I have discussed hardly more than the preference for particulars and "common-sense language," whereas there is, of course, a wide range of practical things that historians do and also teach to their students. The following passage in Professor E. Harris Harbison's recent book reminds us of some:

[Erasmus] was constantly concerned to ask who was writing a particular document, whom he was addressing, what he was really saying, and what were the surrounding circumstances that help explain what he said. "I consider this the principal key to understanding scriptural difficulties, to inquire into what the person who speaks is thinking about," he wrote.⁵

When students now are taught these same things, and other things like them, as the method of history, are they not very close to the tradition of Christian scholarship?

Consider for a moment the passage just quoted. Beginning students often assume that a critical attitude toward the evidence means accepting one document as reliable and rejecting the next as unreliable, as a simple matter of white or black. Scholars who have not learned the value of the historian's style of vision are on occasion impatient to settle almost as bluntly the questions raised about a source. But it is a feature of good historical procedure to pursue the inquiry at real length and almost lovingly, if the document has importance, and then to be once again aware, through reminders, of its "personality" and limitations whenever thereafter using data from it. Surely this is very close to saying that, in some important respects at least, the better the historical method, the more it has in common with the spirit of the Christian life.

This raises a final question, however. Are we possibly tending to set up the norm for good history simply out of that which has been done most nearly according to Christian standards? What about Chinese history a millennium ago, or history in Russia under Stalin? The answer can be frankly from the standpoint of academic history. A simple chronicle of events, or an account of the past that paints it simply to suit current demands, neither of these is the same as developed professional history. For this has its settled ways of testing data, of fitting them together, and of securing satisfactory confirmation of the resulting constructs.

The more searching point is that a logical definition of history, of historical study, taken by itself may be inadequate. The study of history

⁵ Harbison, E. H., *The Christian Scholar in the Age of the Reformation*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956, p. 92.

is like the practice of democracy, in that while there have been other instances here and there, one successful and influential instance stands out as a continuous development in modern times, influenced by and influencing its Western environment. What Professor Harbison says of Erasmus could not be said of any Christian writer of history in the Middle Ages, but it could be said of countless history-writers since 1500. Academic history as we know it seems essentially derived from its background in Western Christendom.

MEDITATION: THE CHRISTIAN GOD

Pray then like this: Our Father who art in heaven . . . (Matt. 6:9, RSV)

Our.

Not the God of Greeks, Jews, barbarians, only.

Not the God of intellectuals, the wealthy, the moral, only.

Not the God of cult members, only.

But—OUR God!

Of all men . . . Free and slaves . . . Jews and Gentiles . . . Righteous and sinners . . . Pleasant and unpleasant.

Is anything needed beyond this one word, "Our," to establish the universality of God, and the universal brotherhood of his sons? Is not this assumed whenever a Christian offers this prayer? Men stand self-condemned before it who pray thus and deny that God is the God of heathen, or say that some men are not brethren.

A great privilege *and* responsibility!

Father.

God is not only universal—he has a special character. Essentially, is he just? Jealous? Dreadful? One to be avoided?

A God who cares—a father-like God! Not an abstract principle or a fearsome God, but a God concerned with all men, all people—a living God!

Think of the God of Sinai: wrathful, jealous, unpredictable, concerned with only one people—and then think of OUR FATHER.

What meanings has the word "father" when applied to God? Just? Does he make demands on his children? Is his chief work with his children that of satisfying their whims? His fatherhood at the point of our deepest well-being. Consider what this includes in terms of spiritual discipline, seeking, self-giving.

In heaven.

Is this a place? What makes heaven heaven? *When* are we "in heaven"?

—J. CALVIN KEENE (see page 526).

3. On Being a Christian Sociologist

WILLIAM L. KOLB

I

UNLESS THE TITLE of this paper is viewed simply as a declaration of aspiration, it can only be regarded by sociologist and Christian alike as the expression of an attitude of arrogance. This statement is not meant as the pious disclaimer of Christian virtue, but rather as a confession that the author does not yet know what it means to be a Christian sociologist. It can be said easily and with truth that to be a Christian sociologist is to attempt to be the best sociologist one is capable of being, to treat the subject matter of one's investigation with concern, and to respect those whom one teaches. Yet this is not enough. There remains the perplexing problem of the relationship between Christian belief and commitment on the one hand, and dedication to objective scientific method and theory on the other.

In the past and continuing in the present there have been two major answers to this problem. Neither has really solved it. The first of these answers subordinates sociology to a revealed theology or to the dogmatic pronouncements of an authoritatively established institution. The second denies the existence of any intimate and enduring relationship between commitment to Christ and the *image of man* which one accepts as a sociologist.

The first answer has the virtue of recognizing the necessity of relating one's Christian commitment and one's sociological image of man. Yet it fails to solve the problem because it refuses to sociology its freedom as an autonomous discipline dedicated to the search for truth by the use of a method which always refers itself to empirically observable data. The second answer, while more easily accepted by most Christian sociologists, also fails, because the denial of a relationship between Christianity and the sociological picture of man would deprive Christ of his lordship over all created reality.

The compulsion to turn to one or the other of these two solutions, however, is based on two kinds of misunderstanding, the one theological, the other sociological. The first misunderstanding is the belief that com-

WILLIAM L. KOLB, M.A., Ph.D., is Head of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Professor of Sociology, at Newcomb College, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.

mitment to Christ as Lord is also commitment to a revealed theology or to a divinely established institution which can determine one's thought. There *are* intellectual implications in the acceptance of Christ as Lord, but these implications have been worked out in various forms by men thinking; they have not been disclosed by revelation nor infallibly pronounced by the Christian community. Thus while all of these theological traditions are deserving of respect, they are not to be accepted as absolute; and in the last analysis each Christian is responsible for his own intellectual beliefs and is accountable for them only to God. The Christian sociologist is related to the accepted theology of his religious community in the same way that he is related to the accepted beliefs of his professional community. He respects both these sets of beliefs as what they are, namely fallible products of human thought and observation. Thus while he is forced to relate his sociology to his faith, it is a matter of relating the beliefs of one community to those of another, and of being independently critical of both. It is not a matter of subordinating sociological theory to a system of authoritarian dogma.

The second misunderstanding, sociological in character, is centered around the use of the empirical method in sociology. It is in the nature of science that its criterion of truth is that of verifiability in terms of empirically observable data. There is no necessary implication here that this is the only method of finding truth or that truth found by such method is the only truth there is. But there is the full recognition in such a statement that for science to be science and sociology to be sociology, people who call themselves sociologists and scientists must employ that method. Nothing is to be gained by trying to change the definition of sociology or of science, for this would mean only that something other than what presently constitutes sociology is being talked about.

Such an understanding of the nature of science and sociology does not mean, however, that there is no relationship between the non-empirically testable propositions of Christian theology and the empirically testable generalizations of sociology. Sociology, like all other empirically oriented disciplines, is and has to be grounded in some complex of non-empirical assumptions and presuppositions. These assumptions and presuppositions vary from one school of sociological thought to another, and have a great deal to do with the particular theoretical frames of reference and fundamental hypotheses of each school. Many sociologists do not recognize the existence of such assumptions; those that do will generally regard them as being metaphysical. Yet it is legitimate—because of their close relation-

ship with the ultimate value concerns of the individual scientist, and because they involve commitment for action as well as cognitive belief—to call them theological.

To recognize the existence of such theological foundations and presuppositions of science is not to deny the importance of the empirical method. Regardless of the presuppositions from which a theoretical model or basic hypothesis is drawn, a scientist must be willing to test such a model or hypothesis by deriving from it hypotheses which are susceptible to empirical test. Thus in a purely intellectual sense such presuppositions can be regarded as heuristic starting points which can be and have been modified as the empirically oriented models and hypotheses to which they give rise are empirically tested.

Yet there are at least two reasons why these theological presuppositions cannot really be regarded as purely heuristic devices. First, there is the social and psychological fact that for the people who hold them they are genuine beliefs of deep seriousness, not heuristic starting points. Second, it is almost certain that the finite mind of man can never reduce the complexity of the real world to the point where the scientific method will be able fully to resolve the differences in orientation to the empirical world that arise from variation in assumptions and presuppositions. The scientist, to be a scientist, must continue the use of the empirical method as the test of his models and hypotheses; but he must recognize the ultimate limits of such testing insofar as all empirical models and hypotheses, and indeed science itself, must have their roots in the theological commitments of the scientist. While some scientists may believe that in the long run one empirical model and one fundamental hypothesis drawn from a particular set of assumptions can be empirically verified, and hence be used to verify the presuppositions themselves, this belief itself so far as present evidence is concerned is non-empirical, and in turn depends upon the non-empirical assumption that empirically verifiable knowledge is truly knowledge.

If what has been said is true, then the Christian sociologist is faced with the responsibility of relating his Christian theology to the theological presuppositions of his discipline; and of discovering what consequences for basic theoretical models and hypotheses ensue when Christian presuppositions and assumptions are substituted for those he has consciously or unconsciously been employing as a member of his professional community. In carrying out this task he is free, under his absolute responsibility to Christ, to select and criticize the version of Christian theology which he will place in a state of tension with his presuppositions and assumptions as

a sociologist. Further, he is free under his responsibility to his profession, which is certainly also part of his responsibility to Christ, to submit the theoretical models and fundamental hypotheses derived from his Christian presuppositions and assumptions to the competition of ideas in the scientific community and to testing by the use of scientific method. In this manner it is possible to resolve the problem of being a Christian sociologist without either subordinating sociology to revealed dogma or denying the existence of an important relationship between theology and sociology.

II

The occasions for examining the relationships between the Christian faith and the assumptions and presuppositions of sociology will vary from sociologist to sociologist, and from activity to activity for the particular sociologist. For the social theorist such an examination may come to be one of his primary and constant concerns. The present sociology research group of the Faculty Christian Fellowship, for example, is planning on devoting a considerable period of time to the critical examination of sociological theory in light of the Christian faith. For the research specialist, on the other hand, there is the task of considering the implications of one's Christian commitment for the assumptions which one is using in studying a single area of human activity. It is highly dubious, for example, whether the Christian family sociologist would accept some of the glib assumptions concerning the need for rationality in mate selection that are current in his field, if he attempted to relate the insights of his faith to the assumptions of his discipline.

For most Christian sociologists, however, there will be one important common occasion for examining the relationship between Christianity and sociology. It is that of teaching introductory sociology to the American undergraduate. Here the problem of what it means to be a Christian sociologist becomes particularly pressing, for in the introductory classroom the instructor is attempting to transmit the heritage of sociology to people who, if they use it at all, will use it as part of their orientation to the everyday tasks and demands of life. The very vulnerability of his students and the absence of criticism by his professional colleagues may tempt him either to act as a Christian propagandist or to ignore the problem of the relationship between his Faith and his teaching. If both these temptations are resisted, however, it may well be that the occasion of teaching the introductory course is the most challenging of any he may face.

It is not the task of the Christian sociologist in the introductory class

to preach the gospel or to teach theology. Rather it is his responsibility to present the principles of sociology in as compelling and as honest a manner as he can. In this his responsibility does not differ from that of his colleagues. It is part of that responsibility, however, to bear witness to the Faith in its relevance to the subject matter of the course. In so doing he will not censor the findings of his profession on which consensus has been reached, or, for that matter, those findings on which consensus has not been reached. Where sociologists agree, the Christian sociologist will inform his students that this is the case and indicate to them wherein the agreement lies. Where they disagree, he will so inform his students, and describe for them the essentials of the disagreement.

He will, however, point out to the students where the use of Christian presuppositions and assumptions will lead to different findings than those upon which there is at present either agreement or disagreement. This is his task not only as a Christian, but as a sociologist, for his relationship to his profession as well as that to his Faith is that of a free man. He is obligated as a sociologist to indicate to his students his own disagreements and agreements with his colleagues and to explain the sources of his point of view. He will, as a Christian sociologist, find agreement and disagreement, not only in examining the empirical evidence, but also in examining the assumptions and presuppositions that lie behind the theoretical models and fundamental hypotheses which have been used to order the empirical data. In this he will not differ from his positivist, naturalist, or instrumentalist colleagues; and like them he will insist on his professional right and duty to engage in such agreement and disagreement. He will resist the pressure for conformity which insists that the theology of naturalism or positivism is the true faith of the scientist, and will therefore insist on contrasting the ordering of empirical data which flows from his presuppositions and assumptions with that which follows from other non-empirical commitments.

Since the task of relating sociology to theology in the manner outlined has so recently been undertaken, it would not be possible, even if space permitted, to describe the relevance of Christian assumptions and presuppositions to the introductory course in each of its major emphases. We simply do not yet know what the results of examining the presuppositions and assumptions of sociology in light of the Christian faith will be, since the examination itself has barely begun. It is possible, however, to suggest tentatively what these results would be in a few major areas. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to an examination of this problem in the areas of *general personality theory* and *the sociology of religion*.

III

Early in the introductory course, the Christian instructor, like all sociology instructors, finds himself dealing with the relationship of personality to society, culture, and the biological organism. If he is a good sociologist he will teach his students that there is consensus in the profession concerning the general nature of personality and its determination by the interaction of social, cultural, and biological elements. In general the biological elements are viewed as offering the foundation upon which personality is built and as creating a set of highly generalized needs for food, clothing, shelter, sex, etc., which any society and its culture must meet. Beyond these limits set by the nature of the biological organism, the culture and the society may shape the personality in any direction. Personality integration is viewed as a function of the success of the culture and the society in meeting biological needs and in elaborating a system of culturally defined means and ends in which the latter are consistently achieved by the use of the former.

There are at least three aspects of this generalized theory of personality with which the Christian sociologist must take issue. First, and most important, there is the non-empirical assumption that the actions of the person are totally determined. Throughout sociological writing it is apparent that there is the shared belief that the person cannot act other than the way he does, given the conditions of his existence. In some of the more sophisticated writing, there is the suggestion that such concepts as "freedom" and "responsibility" be abandoned or given new meanings compatible with the assumption of determinism.

Second, and closely related to the assumption of determinism, there is the reductionist assumption that personality is totally determined by the interaction of social, cultural, and biological elements. There is little or no conception of the personality as a dynamic system in its own right, a system with its own laws and self-determining characteristics, that can only be understood by studying it at its own level of emergence. In those cases where sociologists have treated personality as such a system, they have tended to postulate consistency as the end of its striving, so that the same end result is achieved.

Third, there is the belief that personality, apart from universal biological needs and the universal need for consistency, is purely a historical product. If the culture meets biological needs and is consistent internally so that statuses and roles interlock with one another in a compatible fashion,

and if the process of socialization is carried out successfully, the personality itself will be adjusted and integrated.

Now the quarrel of the Christian sociologist with these fundamental assumptions and hypotheses is not based purely on the difference between his non-empirical assumptions and those of his colleagues. It is possible to assemble considerable empirical evidence to indicate that there are universal *psychological* characteristics of personality and that the personality is a dynamic system in its own right. Yet these two aspects of the disagreement take on a very different appearance when they are considered in the light of the disagreement concerning determinism and freedom. Since the Christian believes that God created man with free will, it follows for him that one of the universal aspects of personality is this dimension of freedom. Because he also believes that man is created as well as creator, he recognizes that the social, cultural, and biological conditions under which man becomes man limit man's freedom. Thus a second universal characteristic of personality is that its freedom is limited by the universal conditions of its emergence. Thus for the Christian the conception of man as universally free and yet universally conditioned emerges. Within that conception it is recognized that the tension between this universal freedom and universal conditioning exists within the historical particularities of unique societies.

The case is similar with regard to the conception of the self as a dynamic system in its own right. Just as the assumption of freedom results in regarding man as *universally* free and *universally* conditioned, so also it results in regarding man as existing in a state of *conditioned freedom*. If the self is free it cannot be reduced to the elements which condition it. This conception of the self as a dynamic system, because of its assumption of freedom, differs from that found in some psychological theories, because it denies psychological determinism as well as sociological determinism. The concept of the conditioned will applies to the psychological conditions of existence as well as to others.

The results of this criticism of orthodox sociological assumptions and hypotheses concerning human personality are that the Christian sociologist places as much stress upon man the creator of culture as he does on man the creature of culture, that he sees man in his conditioned freedom standing outside society as well as within it, and finally, that he sees man's ultimate loyalty and concern always transcending and sometimes opposing the values and beliefs of the culture and society of which he is a part. These results can be seen in a specific context as we turn to the second of the areas of the introductory course to be examined, the sociology of religion.

IV

Because of the stress on sociologicistic determinism and historical relativism in sociology, religion tends to be treated in introductory texts only as a part of the culture of a society which is a going concern. The person learns it through the process of socialization as he does any other part of culture; and because he learns it, it is able to perform certain functions for him and for the society. In order to maintain itself as a going concern a society must possess a degree of integration, i.e., its members must possess a feeling of solidarity and cohesion and they must be motivated to pursue the appropriate ends through the appropriate means and to give up inappropriate ends and means. Similarly a personality must be integrated in order to maintain itself as a going concern, through being motivated to pursue a system of hierarchically ordered ends. Both modes of integration are made possible through the internalization within the personalities of the members of the society of a shared set of ultimate ends or values.

These values, however, cannot be rationally shown to be valid; nor can they simply be rationalizations of the interests of the actors, for they must control such subordinate, empirically orientated interests. Further, in order adequately to motivate the actors they must appear to *them* to be valid, and must be capable of eliciting attitudes of awe, reverence, and respect. It is religion that performs the function of validating the ultimate values of a society in this manner. Religion consists of a system of beliefs and rites through which the members of the society orient themselves to a non-empirical realm. This non-empirical realm commands attitudes of awe and respect. The system of beliefs has as one of its functions the anchoring of the ultimate value system in the non-empirical realm; and the system of rites reaffirms the shared attitudes of awe, reverence, and respect taken toward the non-empirical realm which through the belief system includes the ultimate goals and values.

This theory has been criticized for ignoring the conflicts which can be caused when different segments of the population of a society hold different religious beliefs. But while this criticism indirectly points to some of the problems which the functional theory of religion faces, it is really peripheral in that it does not and cannot challenge the fundamental hypothesis of the non-empirical foundation of moral consensus, nor does it challenge the relativistic, reductionist, and deterministic assumptions of the theory.

The criticism which the Christian sociologist will direct at the functional

theory of religion is different. Logically there are two paths of criticism open to him. He can begin with the assumptions and presuppositions of the Christian faith and attempt to develop an empirically relevant theory of religion, which can then be contrasted with the functional theory of religion. Or he can begin by examining the implications of the functional theory of religion for the deterministic, reductionist, and relativistic frame of reference within which it is stated, to see whether or not there are some different assumptions involved which can then be compared with the assumptions of the Judaic-Christian tradition. In this paper we shall follow the latter course.

To begin, he will note that the functional theory of religion implies that personality adjustment, integration, and conformity are more than the simple result of cultural consistency and adequacy in the realm of means and ends. There is according to this theory an inherent reason in the self for the existence of a tendency to pursue ends that are incompatible with the integration of the self and of society, that must be offset by subordinating such a tendency to the controls exercised by the shared religion and system of ultimate values. There is implicitly present the assumption that the self is a dynamic system in its own right which possesses as a universal characteristic this tendency toward disruptive behavior. Indeed, in the more sophisticated formulation of the functional theory of religion this assumption is explicit, either in the form that the biological nature of man has much more specific attributes than those usually attributed to it in introductory texts, or in the form that the universal social and cultural conditions of the emergence of personality create unlimited wants and will be disruptive unless they are normatively regulated.

Here we must distinguish between the universal condition of man as being a social and cultural creature and the usual but not universal condition of man as living in an organized society governed by an integrated culture. There are two types of situations in which the former conditions would be present but not the latter. The first of these types would be the situation in which the normative order has broken down and has not yet been re-established. The second is the situation in which at the dawn of history man is in the process of becoming human. In both these situations the existence of language and other modes of culture, and the resulting transcendence of man over biological nature so that he is aware of the past, present, and future, of death, of the activities of other men not in his immediate presence, and of unlimited possibilities of want satisfaction, result in a state of war of all against all.

Not only the maintenance of social order but its very creation at the human level requires establishment of moral consensus around a core of ultimate values. Organized human society and integrated culture do not and cannot come into existence until and unless human beings as psychological entities create such a consensus. In this sense, while we do not deny the social and cultural nature of man, it becomes apparent that society as an organized unity is a morally created phenomenon, rather than morality being societally created. It is not enough to say that unless societies create systems of shared values they will not survive. Rather it must be said that as human beings become human, or as they face a shattered society, they must in symbolically mediated social interaction with one another create a shared morality or they cannot create a society.

But what, then, is the origin of ultimate value systems? It is true enough, but not sufficient, to say that they are created by human personalities in social interaction with one another. The functionalist theory of values denies that they can be rationally created and validated, or that they are mere rationalizations of an order created by struggles for power; but in current writing, either in introductory texts or elsewhere, there is considerable reluctance among the functionalists to give an alternative explanation. The following theory, however, is presented in the earlier writings of some functionalists, and was in turn derived from some of their predecessors.

Emergent man as a self-aware creature is aware of the contingency of his own existence, aware of evil and death. He is aware of the natural dangers to himself, and of the disjointedness of his own existence, as he relates himself to others in terms of both his natural affections and the imperiousness of his own desires. This awareness is present in even a highly integrated society; how much keener it must be in the anomic situations of the dawn of humanity or the collapse of a society. Out of this awareness the human being is motivated to relate himself to something which transcends nature and history, and which both cognitively and affectively will give him a meaningful definition of the world, his place in it, and his relationship to other men. Ultimate values, as well as cognitive conceptions of the world and affective orientation to it, are bound up in this relationship and have their source and being in it. It is out of this orientation to a non-empirical realm of reality that it is possible to create a social order; hence, in this sense society must be called a religious phenomenon rather than religion a societal one.

Up to this point we have been dealing with empirically testable impli-

cations of the functional theory of religion as it appears today in most introductory texts. The assumptions of the writers of such texts are naturalistic and deterministic, and in general the assumptions of those who have developed the functional theory of religion in its more sophisticated form are naturalistic and deterministic. In their own minds these men who began with naturalistic and deterministic premises—which originally led to theories of religion and values in which the former was expected ultimately to disappear and the latter to be either rationally determined or psychologically determined in the form of rationalization—have been forced by the weight of the empirical evidence to develop the functional theory of religion. There is of course still much disagreement concerning the empirical validity of the functional theory of religion; but there is the belief among those who hold the theory that it is created and supported by the nature of the empirical data. The stubbornness of fact, or what appears to be fact in the eyes of these observers, has forced the functional theorist away from the theories which were logically and psychologically easily derivable from his naturalistic and deterministic assumptions.

Now the Christian sociologist can point out that there is much greater psychological and perhaps logical congruence between the empirical observations of the functional theory of religion and the assumptions of freedom and of the existence of God in the Judaic-Christian tradition. This is not to say that the truth of the functional theory of religion as it is empirically tested will prove the truth of the Judaic-Christian tradition and faith. It is possible to know that man must worship and to assume that there is nothing to worship; or to know that man needs to relate himself to the non-empirical world and yet to assume that the nature of that relationship is totally determined beyond any freedom on the part of man. The reason that it is possible to hold the functional theory of religion and yet to make these assumptions is that what is being discussed is an "actual" relationship between empirical and non-empirical variables, the existence of which (because it involves the latter) cannot itself be empirically demonstrated. It may not seem logically or psychologically congruent to hold both the functional theory of religion and the naturalistic and deterministic assumptions; but is not impossible to do so.

Yet it is legitimate for the Christian sociologist to point out to his class that, had Judaic-Christian assumptions been employed in sociology, the functional theory of religion would have been more easily derivable; and that, given the theory, it does make more real (although unprovable) sense to assume that if man must worship there is a God to worship and that

his relationship to this God is free. He can further point out that both the kind of existential situation in which man needs to relate himself to God, and the functional theorist's fundamental assumption that man's life on earth is important (so that even religion is to be examined in terms of its historical consequences), are logically and psychologically compatible only with the Judaic-Christian tradition. The other world religions do not picture the situation of man in this manner, nor do they assume the reality and importance of history. Hence the functional theory of religion is psychologically and logically more congruent with the Judaic-Christian tradition than it is with the philosophies of naturalism and determinism or the metaphysics of the other world religions.

V

Thus in at least two areas of the introductory course—the area of general personality theory and that of the functional theory of religion—it is possible to show the relevance of the Christian faith to the sociological image of man. In the first area it was indicated that, as opposed to the naturalistic, deterministic, reductionist, and completely relativistic personality model of orthodox theory, the Christian sociologist would ask for the examination of the theory and research merits of a model in which personality is viewed as existing in conditioned freedom as a dynamic system in its own right and possessing certain basic universal psychological attributes and needs. In the second area it was shown that at least one group of scholars starting from naturalistic and deterministic assumptions have, through their grappling with the evidence, arrived at a theory of religion which is much more congruent with the assumptions of the Christian tradition and of the Jewish tradition to which this is so closely related.

The present writer believes that it is in making analyses of this kind that the Christian sociologist can bear witness to his Faith and yet at the same time remain true to the demands of his profession. It is his obligation to place the assumptions and the insights of his Faith in a constant state of tension with his assumptions and theories as a sociologist. He must do this in his theoretical work, in his specialty, and perhaps above all in his relationships to his students as he attempts to introduce them to the principles of his discipline.

4. Are There Religious Perspectives in the Physical Sciences?

IAN G. BARBOUR

THERE HAS BEEN MUCH important recent discussion of the relation of the Christian faith to the academic disciplines. Interest has centered in part on the vocation of the Christian teacher and the relation of his religious commitment to scholarly objectivity. Other aspects of the discussion have started from the various fields of study, the role of their concepts, presuppositions, and value judgments, and their relation to the teacher's *Weltanschauung*. It has been clear that the issue is not that of "introducing" religious ideas *into* course material or interfering with the conclusions of research, but rather of thinking through the interpretive aspects and implications of the subject matter itself, as well as the assumptions about man and the world which we unconsciously communicate in our teaching.

The physical sciences are at one extreme of the academic spectrum in that the interpretive aspects of science involve a minimum of wider implications, so that the world view of the teacher seems to have little relevance to his subject. Religion has no contribution to make to the technical ability of the researcher or to the structure of particular scientific theories, for detailed investigation of physical phenomena can proceed without asking philosophical questions. Clearly there is no distinctively Christian law of physics. The aspects of reality which the physical sciences select for study raise relatively few religious problems, or even difficulties such as those which evolution presents to some biology students. Nevertheless there are points at which there may be interaction between the Christian faith of the scientist and his professional work. In this article the *methods* and *presuppositions* of science are the primary focus; in the sequel¹ the implications of the *content* of science, particularly the revolutions of twentieth-century physics, such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the theory of relativity, are discussed.

¹ Barbour, I., "On the Contribution of Physics to Theology," *Religious Education*, Sept.-Oct., 1957 (in press).

IAN G. BARBOUR, B.D., Ph.D., is Chairman of the Department of Religion and Associate Professor of Physics at Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.

I. THE LIFE OF THE SCIENTIST

There are at first a number of ways in which the religious perspective of the scientist will affect *practical* aspects of his work. (1) Many of the applications of science involve *moral factors*, concerning which science as such is neutral. The engineer has always had to make decisions requiring some understanding of society and human values, but recent events have brought home the ethical involvement of even the researcher. The social responsibility felt by many physicists was reflected in their concern about the uses of atomic energy, and more recently in the debate over the Strontium-90 hazard. Granted that all the uses of "pure" research cannot be foreseen, and that accidental factors often influence the particular field in which he works, the responsibility for how he spends his time nevertheless falls on the scientist as an individual.

(2) *The science teacher* will find his attitude to students in the classroom and his personal relationships influenced by his religious orientation. In advising his majors he will be concerned with more than the training of technicians and will help his students find opportunities to think through their philosophy of life. (A number of engineering schools have emphasized the importance of courses in the humanities and social sciences, and M.I.T. has just established a Department of Philosophy.) Closer relationship with colleagues and better communication between departments will result from a concern for the unity of knowledge and a vision of the university as a community of persons; scientists have been prone to intellectual isolation.

(3) Activity *outside the classroom* or laboratory will always be a major channel for religious concern. Any acceptance of community responsibility, participation in the life of the church, or positive influence on the campus ethos will be the more significant because of the respect with which our culture regards the scientist.

One could multiply examples of this sort. But note that in each case the scientist is facing special forms of problems arising in *all* fields. The issue of social responsibility, for example, arises in all vocations, and the attitudes involved do not depend on the particular type of situation in which the scientist confronts ethical decision. Nor do his religious beliefs on such questions make any direct contribution to the technical side of his work, important as they are to his *life* as a scientist. Are there points at which his religious understanding and his scientific work are related not on the practical but on the conceptual level? Are there relationships between faith and scholarship peculiar to the natural sciences?

II. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE

1. *Christianity and the Rise of Modern Science*

We start by inquiring about the general presuppositions of all scientific activity and their relation to man's view of ultimate reality. The Judeo-Christian understanding of the natural world was historically an important factor in the rise of science. Whitehead points out that the Greek view of the *rationality* of the universe was an important root of modern science, but lacked any concern for *observation* of the world. The sense of an ordered structure which yet must be investigated empirically was a product of "the medieval insistence on the rationality of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher."² John Baillie³ stresses the importance of the biblical idea that the order of nature is *contingent* upon the divine will. Whereas Aristotle had taken a deductive approach, asking how any detail of nature *ought* to be ordered, and Socrates maintained that each specific character of the world flows by necessity from God's nature, in the Christian understanding God did not have to create the world the way he did, and therefore we can understand nature only by observing it humbly. Protestantism in particular emphasized the receptive rather than the prescriptive function of reason.

It should be noted, however, that such views of the rationality and orderliness of the universe never operated as formal presuppositions related logically to the structure of science, though they affected men's *attitudes* and motivations in ways which made scientific interest possible. More important is the question of man's attitude toward nature seen as God's *creation* and hence fundamentally good, rather than evil or unreal, or the seat of dangerous and inscrutable forces. Biblical realism takes a positive view of the natural order and is concerned about events in history because God acts in *this* world (in contrast to the ascetic otherworldly note found in some portions of later Christian thought.) There is ample documentation⁴ for the Christian commitment of most of the "founding fathers" of modern physics, although the increasingly deistic view of God's relation to a mechanistic universe paved the way for Laplace's conclusion that God, having no place *within* scientific explanation, is "an unnecessary hypothesis." Yet, despite the subsequent retarding influence of the church's defense of biblical literalism, Christianity does appear to have made a significant contribution to attitudes congenial to scientific interest.

² Whitehead, A. N., *Science and the Modern World*, Mentor Edition, 1948, p. 13.

³ Baillie, J., *Natural Science and the Spiritual Life*, Oxford University Press, 1951, Part III.

⁴ e.g., Taylor, H. S., in Fairchild, H., *Religious Perspectives in College Teaching*, Ronald, 1952.

2. *The Character of the Presuppositions of Science*

In considering science *today*, a number of authors have asserted that the presuppositions which make scientific research possible can *only* be supported within a framework of monotheism. Thus Smethurst writes: "For what ground can we have for believing in the universality of order, regularity, consistency and rationality in the universe, unless we believe the material world to be the work of a single rational divine Mind?"⁵ The Oxford mathematician Coulson concludes a detailed discussion of such presuppositions: "Science is only possible in a community where certain religious views are widely held."⁶ These assertions seem to me questionable on several grounds. Many outstanding contemporary scientists affirm entirely secular philosophies, nor has science withered in avowedly atheistic Russia. The reply might be made that such scientists are dependent on continuing Hebrew-Christian factors of Western civilization in which alone, of all world cultures, science actually developed. But this is precisely our contention: that once started, science can continue under various world views.

Furthermore, when we examine these so-called presuppositions we find they are of *two kinds*. (a) Some "metaphysical assumptions" are not basic to the scientific enterprise itself and should be considered to be theoretical concepts of a philosophical nature. For example, the Newtonian conception of absolute space and time,⁷ though not subject to direct verification and for centuries considered to be axiomatic, was, like all scientific concepts, enmeshed in theoretical structures from which could be obtained deductions subject to experimental investigation, as occurred early in this century. Such presuppositions are inevitable, but should be held as tentatively and critically as possible. I would include in this category some "postulates" often viewed as essential to science, such as the constancy and the uniformity of physical laws. Surely the possible variation of basic laws with time or between different parts of the universe is a question for empirical research and theoretical evaluation (e.g. a cosmological theory developed by Jordan postulates the time-dependence of certain "fundamental constants" of physics).

(b) Another group of presuppositions, such as the presence of order, regularity, rationality, and perhaps simplicity, are more basic; but the average scientist today sees the success of science in the past as adequate

⁵ Smethurst, A. F., *Modern Science and Christian Beliefs*, Abingdon Press, 1957, p. 13.

⁶ Coulson, C. A., *Science and Christian Belief*, University of North Carolina, 1955, p. 61.

⁷ See Burt, E. A., *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, Doubleday & Company, 1954, Ch. 7.

vindication of any such assumptions. Nor are these formal propositions to which assent must be given prior to scientific work; H. K. Schilling⁸ has called them "postsuppositions" emerging explicitly only *after* man's spontaneous response of curiosity and interest in natural phenomena.

3. *Scientific Presuppositions and World Views*

But this does not mean that science is completely independent of man's world view. To be sure, the scientist in his daily work need not concern himself about metaphysics, for he limits his inquiry to functional relations among phenomena and operates with a sort of unsophisticated realism. But his philosophical perspective, though not providing formal presuppositions, will affect his attitudes and motivations. There are some world views which would not nourish science in the future, as they have not in the past. Such is the case for most of the *religions* of mankind, in which nature is either worshiped as divine, divided among polytheistic forces, or seen as intrinsically evil or illusory (as in Buddhism and Hinduism). Again, science would find little encouragement in extreme *existentialism*, which sees the world as an unstructured chaos, man's reason as very limited, and the impersonal aspects of the universe as an insignificant stage for the drama of personal existence. (Conversely, it is difficult to see how either a Christian or a scientist could share Sartre's sense of existing in a meaningless and irrational universe). Baillie and others have asserted that if science turns completely *positivistic*, it will lose any speculative interest and become purely utilitarian; but one wonders whether the positivist's interest in the relations between phenomena would not drive him further and provide adequate stimulus for the theoretician.

World views can also undermine science *indirectly* by their effect on the *cultural matrix* in which it must always exist. Certain conceptions of freedom and of the nature of truth seem to be prerequisite to science (note, for example, the fate of genetics during a recent stage of Russian history). The values of a culture, moreover, will determine what questions are considered meaningful and important to ask, and thus will influence the direction of scientific progress.

Such considerations suggest that science can flourish only in conjunction with certain world views, but that there are perspectives other than Christianity which support the attitudes that science requires. Naturalistic humanism, for example, may be an inadequate philosophy on other grounds, but does provide an explicit basis for science.

⁸ Schilling, H. K., mimeographed report on 1956 Danforth seminar at Pennsylvania State University.

4. *The Attitudes Required by Science*

The science teacher need feel no hesitancy in instilling the attitudes which aid scientific work, for though they hardly constitute a summary of religious ethics, they do include a number of virtues emphasized in the Christian tradition. Among these are *honesty* and *integrity*, violation of which is regarded with great seriousness within the scientific community; the scientist takes responsibility for the truth of what he publishes. *Co-operation* and *universalism* are characteristic, whether in the collaborative work of a research team or mutual discussion transcending national barriers. Again, *freedom* and *responsibility* are important; the scientist treasures the right of decision as to the fields in which he shall work, and protests being a mere instrument of someone else's policy, or a "morally irresponsible stooge in a science factory," as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has put it.

Open-mindedness and *tentativeness* have at times in the past been violated in both science and religion. Nineteenth-century science believed it had most of the answers and thought there was little left to discover; part of the reluctance of physicists to accept relativity was unwillingness to modify traditional patterns. Likewise the church was slow to accept historical research concerning the Bible, but today in theology as in science there is greater realization that our formulations are never final. Perhaps suspended judgment, if carried too far, becomes skeptical doubt hindering religious faith; there are decisions—whom to marry, or what social injustices to protest—in which one can't wait until all possible evidence is in. Yet in research one must also act on the basis of probable hypotheses, without waiting for the complete certainty one might like. So even at this point the "virtues" of the scientist are not in conflict with Christian values. We have tried to view these problems as they arise *in science*; a related topic would consider the use of scientific methods *in religion* and the question of an "empirical theology."

III. THE METHODS OF SCIENCE

As we turn to consider the methods of science, it may appear that we are still far from the classroom. But I believe that some consideration of the methods, history, and philosophical implications of physics are not *an addition to* but an important *part of* the teaching of physics, and also an area about which the Christian teacher should be concerned. The extent to which such factors are mentioned will vary with the objectives of the course. In general-education chemistry, attention to what Conant has called

"the strategy and tactics of science"⁹ will be more explicit than in Advanced Mechanics, yet the science major also needs to take a more critical attitude toward the nature of scientific knowledge rather than memorizing formulae on the authority of the text! Scientific work, particularly for the engineer or applied scientist, does not need to consider methodology; certainly it never follows any "scientific method" with five steps like the "do-it-yourself" instructions! Yet developments within physics have shown the importance of distinguishing observation from interpretation and of examining assumptions; and the student's ability to place science within a larger philosophy of life depends on a clear understanding of its nature.

1. *The Role of Scientific Constructs*

How are scientific theories related to the world they purport to describe? In our teaching we continue to answer implicitly with the sort of literalism that characterized nineteenth-century physics, and we do not notice the fact because most of our lectures are on classical physics. The twentieth-century has seen a revolution in the physicist's understanding of *what a theory is*. Scientific theories are constructs by which we correlate a complex series of laboratory experiences.¹⁰ We may explain that the atom is not literally a group of electrons whirling like ping-pong balls; but we need to help our students understand that not just visualizable "models" like the Bohr atom, but all theories, even representation by wave equations, are *symbolic mental constructs* by which we try to organize and predict patterns of experimental relationship.

Often we imply that science is just precise observation of "the facts" and that scientific theories are literal descriptions. We neglect not only the continual interaction of hypothesis and experiment, but the creative activity of the human mind in "inventing" or "constructing" new categories and conceptual schemes. It is not alone in the work of the genius that imagination and nonlogical thought play a part in scientific discovery.¹¹ The very concepts in terms of which theories are formulated—mass and entropy and nuclear parity—are not given to us ready-made by nature, but are highly abstract mental constructions which make possible more coherent and comprehensive patterns of relationship. Toulmin¹² uses the analogy of a *map* which helps us find our way around a range of phenomena provided we know how it is meant to be used—i.e. the "rules of correspondence" by which its symbols are related to observations.

⁹ Conant, J. B., *On Understanding Science*, Yale University Press, 1947.

¹⁰ e.g., Margenau, H., *The Nature of Physical Reality*, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1950.

¹¹ See Beveridge, *The Art of Scientific Investigation*, London: William Heinemann, 1950.

¹² Toulmin, S., *The Philosophy of Science*, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1953.

A theory is seldom shown to be "true" or "false," but only more (or less) *useful, simple, and fruitful*; usually an earlier theory can be amended to fit further data, but eventually becomes so complex (e.g. the Ptolemaic epicycles, or the properties required of the ether) that an alternative is preferred because of its simplicity. This has led some authors to the positivist view that a theory is *only* a useful but arbitrary mental device and is not concerned about any "real world." But this view seems to me to neglect the difference between mathematics, which is free to make its own rules, and physics, which may often use alternative models but must correlate them with sense data determined by, though not directly revealing, the structure of the external world. Moreover many sciences like geology and engineering have been but little affected by developments in twentieth-century physics, and use concepts so directly related to observable phenomena that a "realistic" approach is almost inevitable. Even in physics "operationalism" suggests a middle ground which preserves reference to empirical situations, yet realizes that our concepts involve interpretation.

Perhaps in understanding the interpretive nature of scientific knowledge, the student will find it easier to accept the symbolic character of the language of theology and the interaction of *religious experience* and *interpretation*. Both science and religion start from an unreflective and spontaneous response to areas of human experience, and tend to use language literally and "realistically" (though in both we often give the student only second-hand experience, replacing direct contact with nature by textbook description, and replacing worship by philosophical argument). But in both areas it is important to recognize the symbolic character of the concepts used to interpret experience (noting for example, how the idea of the Holy Spirit developed not from trinitarian speculation but from the attempt of the early church to understand and interpret its own experience).

2. Science as "Public" and "Objective"

In understanding science we need to ask in what sense it is "public." This may refer to science as a *social enterprise*. It is an amazing process of refinement by which the very human activity that goes on in the lab—broken test-tubes, blind alleys, personal motivations, discussions with colleagues—becomes a sentence in a journal: "The reaction was found to be aided by the addition of 3% NaOH." This implies also "*public verification*," results repeatable by other competent observers (not by "anyone"—what percentage of the population could "verify" relativity if their life depended on it?). We need to convey in our teaching the role of the

"scientific community" with its institutions, channels of communication, norms and ideals, playing in the life of science a part as important as the religious community does for religion. "Public" refers finally to observations *in the public world*, although there may be circumstances in which introspection could provide the data for scientific analysis. Science is sometimes spoken of as "*impersonal*," which does not mean that science is independent of the activity of the human mind or the attitudes of the scientist; but it may point to the attempt to standardize observations and to minimize individual idiosyncrasies and preferences.

In what sense can science be described as *objective*? The word implies data as "given," not created by the experimenter or dependent on his wishes but confronting him as an "external" object, from which he is to some extent detached. However, the common idea of objectivity as simple observation neglects the inevitability of interpretation; what questions to ask and concepts to employ are affected by the assumptions of the observer. Moreover, while the *influence of the observer* on the experiment can sometimes be allowed for, modern physics has shown that it is often crucial (e.g. the position of the observer in relativity, or his disturbing influence reflected in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). Note, however, that this "involvement of the observer" refers to the effects of the *measuring process* (which might be automatically controlled with results recorded by camera): the scientist is able to confine his involvement *as a person* to limited areas of his personality.

IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE

1. *Methodological Restrictions*

Because the influence of science as method has been comparable to the transformation brought about by science as technology, and because the teacher is often cast indirectly or directly as an interpreter of science, the Christian professor will perhaps be especially concerned to think through both the strengths and the weaknesses of his field. What we have said above suggests certain limitations imposed not from without but by the nature of scientific activity.

(a) *Science is necessarily selective.* We have seen that each discipline develops its own symbolic language in terms of which it replaces the total complex situation by a model which represents those variables in which it is interested (an elephant on a river bank becomes a mass with a coefficient of friction, a Beethoven symphony becomes a set of molecular vibrations). The scientist will have a preference for variables which can be measured

and treated by the developed formalisms of mathematics, though it seems an unjustified restriction to say that science should always try to be quantitative. It will also tend to limit itself to sense data because of the "public" criterion we have discussed. The more abstractive a scientific field can be, the more exact its results but the further from the total *Gestalten* of ordinary life, and the less adequately it can convey the immediacy, concreteness, and variety of human experience with all its levels of meaning. In dealing with repeatable events subject to generalization, it also deliberately neglects the individual and the unique.

(b) *Science cannot deal with personal involvement.* We have suggested that science is public and objective; but there are many areas of life where such detachment is not possible. In the social sciences the observer cannot stand outside the social and historical process he is studying, and in the humanities the attitude of the detached spectator yields only limited understanding. Personal involvement, participation and response are the essence of art, literature, and religion, as well as human love. Religion may be "objective" in the sense that it is a response to a reality not subject to private preferences, confronting a God who makes demands; but involvement of the whole person, rather than detached speculation, is a prerequisite of relationship to the God of whom the Bible speaks. Ultimate faith in any object—whether God or nation or human ideal—involves the meaning of my existence and my total orientation. Again, though science can investigate significantly many aspects of human behavior, the full meaning of human selfhood can never be studied externally. The necessarily impersonal character of science may in part be responsible for the "depersonalizing impact" of technical education as some students have experienced it.

(c) There are *other limitations* which are obvious to most scientists but are often not recognized by popular conceptions of science as infallible. The *tentative* and dynamic character of science and the presence of rival hypotheses are seldom conveyed by our teaching. Furthermore science does not attempt to make the sort of *totality judgments* and evaluative interpretations necessary in reaching a philosophy of life.

2. *Science and Naturalism*

Is a science course likely to have a naturalistic or antireligious impact on the student? A physics course is inevitably a "success story," and a good teacher should be enthusiastic about his subject. But there is a tendency in any field to identify a partial perspective with total reality. The scientist

considers man as a biochemical mechanism and can easily give the impression that he believes him to be nothing more. Against such *reductionism* or interpreting higher levels of organization in terms of lower (psychology is just biology, biology is essentially chemistry, etc.), I would want to uphold the validity of various levels of explanation—related to each other, forming a continuous spectrum without “gaps,” and yet each having distinctive concepts and categories which do not deny ontological status to the categories of other levels.

It needs to be emphasized that naturalism is a philosophical view and *not a conclusion of science*. A mechanistic view of the universe, though as old as Epicurus and Democritus, did seem to gain support from the fruitfulness of the concepts of early physics,¹³ which were fully exploited in the philosophies of Laplace, Hobbes, and Comte. Despite the critique of materialism by philosophers, and the changed view of the twentieth-century physics toward classical mechanism, mechanistic naturalism is often identified today as a “scientific view.” Now science does, as we have seen, limit itself to certain aspects of experience capable of both naturalistic and positivistic interpretations; but because of its self-limitation it clearly cannot itself decide whether its description of reality is complete. (The point is delightfully illustrated in Eddington’s parable about the scientist studying deep-sea life by means of a net of ropes on a two-inch mesh; after repeated expeditions he concluded that there are no fish smaller than two inches in the sea!) Conversation between a naturalist and a theist should be seen as an argument not between science and theology, but between two ultimate commitments. In the light of the idolatry of science in our culture, the critique of views claiming to be “scientific” is an important responsibility of the thoughtful scientist.

V. THE RELATION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

We have suggested that in dealing with the methods and presuppositions of science the religious faith of the scientist has considerable indirect relevance. Other considerations are raised in the sequel¹⁴ to this article, where specific theories are discussed; implications of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the theory of relativity, the entropy problem, and the debate among cosmologists about creation, are examined, but in general the religious significance of these developments does not appear to be great. What is the relation, then, between science and religion?

¹³ See, for example, Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science*, The Macmillan Company, 1929, p. 213ff.

¹⁴ See note 1, p. 513.

1. *The Complementarity of Science and Religion*

The aspects of reality which the physical sciences select for study are, in general, those about whose detailed structures religion has nothing to say. On this view, no *conflict* is possible, and the historical "conflicts" have been due either to attempts of the church to prescribe scientific conclusions, or of science to make unwarranted interpretive statements (both processes occurred in the debate over evolution, which some churches repudiated and which some scientists saw as showing "that man is just an animal"). Science abstracts one type of variable from the wide spectrum and rich variety of human experience, which includes the holy, the beautiful, and the moral. One and the same flower or sunset may be described within different frames of reference by the poet or artist and the botanist or meteorologist.

Even within physics, alternative categories of explanation for the same phenomena sometimes appear necessary. Niels Bohr coined the phrase "*complementarity*" to refer to the necessity of using both wave and particle representations for light. Here there is nothing "contradictory" about the two models or sets of constructs if one gives up the demand for intuitible models, and both aspects are included in the quantum mechanical representation. Thus despite the desirability of unity, alternative constructs may be necessary to do justice to the total situation.

Between different fields it may be even more necessary to use several *frames of reference* or modes of description to avoid reductionism and to include different types of human experience adequately. Asking different sets of questions, one will receive different sorts of answers, none of which is all-inclusive. The man who says, "love is not real because one cannot weigh it" is mixing two frames of reference; "love" is not a useful concept in the same contexts in which weighing is a useful operation. If you ask, "Why did that man climb the mountain?" the physiologist's mechanical explanation in terms of metabolic and muscular factors does not preclude the psychologist's teleological analysis of the lure of the peak. In analogous manner science and religion, asking different types of questions and referring to differing aspects of experience, provide complementary modes of description of reality.

2. *Science as a Christian Vocation*

Despite the relatively slight influence at the conceptual level, there is interaction between these areas of the life of a person who is both a scientist and a Christian. In what sense can he look on science as a Christian vocation? How can his activity as scientist fit into his world view? Certainly part of

its justification is the contribution of science to *human welfare*, and its use as an instrument of good will. This is inadequate as a total goal, however, from the viewpoint of science, which stagnates if it becomes purely utilitarian; from the religious viewpoint it runs the danger of absolutizing technical progress into an ultimate goal and identifying man's most important needs as material ones. Yet within both frameworks, technical advance and the alleviation of human need and suffering are important motives.

Some commentators¹⁵ have seen as a primary motivation the realization that one is studying *God's handiwork*, much as Kepler spoke of "thinking God's thoughts after him," but today with realms of nature to appreciate far beyond previous generations. Here the world is seen as God's creation in which we participate to his glory. Other authors have spoken of reverence and humility, the religious quality of the astronomer's response to his work, or Einstein's sense of "cosmic mystery." Coulson¹⁶ speaks of science as "a definite religious activity, a revelation of God," and "one aspect of God's presence," a view which provides a religious basis for science, though not without dangers of nature-worship and pantheism, or of sentimentalizing a natural order which at times is harsh and cruel.

"*The search for truth*" is not an empty phrase and, when coupled with sensitivity to the world's needs, seems to me a valid motivation. Curiosity and sheer enjoyment of scientific activity—building a piece of apparatus that works or developing a theory that is "elegant"—are strong and justifiable motives in practice. All of these attitudes may operate in the scientist's own life and will be communicated in some measure to students.

¹⁵ e.g., Pollard, W., in *The Christian Scholar* 36, 110 (1953).

¹⁶ Coulson, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

Meditation on the Gospels

J. CALVIN KEENE

THE ART OF "MENTAL PRAYER," as the practice of meditation and contemplation used to be called, is largely a lost art. Once considered the highest form of Christian worship, it is now, among Protestants at least, almost unknown. Yet there is among us a hunger for forms of worship spiritually more meaningful than those which have come to be considered the normal ones. This need is clearly demonstrated by the widespread interest in cell groups and retreats, and the increasing demand for books on prayer and worship. The spiritual life has gone largely unrecognized, and is now beginning to cry out for recognition and attention.

Historically, meditation assumed various forms, but the central practice among Christians consisted in focusing the attention upon events in the life of Jesus. Imagination, thought, the affections, and finally the will, were all brought into intense use. The aim was to grow into the understanding and love of God and to find freedom from narrow self-love through the imaginative identification of oneself with Christ.

The meditations here presented are a modified form of the kind classically used. Scriptural passages form their ground; statements and questions follow which are intended to stir the mind and stimulate insight, not to add to factual knowledge. The purpose is a profound dedication of the imaginative and intuitive aspects of the personality for discovering the deepest meanings and significance in the passages chosen. Further, the meanings which the glimpsed insight may have for the life of the worshiper appear as a fruit of the insight, for new ways of knowing God, the world, and oneself must inevitably lead to forming decisions and developing concerns.

The methods for using these meditations may vary. Concerned individuals may use them in private devotions; prayer groups or cells may find them valuable for worship periods of fifteen minutes or more. College chapels and theological seminaries may find use for them occasionally. Churches, under professional or lay leadership, can use them with smaller

J. CALVIN KEENE, B.A., Ph.D., is Professor of The History and Philosophy of Religion at The School of Religion, Howard University, Washington, D. C., and Managing Editor of *The Journal of Religious Thought*.

groups of concerned people. They have been found to be a popular and a very meaningful preparation for the preaching service when distributed half an hour before the opening of the formal service, to be used while quiet music is played.

In general, silence needs to form the background of the effort, and a fairly extended period of time, certainly not less than ten minutes and, better, up to thirty minutes, is needed. Each person should receive a copy of the meditation, possibly in mimeographed form. The services for which the meditations appearing below were prepared are held once each week, as one of four weekly services. Quiet organ music is played while the worshipers are gathering. Each is handed a copy of the meditation for the day. The leader takes his seat in the front. Ten to fifteen minutes of complete silence then ensues, during which time each attender uses the materials supplied. It is advised that not every point raised be covered, but rather, that after the reading of the Scripture passage each person read down the sheet until he reaches a point that is striking and significant to him. There he halts and lets his mind play unhurriedly about that point, turning it over and over, allowing other ideas to gather about it, seeking for insight into the deep meanings and implications of the passage—in short, trying to grasp the inner meaning known by Jesus when he spoke the words. As one striking thought appears to be exhausted, the reading may continue, quietly and unhurriedly, to the next one that calls the attention. The benediction closes the service.

The heart of this kind of service needs to remain if the idea is to be well carried out, but modifications of setting can be made. For instance, the leader may wish to start with an invocation and close with a brief prayer of thanksgiving; or he may find it desirable to read aloud the Scripture passage of the meditation. Cell groups or smaller church groups may well use these meditations as the basis of a longer period of worship. At the close of a quarter or half hour of silent meditation, there may be sharing of the insights obtained and of the meanings sensed. Such a procedure unites the values of highly meaningful worship with a kind of "depth Bible study."

Using these meditations in our day is something of an adventure, just because the intent and procedure is so different from usual practices. Yet use over a period of five years with men whose background provided no preparation or sympathy for this approach has discovered a very genuine response, of a kind that encourages one to believe that many others who appear uninterested might respond equally well and find great value in this form of worship. Earnestness and a seeking spirit are the essentials.

MEDITATION: MY IDEALS AND LIFE PURPOSES

And the tempter came and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, command these stones to become loaves of bread." But he answered, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God.'"

Then the devil took him to the holy city, and set him on the pinnacle of the temple, and said to him, "If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down; for it is written, 'He will give his angels charge of you,' and 'On their hands they will bear you up, lest you strike your foot against a stone.'" Jesus said to him, "Again it is written, 'You shall not tempt the Lord your God.'"

Again, the devil took him to a very high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them; and he said to him, "All these I will give you, if you will fall down and worship me." Then Jesus said to him, "Begone, Satan! for it is written, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve.'" (Matt. 4:3-10, RSV)

1. *Command these stones to become loaves of bread.*

These temptations are not temptations to immorality. They are the kind of temptations which may occur to any dedicated person who is attempting to find the way his life should take.

Bread symbolizes the physical needs of life. Use your abilities for these; make them the goal of life. Is this as far as I have gone in facing my temptations? *Not by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God.*

Is there anything sinful in "bread" itself—the goods of life? What then is wrong in making "bread" the purpose of living? What is omitted that is far more important? What are the "words" that proceed from God?

2. *Throw yourself down . . . he will give his angels charge of you . . . they will bear you up.*

The temptation of being so sure I am right with God that God is required to look after me.

Because I live by God's "words," is he therefore committed to fit himself into my life and plans? *Must* he look after me, even to the point of miraculous interference? Is there any certainty that I will be protected from harm and suffering? Should I test him out? Does God exchange protection for obedience? *You shall not tempt the Lord your God.*

God is God. He is *never* obligated to man. Recall the parable which states that, having done all we can, we must still say we are unfaithful servants.

3. *All of these will I give you if you will fall down and worship me.*

The power temptation. Why does it always involve compromise (Satan-worship)? Why do men "worship Satan" today? Do they gain the world? Why not? In what form do I know this temptation?

You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve.

Not for "bread" alone; not in order to obtain God's protection.

Life that takes all the risks, but is lived in complete loyalty to God.

God alone is worshiped, and he alone served.

How did Jesus' life reflect this decision? Consider his step-by-step progress to the cross, in obedience every day to God's direction. Did he expect God to save him from death? Recall his words in Gethsemane.

MEDITATION: MEETING EVIL

Do not resist one who is evil . . . I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust. For if you love those who love you, what reward have you? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? And if you salute only your brethren, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect. (Matt. 5:39, 44-48, RSV)

Do not resist one who is evil.

Jesus is addressing his disciples and followers.

When attacked by one who is evil, what courses of conduct are open to us?

How do I respond when criticized, insulted, mistreated in any way?

When I retaliate in kind, what are some of the results?

Think of this in connection with the "Second Commandment." How did Jesus respond to evil? How did the great saints? Does this teaching arise from weakness or from strength?

Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you.

Instead of giving what one gets, how shall a disciple of Jesus meet attacks? Under what conditions and with what results have I ever done this?

So that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven.

What is the real basis for acting in this way? Recall the "First Commandment."

Does Jesus say there is any guarantee that nonresistance, love, and prayer will be successful in making friends of enemies or in escaping their attacks? Is this, then, a *method* for ending disputes?

What happened to Jesus himself?

Is this primarily advice for settling social problems, or is it primarily a necessary way of acting for one who truly loves God? Has it any application in personal, national, and international affairs? With what motives and what expectations might it there be used in light of the above?

You must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

What *kind* of perfection is here implied?

Is this a genuine possibility for us men? If so, in what sense?

Is it *my* ideal?

MEDITATION: GOD'S COMING KINGDOM

Thy kingdom come, thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven.

(Matt. 6:10, RSV)

1. *Thy kingdom come on earth*, among men—not, may I go to heaven when I die.

Here is the social ideal—all men gathered about their "king." This is the *true* Christian ideal.

What is God's kingdom—how identify it?

Think of truth, reality, goodness, love, brotherhood. What other "kingdoms" are there in which men live?

To what "kingdom" do I belong? Who or what is sovereign for me? If I belong to a "kingdom" other than that of God, what effect does this have upon the coming of his "kingdom"?

"The Kingdom of God is among you"—why does it not come in its fullness?

2. To pray for God's kingdom means that one is working for its appearance.
Not just an expression of general good will.

Where does the kingdom start for me?

Why cannot God simply superimpose his kingdom upon men? What then is needed for the kingdom to come, and when will it come?

How does this relate to the teaching, "Seek first his kingdom"?

If this is not our true desire, had we not better recognize how shallow our Christianity is, and stop praying for its coming?

3. Some necessities before one can enter the kingdom of God:

Stop harming—learn to do good. Avoid wrath, greed, lust—learn to love.

Discipline selves and desires—train for the life of the spirit.

Become purged of hunger for satisfaction of appetites and comforts; for possessions; for position and honor.

4. The Christian knows there is a goal to life. This knowledge is a great promise, and a great responsibility.

MEDITATION: MY NEIGHBOR AND I

Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets. (Matt. 7:12, RSV)

This is the law and the prophets.

For the ancient Jew, the law of Moses and the teachings of the prophets summed up all of God's demands upon his people. In this statement Jesus says that, in our relation to our fellowmen, all these precepts can be put into one all-embracing statement. It also sums up the "Sermon on the Mount," addressed to Jesus' followers.

Consider this verse against others of Jesus' teaching: love your enemies; forgive seventy times seven; do not judge; etc. Does it truly sum up the essential meaning of these?

Whatever you wish that men would do to you.

Jesus appeals to my experience as a human being. Consider this in connection with the statement, "Love your neighbor as yourself." Recall also Shylock's appeal in *The Merchant of Venice*.

What kind of treatment do I wish for myself?

Sympathy?

Forgiveness?

Aid when it is needed?

Understanding?

Justice?

To be found important?

Mercy?

Kindness?

Love?

So do to them.

This is not purely a negative teaching. Jesus' teaching emphasizes not so much the avoidance of sin as the *doing* of good. Compare the so-called Silver Rule—"Do not do to others what you do not wish others to do to you." What is the vital difference as compared with Jesus' teaching?

If others act inconsiderately of me, how then shall I treat them? Does such

treatment rule out this teaching? Is the Rule to be followed only among my fellows who in turn follow it? Think of "turn the other cheek," etc.

How far do I really attempt to put this teaching into effect: In my home? In my work? In social relationships? Where have I practiced it yesterday? Last week?

But, does this imply that if I would wish to be made into an alcoholic, then I should supply my fellows with alcohol? What needs to be added to defend this teaching from misunderstanding?

MEDITATION: GAINING AND LOSING LIFE

He who finds his life will lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it. (Matt. 10:39, RSV)

Finds life—loses it.

Think of some of the people who try to "find their lives." Who are they? How do they go about it? What do they believe is most important in living? Are they found in business? In the ministry of the church? In the household? Are they known chiefly by what they do, or by their purposes? What is the center of all they do?

Do institutions also, churches included, try to "find their lives"? How do they? Do nations? What will happen to them?

In what sense is life lost to such as gain it? Does this statement refer primarily to the fact of physical death, or what? Think of persons and institutions which have lost life, yet remain.

Do I actually seek my own life behind my expressed ideals and my pious pretenses to be acting in God's name?

What relation is there between this idea and the parable of people who build their houses on sand?

Loses his life—will find it.

What is meant by "losing oneself"? Did Jesus lose himself? Did Paul? Think of others.

In what sense have these people "found" themselves? Is this a description of an external happening or of an inner, spiritual fact?

Note the distinction between the life lost and the life gained.

For my sake.

Does "losing life" guarantee that it will be found? Think of persons who have lost themselves for something other than Christ's sake, and have not found.

What is meant by "for my sake?" What difference does this make; and why?

Have I lost my life for *his* sake, and how does this show in my living? If I have not, what is it I hope to gain, and how do I hope to gain it?

MEDITATION: COUNT THE COST

If any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple. Whoever does not bear his own cross and come after me, cannot be my disciple. For which of you, desiring to build a tower, does not first sit down and count the cost, whether he has enough to complete it? Otherwise, when he has laid a foundation, and is not able to finish, all who see it begin to mock him, saying, "This man began to build, and was not able to finish." . . . So therefore, whoever

of you does not renounce all that he has cannot be my disciple. (Luke 14:26-30., 33, RSV)

Consider the shallow meanings given today to being a member of the Christian church. Yet, to be a Christian means to be a disciple of Jesus Christ!

Then, think of this: "If anyone comes to me and does not *hate* father . . . mother . . . and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple." What can such a statement as this possibly mean? Are we not told to *love* parents, neighbor, etc.? Jesus here touches all those nearest loyalties around which we usually center life.

Remember the statement, "Seek first the kingdom of God"—does this throw any light upon our being told to *hate* our dearest friends, and ourselves?

What is it that so often draws us away from the kingdom of God (from absolute loyalty to God)? Is it not love for parents, wife, children, ourselves?

Whoever does not bear his own cross and come after me, cannot be my disciple.

What does "bearing a cross" mean in this connection? What is the cross *I* bear? Does Jesus regard this as a light or incidental matter?

Sit down and count the cost.

Is Jesus trying to build up a large following by making discipleship appear simple? What does he actually seem to be doing?

Is he satisfied with 25 per cent or 50 per cent discipleship?

In terms of the spiritual life, what would the illustration of building a tower and then of being unable to finish it mean?

Why is it vitally important for one considering discipleship to make sure he has sufficient resources for it?

What practical consequences has this for our Christian church?

Theology and the University Student

DEANE W. FERM

IN JUNE OF 1955 Dr. Clarence P. Shedd retired from the Stephen Merrell Clement Professorship in Religion in Higher Education at Yale Divinity School—a position which he had held since 1923. During those years—and since, for he is having a very “active retirement” as Visiting Professor at Pacific School of Religion—he has probably been closer to the problem of religion in higher education and particularly in state universities than any other person. It was my privilege to have him as a teacher during my recent graduate days at Yale. On the occasion of his retirement from the Yale Divinity School Faculty, Dr. Shedd lectured to the Yale Divinity students on the subject, “Religion in Higher Education—Retrospect and Prospect.” In this address he summarized his convictions on this subject with respect to the past, the present, and the future. I should like to quote from this address as he speaks about the present situation:

The sobering fact is that we are not significantly influencing most of the students in our large universities. We are now doing excellent and very important work with a very small minority of students and faculty. I venture the assertion that in no large university are the religious forces making a significant contribution to more than 15 per cent of the student body. Probably 10 per cent is a safer guess.¹

I believe that Dr. Shedd is right. It is my opinion that the churches of a community where there is a state university or college doing a good piece of work can feel satisfied if they are able to make a solid impact on 10 to 15 per cent of the university student body—whether it be in terms of regular church attendance, regular participation in student religious programs, or some other form of church activity. And I would venture to say that at least half of these 10 to 15 percenters who are influenced by the churches are so affected only because of the social fellowship that they have there, and not because of any sort of solid religious conviction.

¹ Shedd, C. P., “Religion in Higher Education: Retrospect and Prospect,” *The Christian Scholar*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, Dec., 1955.

DEANE W. FERM, B.D., M.A., Ph.D., is Director of the Montana School of Religion, affiliated with Montana State University at Missoula, Montana. His article was delivered as an address at the Northwest Regional Conference of the Congregational Christian and Evangelical and Reformed Churches in October, 1956.

I

Why is it that the churches are doing such a relatively insignificant piece of work on university campuses? There are, of course, many reasons. It is my impression that a major reason is that most university students just do not understand what Christian theology is all about. First of all, there are large numbers of students on state university campuses who have never been exposed to Christian theology, and consequently they have two strikes against them before they start. Secondly, there is a sizeable number of students who have an acquaintance with Christian theology, who have been reared in church homes, but who have found that the theology which they have learned is largely irrelevant to the university campus. Why is this?

I believe it is because the churches by and large are not speaking the language of the university students. The terminology which the churches use and the framework in which they express their faith often mean little or nothing to present-day students. We are living in the twentieth century today—not in the first century. Yet the categories in which the biblical writers express themselves are from the world views of many centuries ago. And these ancient world views do not agree with the twentieth-century world view. Consequently, the university students who do not understand—let alone accept—the earlier world views are lost inside the church. They feel like the Jews in Babylon when they cried, “How shall we sing the Lord’s song in a strange land?”

Harry Emerson Fosdick, whom I consider to be one of the truly great preachers of our generation, expresses this point well in his book, *The Modern Use of the Bible*:

It is impossible that a Book written two to three thousands years ago should be used in the twentieth century A.D. without having some of its forms of thought and speech translated into modern categories. When, therefore, a man says, I believe in the immortality of the soul but not in the resurrection of the flesh, I believe in the victory of God on earth but not in the physical return of Jesus, I believe in the reality of sin and evil but not in the visitation of demons, I believe in the nearness and friendship of the divine Spirit but I do not think of that experience in terms of individual angels, only superficial dogmatism can deny that that man believes the Bible. It is precisely the thing at which the Bible was driving that he does believe. Life eternal, the coming of the kingdom, the conquest of sin and evil, the indwelling and sustaining presence of the Spirit—these are the gist of the matter once set forth in ancient terms, but abidingly valid in our terms too, and valid also in other terms than ours in which our children’s children may express them.²

² Fosdick, H. E., *The Modern Use of The Bible*, The Macmillan Company, 1929, p. 129.

Dr. Fosdick has coined the phrase, "abiding experience in changing categories," by which he means that we should translate the experiences of the early Christians into terms that are intelligible to our generation. Unfortunately, the churches seldom do that. They continue to recite passages from the Bible and from the early church which in their terminology and illustrations and theology simply do not make contact with university students.

Similarly our world view today is not the world view of the Middle Ages or the Reformation from which many of our Protestant doctrines come. I often hear Lutheran ministers quote Martin Luther and Presbyterian ministers quote John Calvin as though what these men said and how they said it was the final Word of God, even though these two men did not equate their words and ideas with the Word of God any more than did the biblical writers equate their words and ideas with the Word of God. Why should we not be concerned with developing Luthers and Calvins in our own day—men who would be courageous and farsighted enough as were Luther and Calvin in their day to translate the gospel into twentieth-century categories? Martin Luther and John Calvin may have been the two greatest figures of the sixteenth-century Reformation, and we should be exceedingly grateful to them for some important contributions to a decaying Church. But people—and especially students—do not join churches today because of a theology which drew their ancestors together four centuries ago. The entire climate and temper and understanding of the world have changed.

We live in a new day and age—a time of psychological and psychiatric, not biblical, orientation. The Reverend A. L. Kershaw, an Episcopalian minister, in his excellent pamphlet entitled "The New Frontier for the Student YMCA and YWCA," comments: "The key cultural words of our time are frustration, therapy, tension, depression; not judgment, salvation, sin, and hell. It's a new world with new demands."³ But the churches by and large do not seem to understand this. They go on their traditional way grinding out the old tunes in the same style, while the students go "bopping" by. Professor Paul Tillich has stated the case succinctly in *The Protestant Era*:

The Protestant message [for the man of today] cannot be a direct proclamation of religious truths as they are given in the Bible and in tradition, for the situation of the modern man today is precisely one of doubt about all this and about the Protestant church itself. The Christian doctrines, even the most central

³ Kershaw, A. L., "The New Frontier For the Student YWCA and YMCA," 1955, p. 11.

ones—God and Christ, church and revelation—are radically questioned. . . . They cannot in this form be the message of the church to our time. . . . It cannot be required of the man of today that he first accept theological truths, even though they should be God and Christ. Wherever the church in its message makes this a primary demand, it does not take seriously the situation of the man of today and has no effective defense against the challenge of many thoughtful men of our day who reject the message of the church as of no concern for them.⁴

There you have the core of the matter in a nutshell. The churches with their claims to revelations often present dogmatic truths to the students which they claim are primarily matters of faith. These matters cannot be argued about; they concern historical events which must be accepted on faith. But, as Tillich points out, the Christian message of today cannot be a direct proclamation of religious truths as they are given in the Bible and in tradition. And the reason why the Christian gospel today cannot be a direct proclamation of dogmatic truths is that the university students in their regular courses of study and in their everyday living want to examine all presuppositions and think out their conclusions in terms of their own experience.

II

We have heard it said a hundred times if we have heard it said once, that the primary purpose of a college education is to teach the student to think for himself. That is to say, he is supposed to examine relevant information and then come to his own conclusions. And because this idea has been pounded into his brain, it has become part and parcel of his attitude toward all of life's problems—including the religious ones. He wants to base his conclusions with respect to religious questions on his own personal experience and investigation, just as he is supposed to do in all other areas of concern. And there is no good reason to suppose that any truth, be it religious or otherwise, should be immune to rational investigation. In fact, as far as the student is concerned, such immunity under the disguise of faith will only serve to weaken his belief in the alleged truth, because it tends to arouse his suspicion that something is being hidden from him. After all, if the ultimate issues of life are at stake, one should be pretty certain about his convictions. At least this is how the student feels.

This is another way of saying that the scientific method has become *the* method for ascertaining truth, not only for the university student, but for all of us. I would prefer to call it the philosophical method of inquiry, since the term *scientific* probably has a narrower connotation to many persons than I mean to imply. However, it is best known as the scientific method,

⁴ Tillich, P., *The Protestant Era*, Chicago University Press, 1948, p. 202.

so I shall stick to the popular lingo. I think that we ministers are fighting a losing battle when we disparage the scientific method. We might as well accept it in religious matters as we do in secular matters. This is not to say that we accept scientific truth as all-encompassing; heaven forbid! The area in which the scientist *qua* scientist works does not embrace the whole of man. There is a world of difference between accepting the whole truth from the scientist as he sees it—especially when he is rambling clear out of the area of his own specialization—and accepting the method which he uses. In many cases the scientist is the world's worst user of his own method.

What is the scientific method? Since we often have misconceptions concerning this, I think that we ought to clarify it. The scientific method is a way of determining what is true and what is false. I believe that it can be outlined roughly in four steps.

1. *Preliminary orientation.* First, we need to outline what the problem is that we are to investigate. We cannot ramble all over the field of human inquiry; we must keep our study focused on some particular aspect. This initial step may seem self-evident. Yet we know how easy it is for theologians in particular to run all over the field before beginning at home plate.

2. *Analysis of the problem.* The procedure here is in terms of the inductive method rather than the deductive method. That is to say, we do not begin with certain propositions and then seek confirmation for them in our own experience. One is reminded at this point of Anselm's affirmation: "I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand." This is the way that Christian theology has usually begun, but this is to reverse the process of the scientific method. We must begin with the facts relating to the particular problem and with our own personal experiences and the experiences of others. Then we must see these various elements synthetically in their relations to each other. This method of inquiry is barren of real content unless it rests on the solid ground of fact and experience. We must first get the facts pertaining to the problem; and there is no area of human concern too sacred to permit free, full and uninhibited inquiry. This is the method to be used in matters relating to God, Jesus, and the Bible just as it is in other matters.

3. *Forming a hypothesis.* We must draw some sort of conclusion on the basis of what we have learned in the second step. After all, facts are meaningless until they are interpreted. Therefore, the consequences to which the facts lead must be carefully noted, so that a proper hypothesis can be made. The more facts that are known, the more certain the

hypothesis will be. The fewer the facts, the more cautious the conclusion. In other words, we will be more certain, for example, that two parts of hydrogen plus one part of oxygen will make water than we are that there is a life after death. The late Professor D. C. Macintosh of Yale suggested a ladder of certainty in three steps: verified knowledge, reasonable faith, and permissible surmise. I believe that this ladder is still relevant today.

4. *Verifying our conclusion.* Once we have constructed a hypothesis, we must continue to test it to see if it can hold water. If it does not hold water, then we must be willing to revise it. If it does, we may become more certain that it is true. Investigation, then, must be a continuing process. Nothing is dogmatically certain—not even the existence of God. It can at the most be problematically certain. We are human and finite, and since we will never know the final answers, we must always be willing to leave the door open for further inquiry and reinterpretation. The revelation of God, according to this procedure, does not mean the dogmatic acceptance of supernaturally received truths. Rather, revelation is the convex side of discovery. The more we discover, the more is “revealed” to us.

This, then, is the scientific method. It is the method which has revolutionized our world. As the eminent modern historian Herbert Butterfield declares, the scientific revolution “outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christendom.”⁵ Students are taught from the first grade that this is the method that the wise person follows. By the time that they reach the university they are mature enough to realize that this method is not to be restricted to non-ecclesiastical matters. What has been considered good enough for all other areas must be good enough for church matters as well. They will not accept so-called revealed truths on faith; they must investigate.

They know that there are contradictory claims among the various religions of the world; and they are not willing to accept the claims of one on faith without first examining the claims of the others. Some religions claim that there are many gods, others that there is only one. Some say that god has a corporeal body, others that god is a spirit. Some say that god is masculine gender, others that god is feminine gender, still others that god is neuter gender. Some affirm the reality of material substance,

⁵ Butterfield, H., *The Origins of Modern Science*. London: G. Bell, 1950, p. viii.

others deny it. Some claim that salvation is by Christ alone, others say that it is by Buddha alone, still others say that it is by Mohammed alone. The students feel that rational inquiry is needed to evaluate these claims. And such rational inquiry via the scientific method is indispensable unless, of course, religion is to degenerate into a cat-and-dog fight or into a purely subjective emotional expression.

I have been much impressed by a book by the English theologian John Macmurray entitled *The Structure of Religious Experience*. He writes:

Religion stands at the crossroads. Throughout the world the parties of social progress are, in general, either passively or actively anti-religious. Organized religion, on the defensive, tends to range itself, actively or passively, with the conservatives and the reactionaries. . . . One of the main reasons for the fatal alignment of religion with reaction is that the progressive attitude of mind is frankly empirical, while the religious temper remains traditional and dogmatic. The empiricism which is at war with our religious traditionalism is bound up with science, and upon science the progress of civilization increasingly depends. . . . If religion could abandon its traditional dogmatism and become itself empirically-minded, it could lead the progressive movement with science as its technical advisor. If this is impossible, then religion can no longer perform any positive function in society which depends, even for its daily bread, upon the empirical temper of scientific research.⁶

I wish to stress the point that acceptance of the scientific method does not carry with it the implication that only the areas of the sciences as such reveal truth. For example, the various sciences can tell us nothing regarding the regulation of human conduct. Psychology as a science can observe human behavior; but it cannot tell us whether such behavior is right or wrong. The whole area of ethical judgments lies outside the provinces of the sciences. So do such questions as the existence of God, immortality, freedom, "etc., etc., etc." And we must be careful to note when the scientist moves out of the field in which *as a scientist* he has a right to draw conclusions. Nor does the acceptance of the scientific method mean that every belief can be socially tested in the laboratory. Many of our experiences are so intensely personal that they cannot be subject to a public test.

However, acceptance of the scientific method does mean that we should not simply have faith in someone else's faith without examination, for this would be a sign of intellectual immaturity. It means that our faith should come as the result of our own wrestling with the issues of life. It means that we must exercise caution in our conclusions; that we must be willing to investigate the known facts in a given field before we make our careful pronouncements.

⁶ Macmurray, J., *The Structure of Religious Experience*, Yale University Press, 1936, pp. ix-xi.

I like at this point to think of a running scale. At one end is the dogmatist whose mind is closed. "I know I am right in my faith," he says, "and I shall never change." At the other end of the scale is the person whose mind is like a tunnel, i.e., open at both ends. This is the person who is never ready to take a stand, and it seems to me that he is just as much to be avoided as the dogmatist. I think that we should be near the dogmatist end of the scale. We should have our heartfelt convictions—our convincing commitment—and yet at the same time be at the most 99 and 44/100 per cent certain. We must at least be willing to examine new insights and new ideas that may modify our convictions.

III

What are some examples of facts which the scientific method reveals when applied to ecclesiastical matters? In certain history courses the university student learns about the controversy in the early church over the relation of Jesus to God. He finds that there is no explicit doctrine to be found in the Bible which makes evident what this relationship is. He discovers upon further investigation that it was not until almost 300 years after the death of Jesus—in A.D. 325 at Nicaea—that he was declared *homoousion*, i.e., of the same substance, with the Father. Then he proceeds to study that particular Council and what actually happened there. He learns that most church historians agree that at this Council the majority of the church fathers who were present had not decided whether Jesus was fully God or whether he was not fully God. It has been estimated that of the 300 or so church leaders who were present, at the outset about seventeen were definitely for the minority position and about thirty for the position which ultimately prevailed. Eventually the *homoousion* side won out; and the Emperor Constantine, who was not even a member of the Church, in order to enforce the decision, banished the minority, burned their books, and promised the death penalty for disobedience.

The history student is disturbed. He reads on. He discovers that the Council of Nicaea did not settle the issue. On the contrary, the controversy raged on for more than fifty years, with first one side winning the advantage and then the other side, depending in large measure on which side could win the favor of the secular Emperor. He realizes that each side held its own councils during these years, often banishing the other side with the approval of the emperor. And then he learns that the decision of Nicaea was once and for all determined and reaffirmed at

the Council of Constantinople in A.D. 381. From now on the decision was dogma; there would be no argument about it.

The student is disturbed that his church never told him about this early controversy, because it concerned a problem about which he himself had long been troubled. He knows now that he can never accept the dogma that Jesus is fully God as a result of a brief period of instruction in confirmation class. He knows now that the early church fathers wrestled with this problem for centuries and that dubious methods were used to determine the once-and-for-all results. The student is not certain that such an important decision can be determined by majority vote. He, too, must wrestle with this question—and he will use the scientific method. This does not mean necessarily that he will reject the doctrine; it means only that he will not accept the doctrine just because the church had told him that it was true. It possibly will mean that he will not think it absolutely essential that Jesus be considered

begotten of the Father, only-begotten, that is of the substance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God. . . .⁷

For he will soon find that most laymen do not know and do not care what the Nicene Creed had to say about Jesus' relationship to God.

Next, his appetite whetted, the student goes on to the controversy over the relation of Jesus to man. He finds that it did not become dogma in the western part of the Church that Jesus was fully man until A.D. 451 at the Council of Chalcedon. He is bothered by the language used at that council to describe this relationship:

. . . only-begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same . . .⁸

But the student has to admit that he cannot explain this relationship in any clearer terms. Then he learns that the eastern section of the Church was not satisfied with the decision of Chalcedon and that the controversy continued to rage for another 300 years or so in that part of the world. He finds that the matter was finally settled also in the east—that Jesus is fully human as well as fully divine. But wait a minute. He meets a foreign student on his campus who belongs to the Coptic Christian Church which insists that Jesus was only fully divine and not fully human. The

⁷ Bettenson, H., ed., *Documents of The Christian Church*, Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 36.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 73.

student is less certain now about the truth of the doctrine. And he is less certain about its importance, too. For, he finds that he can get along fine with this foreign student—they can even worship together—as long as they don't argue about their Christology.

Then the student turns to the Bible—"the word of God"—the unique revelation to be found in sixty-six books. He discovers that the Roman Catholic Church counts that unique revelation as coming also through another set of books, the Apocrypha, not found in his Bible. And he begins to wonder just where the Holy Spirit stopped working. He begins to investigate how the Bible was formed. He learns that many of the books in the Bible were long in dispute; that the authorship of most of the books is doubtful; that the canon of the New Testament was still in doubt several centuries after the death of Jesus; that no so-called ecumenical Council of the Church ever declared which books should compromise the New Testament until the sixteenth century—at the Roman Catholic Council of Trent. He is less certain now that a unique revelation of God is confined to these sixty-six books.

The student decides that he might learn more about the Christian faith by attending a student conference. He hears about the Regional USCC Conference, to be held in December of 1956. He acquires the study book to be used at that conference—*Chosen Peoples*, by Denis Baly. He begins to read and gets stuck on the first page of the first chapter. For, the author asserts, "We shall begin with God and with what God says and what he does, and for these our source book must be the Bible, there being no other authority."⁹ No other authority? How can he turn to the next page without examining this assumption? But if he attends this conference, he will soon learn that there is no point in raising the question. It's the wrong kind of question to ask. This statement concerning the sole authority of the Bible must be accepted on faith—so he is told. To be sure, he may raise the question, and it will be discussed. But the point is that the current trend in theology today considers such questions irrelevant and inappropriate. He discovers, moreover, that the ecumenical movement among the "standard brand" Protestant churches today is based on the theological assumption that only in the history of the Jewish people, and finally, supremely, and uniquely in Jesus Christ, has there been a significant revelation of the will of God. He is disturbed about this assumption, for he numbers among his good friends on his campus Moslem and Hindu students who are equally

⁹ Baly, Denis, *Chosen Peoples*, Philadelphia: The Christian Education Press, 1956, p. 1.

loyal to their historical faith. But he finds at the student conference that he must accept this assumption on faith; questioning it is no longer a live option.

And so he goes back to his campus disillusioned about the church. The questions that he wanted to raise were not considered legitimate questions; he was told that he would never have thought of raising such questions if he had been in the circle of the faithful. *But these are precisely the religious questions about which the university student is most concerned today.*

The student loves his church. He wants to serve her with all his heart and mind. But the scientific method has changed him; and he will never be the same again. He wonders what he should do. He asks some of his fellow inquirers what they do about it. Some of them, many of them, say they have left the church. Others say that they remain within the church because of the social and cultural program she offers. But what about the theology of the church, he asks. Oh, as a student friend put it to me recently, "We're above all that. We realize that the church has to speak to a certain level of people who will not change in their views and who cannot be offended. We'll go along with her."

This is painting a depressing picture. But, after all, the current trend in theology is depressing. I am reminded once again of the words of John Macmurray which I have already quoted:

Religion stands at the crossroads . . . If religion could abandon its traditional dogmatism and become itself empirically-minded, it could lead the progressive movement with science as its technical advisor. If this is impossible, then religion can no longer perform any positive function in a society which depends, even for its daily bread, upon the empirical temper of scientific research.

Church-Affiliated Colleges and Academic Freedom

LOYD D. EASTON

ON THE BASIS of present trends and statistics it is widely expected that there will be a tremendous growth in higher education during the next few decades. But there is justifiable concern whether private and church-affiliated institutions will be able to maintain their present relative strength in face of the greater financial resources of state and municipal institutions. Hence a number of churches have moved to increase financial aid to their affiliated colleges and universities. An example of this is the four year program recently adopted by The Methodist Church, America's largest Protestant denomination.

The Methodist program, however, is not confined to increasing financial support of education. It also suggests that a committee be formed to examine institutional charters and encourage trustees, in appropriate instances, to alter charters with a view to strengthening the bonds between the Church and its affiliated colleges and universities.¹ Such a move inevitably raises questions about the prospects of academic freedom. There are, as we shall see later, elements of Protestant Christianity which logically support intellectual and academic freedom. But there is also a totalitarian, all-or-nothing impulse within religious commitment which has frequently led church-affiliated institutions to impose authoritarian restrictions on research and teaching.² The main job of the church college, said *The Christian Century* a few years ago, is to produce Christians just as the main job of law schools is to produce lawyers. This requires teachers who will

¹ "The Quadrennial Program [of The Methodist Church] for 1956-1960," *Zion's Herald*, 134 (May, 1956), p. 6.

² See Hofstadter, Richard, and Metzger, William, *Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University, 1955), pp. 210, 263, 330 ff., 483 ff. *et passim*. The findings of Hofstadter and Metzger appear, on the whole, to contradict Russell Kirk's claim (*Academic Freedom*, Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 39 ff.) that there is a superior degree of freedom in church colleges where a sense of religious consecration, a belief that teachers are "Bearers of the Word," can fortify professors against intimidation.

LOYD D. EASTON, M.A., Ph.D., is Professor of Philosophy and Department Chairman at Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, and former Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Ohio Conference of Chapters of the American Association of University Professors. This article is based on a paper read before the Faculty Club of Ohio Wesleyan, October 5, 1956.

exercise freedom only "in the direction of inculcating Christian ideas."³

Can there be academic freedom in a church-affiliated institution committed to specific religious purposes? In one sense there can be, if by academic freedom we mean the position of the American Association of University Professors in its statements of 1915, 1925, and 1940.⁴ Those statements of the principles of academic freedom specifically recognize the right of an institution to subordinate all its activities to the inculcation of religious faith. But the 1915 Declaration—the basis of later statements widely endorsed by other organizations, including the organization of college administrators—further insists that doctrinal standards shall be clearly defined and the authority to interpret them, in case of controversy, shall be designated.

The Committee on Academic Freedom of the college presidents' organization, in "answer" to the 1915 Declaration of the American Association of University Professors, asserted that good taste forbids asking questions about religion when a professor is hired, but he must nevertheless "assume" limitations on teaching about religion "in a college which he has reason to believe is a Christian institution."⁵ President Meiklejohn (Amherst) and President Welch (Ohio Wesleyan) were members of the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Association of American Colleges, but the trend of their individual discussions of academic freedom⁶ is such that it is difficult to believe that they had much to do with the report their committee presented. Some of their main ideas appear later in the present essay. The American Association of Colleges and the American Association of University Professors subsequently came to agreement on the principles of academic freedom and tenure in the 1925 Conference Statement.⁷

Insofar as the requirements of clear definition of doctrinal standards and designation of authority to interpret them are met, even the most rigidly church-controlled institution may be said, in one sense, to adhere to the principles of academic freedom. But we do not have to look far to find church-affiliated institutions which have failed thus to define their doctrinal standards. They frequently rely on vague statements about Christian purposes and traditions.

³ "Is Christian Education Possible?" (an editorial), *Christian Century* 69 (1952), pp. 454-456. For a similar view see Soper, Edmund D., "Academic Freedom in a Christian College," *School and Society*, 30 (1929) pp. 523-528.

⁴ *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, 34 (1948), p. 141 ff.

⁵ "Academic Freedom and Tenure of Office," *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, 3 (1917), pp. 48-56.

⁶ *A.A.C. Bulletin*, 2 (1917), pp. 157-187.

⁷ Hofstadter and Metzger, *op. cit.*, p. 495.

Vagueness or silence about an institution's doctrinal standards, however, can be a source of trouble. It can lead to the bad faith and injustice of an *ex post facto* ruling.⁸ This seems to have been the case in the dismissal of Professor Herbert Fuchs from American University, an institution operated by The Methodist Church. President Hurst Anderson indicated that Fuchs' views on religion were a factor in his discharge after his second appearance, as a co-operative witness, before the Un-American Activities Committee. But President Anderson did not contradict Fuchs' claim that he had been hired without any specific inquiry as to his religious views.⁹

While the statements of the American Association of University Professors concerning academic freedom provide for church-affiliated colleges with restrictions on teaching and inquiry, they also indicate that such institutions do not enjoy academic freedom in the fullest sense. The provision for such institutions is a "limitation" on academic freedom. "Genuine boldness and thoroughness of inquiry," the 1915 Declaration asserts, "are scarcely reconcilable with the prescribed inculcation of a particular opinion upon a controverted question." Full academic freedom requires that the teacher or research-worker be free of restraints imposed by those outside his profession. It also requires that the activities of the teacher or research-worker fulfill certain requirements set by his professional colleagues.

Some of these requirements appear in the 1915 Declaration, the basis of later statements adopted by the American Association of University Professors. Other requirements are to be found in resolutions passed at the annual meetings of the American Association of University Professors. For example, on controversial topics the teacher should fairly set forth divergent opinions of other investigators, though he need not hide his own view under a mountain of equivocation. Again, the college teacher should introduce new subjects gradually and avoid indoctrinating the students with his own opinion before they have sufficient knowledge to form one of their own. Finally, the question of whether a teacher has violated requirements and standards of his profession should be decided by his faculty colleagues in a manner which clearly insures "due process."

In respect to professional fitness there are good grounds for going beyond the position of the American Association of University Professors in the interest of full academic freedom. The 1915 Declaration and later statements require faculty participation only in cases of reappointment

⁸ Cf. Coe, George A., "Academic Liberty in Denominational Colleges," *School and Society*, 30 (1929), p. 679.

⁹ Cf. "News Release," A.C.L.U., 13 March 1956.

and dismissal. But as President Meiklejohn of Amherst pointed out in a discussion of the 1915 Declaration at a meeting of the Association of American Colleges, the really important issue is appointments. Through appointments an administrator can easily restrict teaching and inquiry without risking repercussions that follow a dismissal. President Welch of Ohio Wesleyan, speaking from the same platform as President Meiklejohn, argued that the faculty must have a part in considering both appointments and dismissals, though final authority for action may rest with trustees. This method, he noted, involves a "jury of one's peers" and is required by "the growth of the democratic principle in state and church and industry."¹⁰

The American Association of University Professors and other organizations sharing its point of view have tended to appeal to broadly utilitarian considerations as the ground of academic freedom. "The common good," according to the 1940 Statement of Principles, "depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition." More particularly, the 1915 Declaration asserted: "It is highly needful in the interests of society at large that what purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be the conclusions of such men and not the echoes of the opinion of the lay public or of the individuals who endow or manage universities." There are also, however, specifically Christian considerations which support academic freedom in its fullest sense. More accurately, I should say Protestant Christian considerations, and broadly Protestant at that—for I must leave aside the complicated question of the relation of Roman Catholicism to academic freedom.

The 1915 Declaration insists that in the area of religious belief, as in other areas of study, there must be continuous, unremitting inquiry since we are far from final truths and universal agreement. This emphasis has found increasing expression in the writings of Protestant scholars and theologians. In 1929 George A. Coe saw academic freedom, in the fullest sense, as indispensable to liberty and creativity in the religious sphere. He insisted that "Substantial religious freedom and therefore substantial academic freedom exist only to the extent institutional influences are on the side of unobstructed re-examination of anything one wants to re-examine." Such re-examination is essential to creativity in religious life; it is the mark of a "self-recreating religion."¹¹ More recently Reinhold

¹⁰ Welch, Herbert, "Academic Freedom and Tenure," *A.A.C. Bulletin*, 2 (1917), p. 169; Meiklejohn, Alexander, "Discussion," *Ibid.*, pp. 182-3.

¹¹ Coe, G. A., *op. cit.*, p. 680.

Niebuhr has asserted, from a different theological perspective, that the self must be constantly challenged through sharpened critical intelligence to prove that the values it exalts in the name of God are legitimate loyalties. Here, in Niebuhr's view, is the meeting point between high religion and a responsible culture which tries to free the mind.¹² Daniel Day Williams relates freedom in education to the "Protestant principle" as set forth by Paul Tillich. From this point of view "personal commitment to God as known in Jesus Christ is compatible with a continuing criticism and reformulation of the historical structures in which that commitment may be expressed."¹³

The specifically religious considerations offered by Coe, Niebuhr, and Williams in support of continuous and unobstructed inquiry directly suggest criteria of faculty selection for Protestant church-affiliated institutions. Other religious considerations, we shall see presently, have a bearing on the method of selection.

If there is to be thorough, all-sided re-examination and continuous inquiry in the area of religious belief, faculty members must be selected with that end in view. This requires that there be diverse and clashing points of view—including the point of view of a radical critic of current religious ideas—in situations where there are several instructors. Obviously there must be appropriate allowances in balance which take into consideration instructors' temperament, their appeal to students, and the kind of religious attitudes students bring to a particular institution. But such a diversity and clash of points of view as we have recommended would seem to be the best guarantee that there will be continuous inquiry and re-examination in religion on the part of both faculty and students. Where there is only one instructor in religion or directly related fields, as is the case in many church-affiliated institutions, he should be the type of teacher who can so present diverse and clashing points of view as to stimulate thorough inquiry and re-examination of beliefs among his students.

One of the central ethical affirmations in Christianity is the supreme worth or preciousness of every person. This is derived from the idea of man as an image of God and Jesus' teaching that the Sabbath was made for man, thus subordinating all institutions and laws to persons. Such an emphasis finds expression in the requirement that teachers shall impartially set forth divergent opinions of other investigators and avoid indoctrinating

¹² Niebuhr, R., and others, *Religion and Freedom of Thought*, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954, p. 57.

¹³ Williams, D. D., "Christian Faith and Academic Freedom," *The Christian Scholar*, 36 (1953), p. 12.

their students. Academic freedom is thus inseparable from teaching that respects the intellectual autonomy of students, always treating them as ends in themselves and never merely as means. Here is an answer to the question of whether a church-affiliated college or university may rightfully indoctrinate students and "produce Christians" through prescribed teaching and inquiry. Legally, of course, it may, as the 1915 Declaration and other statements allow. But morally, and in the full meaning of academic freedom, it may not. For to do so is to engage in a manipulation of students and teachers which treats them as mere means to the greater glory of the institution or denomination.

The Christian affirmation of the supreme worth of every person is also implicit in the requirement that dismissals, reappointments, and also appointments be made only with the advice and consent of the faculty. This is a measure of protection against teachers being treated as mere "hands" to be hired or fired in the purportedly higher interests of the institution or denomination. It is also a realization of the principle of democratic self-government. This principle, whatever other defenses we may adduce in its favor, is radically linked with the Christian affirmation of the worth of each person, for it insists that everyone who is affected by any social institution shall freely and effectively share in running it. This principle, in its own terms, asserts that the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. It is a corollary of the Christian ideal of community in which the bonds of brotherly love demand an equality that preserves the self-direction of every member of the community—an equality that preserves freedom.¹⁴

We are led to the conclusion, then, that commitment to academic freedom in the full sense as we have described it is a better index of an institution's Christian character than specific doctrinal requirements that prescribe the selection of faculty, teaching, and learning. If this conclusion is sound, it should be one of the guideposts of every effort during the next few decades to increase church support and strengthen the church affiliation of American colleges and universities.

¹⁴ Cf. Vlastos, Gregory, "Religion and Democracy" in Wilder, Amos (ed.), *Liberal Learning and Religion*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951, p. 294.

Is a Humanistic Grounding of Democracy Adequate?

PETER A. BERTOCCI

WHEN AMERICANS SALUTE the flag today, they "pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands; one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." The recent addition of the words "under God" is an impressive fact. For it makes explicit a belief which is questioned by many thinkers both in America and in the rest of the world. Humanists, be their thinking supported by Marxist or naturalistic analyses or not, hold that liberty and justice for all are not dependent on belief in God. Indeed, they suggest, the ideal of democracy can be better attained if we realize that all men are brothers, but not under God. The present is an attempt to examine both the theistic and humanistic grounds for the democratic ideal.

I. THE ESSENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

Belief in democracy involves two underlying convictions. First: No one person, no one profession, no one party, no one class, is good enough, or wise enough, to have complete power over other persons. This might be called the pessimistic pole of the democratic faith, for it questions both the wisdom and the goodness of any person or group to rule over others. Second: This pessimistic pole, however, is counterbalanced by an optimistic pole, namely: Every normal person is good enough and wise enough to have a share in the determination of the policies by which he is to be governed. Both poles together involve the central conviction that no man is good enough or wise enough to determine by himself what is good *for himself or for others*. In other words, every man has a contribution to make in the development of social aims and organization. This central conviction, I repeat, underlies the democratic method or model of political representation, and of social organization. No matter how much a man may believe

PETER A. BERTOCCI, A.M., Ph.D., is the Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate School, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts. This article was first delivered as an address at an Operations Research Conference at Washington, D. C.

that he knows what is best for himself, the moment he grants to another participation in the determination of what is good for both, he is granting that the insight of the other may well add to his conception of the good for himself.

A crucial distinction must be made if we are not to confuse the essence of the democratic faith with important accretions. We must distinguish carefully between democratic methodology, or the democratic form of political organization, and the particular way in which this political ideal is implemented at any one time within a given society. For example, the republican form of democratic representation, the so-called two-party system, the age or distribution of voting privilege, and other specific ways in which a people manifest their democratic faith, must not be identified with the underlying ideal itself. The democratic ideal is that adequate opportunity be given to all to make their concerns felt in the determination not only of policy but in the development of means to realize the policy.

A present struggle on the American scene illustrates the importance of this distinction. A particular economic system, the capitalistic, has been deemed by a majority to be the best way of realizing economic and social goals in America. Many orators talk as though belief in democracy were identical with belief in the capitalistic economic system. But it should be clear that any given economic system, capitalistic or socialistic, is not *necessarily* the only way, or the best way, of implementing the democratic ideal. In a word, it is a serious question, largely of empirical fact, whether economic capitalism, or socialism, or some other economic system, is necessary to the maintenance of political democracy. Those who hold that political democracy is tied in with a free enterprise system may be correct, but the American constitution, at least, does not specify this system as *the* democratic system. Furthermore, important changes in American capitalism, such as the increased power of labor, have been brought about by the appeal of citizens to their constitutional rights. Belief in political democracy, then, does not lie *alone* in pointing to any specific achievements under a given structure of organization—important as these may be—but in pointing to the success of the ideal model in guiding the development and implementation of the ideal.

II. THE ROOTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC FAITH

Are there *reasonable* grounds for supposing that men are best off when they guide their strivings by the democratic ideal? By a reasonable ground I mean a belief which organizes the available data from human experience

and science more coherently than does any other hypothesis. We shall approach the answer to this question by outlining the two main sources of historic belief in the democratic ideal.

The democratic ideal in the West has emerged not only from long practical experience with non-democratic ideals, but from a model of the universe which supported the ideal of respect and love among men because men were conceived as brothers under the rule of God's love. This model of human relations pervades much of the Greek world-view dominated by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and it dominates the Judeo-Christian tradition permeated by the teachings of the great Hebrew prophets, of Jesus, and of Paul. This model emerges again from that blend of Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian faith found in the world view of Augustine and Aquinas, and from further developments in such thinkers as John Locke and Immanuel Kant. It was by appeal to this normative model of man's relation to man and to God that men sought to liberate themselves from the arbitrary power of other men; and this model inspired the dream of a society in which human beings were to respect each other in weakness and in strength.

Now, many would argue that this insight of Judeo-Greco-Christian faith, a faith which is said to stand on its own independent religious evidence, is in the last analysis, the only true and the only vitalizing dynamic of democratic morale. Unless enough men, they insist, have been moved by the conviction that they are born under the governance of a God whose love is the ultimate motif of all being, we should not today have an American Constitution.

From the viewpoint of the writer these contentions are not based on flimsy considerations, and he places this religious model first because it is the dominant model to which all Christians and theistic Jews still look. That this model of the universe is still the dominant American norm is borne out by the proclamation in the summer of 1954, that the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag be changed to specify that this nation is "one nation *under God*." Those who live by this theistic model believe that the democratic political and social ideal articulates the procedures by which human beings should guide themselves in their attempt to live with each other. And they would argue that other apologies and apologists for democracy do in fact live parasitically on a culture transformed by this Judeo-Greco-Christian faith. Without this faith the spiritual climate and atmosphere needed for democratic morale would never have developed.

But what is the chief alternative model underlying democratic faith?

Immediately a model of human nature, which has by no means been always at odds with the religious model, comes to mind. This is the humanistic model of man as a reflective creature guiding his life by the ideals of reason. Some caricatures of this model have been easy targets for potshots aimed by not over-acute critics. But the concept of reason exhibited in the model we have in mind is not of a reason disengaged from the emotional and other needs of human existence. It is a reason which, qualified in its own nature, and in the midst of man's complex desires and capacities, functions to relate human striving and capacities to each other in accordance with the demands and opportunities afforded by the surrounding world. Its task is to guide human theory and action by developing conceptions which take full account of the complexity of human experience. A reasonable man guides action by the keenest awareness possible of what is open to him in the universe.

The democratic ideal might well spring from this conception of man and his nature. For the democratic ideal, as we have seen, focuses on the fact that the truth is best found by allowing all sides of an issue to be presented before the court of organizing reason. The democratic concern for the education of man roots in the conviction, *among others*, that men miss the fruition of their natures unless they feel free to question, to doubt, to discover, to listen to each other, and to express their reasoned convictions in action. Let a man be assured of his job, of medical care, of public protection—but only if these guarantees do not endanger his freedom to think and speak soberly. For with a job, with medical care, with public protection, and without freedom, he is nothing but a complicated, well-cared-for animal!

Whatever else, then, men do to protect themselves, they must protect their freedom to think and to know. Indeed, this demand that no arbitrary barriers be set against man's thinking nature has produced one of the major battles within the religious world-perspective, especially when loyalty to a religious dogma was used to put the *quietus* on rational investigation.

But this recognition of the fact that man is a thinking being leads to an even deeper ground for belief in the democratic conception of responsible freedom. If man were simply the creature of some irrational drive, such as fear of physical want and pain, if he were simply the victim of sexual desire, or if he could not curb a passion for power, then what reasonable ground would there be for respecting another person's decisions? A dictator or tyrant might then argue, as did Hobbes, that since the only dependable equality among men is the fact that any man can kill another,

there is no rational ground to prevent any man from so contriving that the abilities and energies of other men be enslaved to his own survival and security. For desires as desires are only stronger or weaker. Without reason to guide them, desires know no law except the demand for immediate satisfaction. If man is simply a creature of desire, any action he performs is simply the action made possible by a scramble in which the strongest desire, or complex of desires, wins.

If all men are complete victims of desire, there is no rational ground for respecting the decision flowing from the strongest desire. One need feel no more compunction about harnessing the energies of another man to his purposes than he does about harnessing horses or dogs—and any kindness shown to others need be no more than a measure of prudence. For the mind is now made up not by sifting evidence, or seeking consistency, but by manipulating desires.

The minds of men may be easy victims of rationalization. Yet the fact still remains that men challenge the right (note the word!) of other men to make their minds up for them. And they do it in part, at least, because they recognize an ideal of conforming or adjusting their desires and abilities to what is so whether they like it or not. They realize that while one man may often contrive to gain a confession or a verbal conclusion from another by twisting his emotions and his arms, he has not won the other's mind to his conclusions until that other mind is convinced by its own analysis that this conclusion *does follow from* the premises or evidence! One may beat flesh into unconscious pulp, one may threaten with hemlock and torture—but those men who have stood strong have shaken the confidence of authoritarians and inspired the latent ideal in men's minds.

We have, of course, been simply rephrasing the underlying logic (from Socrates, through Copernicus and Galileo, to Kant) for the doctrine that persons, because they are rational, must be treated as ends in themselves and never as means only. To this central humanistic basis for the democratic faith in the dignity of man, there are other arguments which could be added. Among these is the success of scientific method, which formulates one important aspect of the function of reason.

For the success of scientific method depends not only on its concern that hypotheses be checked by reference to public facts, but on the willingness of the investigators to respect each other enough to take full account of varying interpretations of facts and events. In a society governed by demands for scientific success, we find that the sharing of investigations, the free discussion of conclusions, the common responsibility for impartiality,

and loyalty to that hypothesis which best accounts for the data, are growing roots of the democratic ideal. In so far as thinkers respect each other as thinkers (not as white or black, male or female, rich or poor), in so far as thinkers realize the possible inadequacy of their own insights, to that extent do they seek to remove arbitrary barriers in the way of free discussion and free investigation. Since so many of the goods by which men today live depend on scientific investigation, democratic interchange becomes not a luxury but a necessity for survival at this level of existence.

We have been arguing, at the humanistic level, that the democratic respect of other persons for their own sakes takes root in the fact that man is a reasoning creature and not one necessarily victimized by blind impulse.

But contemporary biological and social scientists are discovering important grounds for the thesis that the democratic ideal finds encouragement in the nonrational needs of man.¹ Gone is the day when the total evolutionary struggle is depicted as a process in which the individual's survival depends entirely on his capacity to overcome others. Were the individual animal not endowed with co-operative capacities which knit him to his species in a common struggle for survival, he would die. The human species also is not composed of individuals motivated exclusively by antisocial urges. There is growing emphasis on two fundamental facts as a buttress against personality breakdown and a basis for wholesome development of personality. The one is the individual's need, from cradle to grave, for love, for the feeling that he counts for himself and is not merely treated on the basis of merits and demerits. The second is the individual's need to feel that he is a participant, and not merely an instrument, in his social groups.

Consonant studies show that the authoritarian personality is not so much a strong personality as it is a rigid one, worried by fear for self, afraid to evaluate realistically his own abilities and inabilities, and seeking to thrive by denying the abilities of others. The tolerant personality, on the other hand, feels more secure emotionally, has more insight into himself, accepts his share of blame instead of blaming "the world," has a good sense of humor, can stand uncertainty better, and is not easily victimized

¹ Those interested in this phase of the discussion should consult: Adorno, T. W., et al, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. Allport, G. W., "A Psychological Approach to Love and Hate," *Psychological Review*, 1945, 53 pp. 117-132; and *The Nature of Prejudice*, Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, 1954. Ashley-Montagu, M. F., *On Being Human*, New York: Henry Schuman, 1950; and *The Meaning of Love*, New York: The Julian Press, 1953. Fromm, Erich, *The Sane Society*, New York: Rinehart, 1955. Maslow, A. H., *Motivation and Personality*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. Simpson, G. G., *The Meaning of Evolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Sorokin, P. A., *Altruistic Love, A Study of American "Good Neighbors" and Christian Saints*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1950; and *Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. Suttie, I. D., *The Origins of Love and Hate*, London: Kegan Paul, 1935.

by frustration. As Professor Allport says, "the development of mature and democratic personalities is largely a matter of building inner security. Only when life is free from intolerable threats, or when these threats are adequately handled with inner strength, can one be at ease with all sorts and conditions of men."² Such discoveries confirm confidence in a democratic political system which guarantees to every man a voice in the formation of policy; they support any democratic organization which in principle and practice removes arbitrary barriers to man's growth and participation.

III. DOES HUMANISM PROVIDE A MORE REASONABLE BASIS FOR DEMOCRACY THAN CHRISTIAN THEISM?

In the last section we have sought to indicate alternative theoretical supports upon which belief in the democratic ideal rests. But the question before us is not simply whether the democratic ideal is rationally established, but whether it is capable of eliciting the sacrifice needed when serious conflicts in the lives of citizens occur. It is not easy for a person to wait for representative discussion of economic, social, or religious values, especially when he is not convinced that *at this point* others know what is good for them and when it would be a simple matter for him to gain the desired political control. The spirit behind "I don't believe what you say, but I'll die for your right to say it" faces a more bitter struggle when the opposing side not only "says it" but also wins the day. To take defeat of one's cherished values *and* maintain good will when one really does not have to, and when one honestly believes the opposition wrong and deluded, is no mean test of one's democratic morale. Nor is it easy, as the present American scene illustrates, to grant freedom of speech to those who seem quite willing to use it to destroy, as many conceive it, the very foundations of democratic order. Will the ideal of democracy as a moral generalization about human nature suffice for such morale? The answer here is by no means self-evident, so we must re-examine the foundations of the democratic ideal with this question in mind.

Any moral ideal believed to be true does enlist the loyalty of men. If men believe a moral ideal is false or unfounded, they will not long support it. But men sacrifice most completely for what they worship; they are supremely loyal to what they love with adoration. If the moral ideal of democracy can be legitimately connected with whatever does inspire worship and adoration, then the requirements for the highest democratic

² Allport, G. W., *The Nature of Prejudice*, Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, 1954. p. 441.

morale can be met. The strongest basis for loyalty to the democratic ideal, accordingly, would be the belief that the democratic ideal is rooted not only in man's nature, but also in the fundamental moral tendency of the universe. That the democratic ideal has actually been rooted in the conviction that it is the will of God who loves all men, and whose will it is that men should treat each other as brothers, is a matter of history. Such theistic belief, of course, satisfied other emotional and rational demands of the human spirit. But lest we rely too uncritically on theistic rationale, we must consider the humanistic case for morale.

Erich Fromm expounds the thesis that men cannot be strong personalities unless they learn to love productively, that is, to care and feel responsible for the growth of all man's powers.⁸ Responsible love for others develops an inner confidence which at once increases the emotional freedom of the agent and the recipient. This psychological law of love is valid because it describes the underlying structure of human nature. It needs no further justification. As a matter of fact, persons who conceive their moral code as an authoritarian "imposition" upon their natures from "above" do not enjoy healthy personal-social freedom. Hence, Fromm argues, it is one "escape from freedom" (among others) to love simply because a supernatural Being so orders it.

There are two things which must be said about this indictment of religion. If all religion were "impositionist" in the arbitrary sense Fromm has in mind, then one might well say that any morale-value achieved through religious belief is counterbalanced by eventual losses in the quality of human growth. At least, I would so argue along with Fromm.

But Fromm never sees that even the most authoritarian conception of the will of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition is never as arbitrary as he supposes. For while the more authoritarian groups in this tradition hold that the law of God is not to be questioned, they also adhere to a tenet which keeps the Divine Law from ever being sheerly arbitrary. This tenet is that the human being from whom God demands loyalty has been created by God, in God's image. It follows that since God knows man's frame, he does not demand the impossible, nor, indeed, does he withhold his aid from those who avail themselves of it. It may be remarked in passing that it is a most curious fact that many psychologists, though emphasizing man's need for love and his need for participation, seem to overlook, or underestimate, the productive love and responsible participation

⁸ Fromm, Erich, *Man For Himself*, New York: Rinehart & Company, 1947; and *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

inspired by sincere belief that the cosmos itself favors responsible freedom.

But let us ask whether Fromm's humanistic orientation can reasonably provide the needed morale. Granted, for example, that we can tell men that when they love others productively they are fulfilling themselves, and that they cannot love themselves realistically without helping others to grow. Can we reasonably expect heroism to take the place of calculating prudence when the going gets rough? In a word, can productive love be more consistently maintained if a person believes it represents only the highest trend in himself and his neighbor, or if he honestly believes that such love is the norm ingrained in the universe itself?

We must not give way to sentimentality here, nor to romantic misconception. The essence of the religious belief referred to involves not a God whose chief concern it is to provide "peace of mind" and a "sense of security" for the weary. I am referring to a God whose moral norms for himself and for man call for mutual love and sacrifice as the very basis of any solid and enduring fulfillment in the world. This God is not the manipulator of men, jealous of his position and power, and reigning by fear and threat. He is the cosmic Person whose intelligence consists in creating and so maintaining all the orders of existence that they provide the basis for human intelligence and freedom. He is the cosmic Person whose love consists in maintaining that mixture of freedom within order which reveals him to be the Forgiving Creator of all men. He stands as the companion of every good human hope and aspiration, and as the Sufferer in all cruelty and breakdown of mutuality among men. As such, he is the object of supreme devotion. And men whose faith in their fellows may well falter, men who can frequently see no hope in other men or their projects, do find new hope and power in this vision of God, the living Father.

To develop this theme: men cannot lastingly worship each other. The best of men may well doubt whether critical sacrifice for the sake of the development of other men is worthwhile when these men are ungrateful and hostile. Why give one's time and energy, why endanger one's own earned goods, for the sake of other human beings who often misunderstand and despise you to cover their own insecurity? Why die for democratic ideals when so many others are parasites on freedom? The writer would be the last to say that the humanistic faith in democratic ideals by itself would in *good men* fail to bring sacrifice. But have such good men an adequate *rationale* in such situations without theistic faith?

The religious person in the Judeo-Christian tradition is called indeed, as is any other man, to love his neighbor as himself, but he is called to do

so because this is the only way to live in this, God's world. But, further, he comes to love his neighbor as the by-product of an even greater love for the Supreme Source of all his goods. His whole nature is enlisted in the worship of the ideal. The thoroughgoing humanist, in the sacrifice-situation, may indeed give his all because he knows nothing better. He vows that he will not bend his spirit to any hate and distrust. But his reason may well ponder: Can it be that the universe is indifferent to my fellowman, while I am not? Is not my conviction, that men grow only as they live democratically, organic to the reality itself? A thinking man whom this question keeps plaguing, a thinking man who feels that the best in himself and in others has no anchorage beyond themselves, cannot (I hazard the psychological generalization) feel the psychological unity needed for the highest living from day to day, or to meet moral emergencies. For in time of trouble men are helped by the conviction that they are not alone in their struggle for values. Indeed, an impartial, indifferent neutrality on the part of the cosmos at this point is tantamount to opposition, and certainly does not help men to gird themselves for poised, patient sacrifice.

It may be replied that there is not enough evidence for belief in this kind of God, and that men must simply learn to bare their chests to the elements and love each other in spite of cosmic indifference. This is not the place to justify belief in God. But I would suggest, for myself, that unless the humanist can find more evidence for his denial than I have seen, his own rooting of democracy in the human situation may well be taken as a most important clue to the structure of the world beyond man. If, on the other hand, belief in God, without neglecting important facts, can generate greater loyalty to the democratic ideal, on what rational grounds can we discourage belief? If the belief in God generates more power for democratic living than does humanism, it may well do so, because, far from insulting human intelligence, it co-ordinates and unifies the total demands of man's nature. For when a man believes that his own most respected impulses and drives, as well as his own ideal of reason, are themselves the crucible in which the cosmic Person is involved, his sense of adventure is stirred, and his rational and emotional needs for feeling rooted in the universe are satisfied.

The theistic faith, by grounding the humanist belief in man in a more inclusive belief, engenders a quality of democratic morale which the humanist faith by itself does not justify. For now the respect for persons, the concern for growth in persons, which must undergird democratic morale, is itself undergirded by Cosmic Respect for persons.

New Testament and Myth

The Existential Approach to Christianity

MARIA FUERTH SULZBACH

I

SINCE THE DAYS of Constantine, when Christianity became an accepted world religion, the church has succumbed time and again to the temptation of using the gospel for its own purposes. In its apologetic zeal Christian thought has often been more interested in constructing a picture of Christianity and trimming the gospel to suit itself than in proclaiming Jesus Christ "the Word made flesh." For it has always been easier for men inside or outside of the church to get hold of the gospel than for the gospel to get hold of them.

The last fifty years have wrought great changes in Protestant theological thought; and nowhere is this change more evident than in the Protestant attitude towards Christology. Up to the period of the First World War, the old liberal school applied all forms of human knowledge to the study of the Bible. Adolf von Harnack, the leader of this school, who personified scientific passion in all his research, came to the conclusion that the Christology of the ancient church was the result of syncretistic religious movements and popular philosophy. The historicism of the old liberal school was reluctant to accept the picture of Christ as drawn by the Church Fathers without important reservations. The liberal school questioned this picture as well as the idea of the incarnation of the Logos, which it regarded as a kind of mechanical combination of mortal and immortal elements in the person of Christ.

Both the liberal and the history-of-religions school of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had their parallels in the early church: ancient Ebionitism on the one hand, ancient Docetism on the other. Just as Ebionitism saw only the man Jesus as a personality of greatness and strength, so Harnack and his school reduced the Gospels to a few basic

MARIA FUERTH SULZBACH, Ph.D., author of several books in German, has been in this country since 1937, writing, teaching and lecturing. She studied under Rudolf Bultmann, and is personally acquainted also with Karl Barth, Oscar Cullmann and other European theologians.

principles of religion and ethics. "The kingdom of God comes by coming to the individual, by entering into his soul and laying hold of it" (Harnack). And because ancient Docetism saw Jesus as only a symbol personifying the ideas of the pre-existent Logos and of a world Savior, the man Jesus of Nazareth was made of no importance. In a similar way the history-of-religions school saw the Christ only as the eternal symbol of the cult of the Christian church.

The radical results of biblical criticism undermined the historical, factual picture of Jesus as an objective and secure foundation of Christian belief. This biblical criticism destroyed the modern "ebionitism," the Jesus-of-history movement, which in the last instance could have completely omitted the *vere Deus*. In fact, biblical criticism led to a Christ-of-faith Christology which does not attempt to eliminate New Testament mythology but rather to interpret it. The forerunners of this present-day Christ-of-faith Christology can be found on the one hand in men like Hegel and D. F. Strauss, who (resembling the ancient Docetists) saw in Christ and the Christian religion a specific expression of a more ultimate philosophical absolute idea; and on the other hand in an existential thinker like Kierkegaard, who passionately insisted on the "subjective inwardness" of Christian faith as decision.

Among the theologians who subscribe to the Christ-of-faith theology figures Paul Tillich, whose "fact and interpretation" is a mixture of existentialism and docetism, and Rudolf Bultmann, whose existential approach to Christology, combined with his method of "demythologizing," tries to exclude all docetistic ideas. Tillich's Christology is not biblical.

In his *Systematic Theology*¹ Paul Tillich distinguishes between fact and interpretation. Jesus is the historical fact on which all interpretation of the Christian faith is based; but for Tillich he has no major significance. The cornerstone of the Christian faith is assumed to be not Jesus, but rather the Christ as the interpretation of the "fact." Tillich's theology is based on the picture of Jesus as the Christ. "He who is Christ is he who brings the new con, the new reality."

In adopting this point of view Tillich seems to get rid of the ancient stumbling block which has always been contained in the *vere Deus, vere homo*. There is a basic difference between the Gospel idea of the incarnation as a historical object of corporeality and the interpreted picture of this reality. As far as it is Christological, Tillich's ontology of the "new being,"

¹ Vol. I, Chicago University Press, 1951, p. 49.

the basis of his theology, is clearly indifferent toward all that the name "Jesus" stands for.

Years ago Tillich made an attempt to replace traditional Christian dogmatics by a new interpretation of Christianity. He developed a concept of symbolism to serve this purpose. He introduced the idea that Christ can be understood as a Christian symbol (and, for that matter, Buddha as a Buddhist symbol). He stated that the efforts of the Jesus-of-history school are not only abortive; they are unnecessary (*überflüssig*), since it is the symbolical, not the empirical, picture of Christ which matters.² Today, as in the past, Tillich finds the problem of Jesus' humanity irrelevant.

Yet there are no testimonies anywhere in the Gospels to the effect that Jesus, the man, was at any time considered less important than Jesus, the Christ. When the Gospels say, "Jesus Christ is Lord," they want to emphasize their opposition to early Docetism which already in their time taught the unimportance of the man Jesus. The earliest Christian confessions concur in affirming that they saw the Son of God, "Jesus the Lord," in the man Jesus and only in him.

The meaning of such New Testament words as "Thou art the Christ" (Matt. 16:16) is, according to Tillich, that Christ is the New Being. That the personification of this idea took place in Jesus of Nazareth is more or less accidental.³

Bultmann's existentialist approach to Christology on the other hand, with its accent on soteriology, stems from his biblical research. Bultmann is one of the founders of form criticism. His demythologizing of the New Testament is a product of his exegetical life work. The result of his New Testament studies may be summed up in his words: "Christology is proclamation." Jesus Christ can only be experienced through the *kerygma* (preaching). But since the New Testament kerygma is transmitted in a mythological language, and men no longer think in mythological terms, the latter must be reinterpreted. Bultmann is not only an exegetical scholar but also a theologian. Consequently his method of interpretation is twofold. As a theologian he wants to interpret the kerygma existentially or, otherwise expressed, anthropologically, in terms of one's own existence.

² Tillich, P., *Religiöse Verwirklichung*, Berlin, 1930, p. 286. Emil Brunner has this to say: "It is the essential element in the Christian faith—and it is this which distinguishes it from all religions, as well as from all mysticism, philosophy, and science—that its statements do not spring from a process of analysis or meditation or reflection upon existence, but from their relation to an historical event, in which it itself, as one element, participates, and in so doing itself becomes historical. . . . Every attempt to derive the historical to which the Christian faith is related from a system of timeless truths . . . falsifies its substance." (*Man In Revolt*, Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1939, p. 49.)

³ For additional observations on Tillich's theology see my article, "The Place of Christology in Contemporary Protestantism," *RELIGION IN LIFE*, Spring, 1954.

Since he is an exegetical historian, whose studies have culminated in the most radical rejection of the so-called factual, historical New Testament foundation, his technique of demythologizing introduces a twofold understanding of the historical element in Christianity by differentiating between *historisch* and *geschichtlich*. These words cannot be translated into English; they both refer to concepts of time, and to use the word "historical" for both would only cause confusion. But though Bultmann's terms are untranslatable it is possible to explain and analyze them, which we will do later.

II

One of the problems which confront theology and the theologian Bultmann is the relevance of New Testament ideas and language to modern ways of thought. The *vere Deus, vere homo* of the ancient church, implying the belief that a few years of secular history reveal the norm and the central issue of all time, proves such a stumbling block to modern man that he cannot find in it an adequate description and conception of the person of Christ. Just as the primitive community was confronted with the decision of faith through the coming of Christ, so modern man cannot stay neutral when confronted with the kerygma. He has to reach a decision, a decision of faith. And this decision depends, in the eyes of Bultmann, on man's existential self-interpretation.

The mythological problem of the New Testament and of Christology will be dealt with at a later stage. What interests us now is Bultmann's ontology of existence as applied to the Christological problem.

From Bultmann's point of view the Christian is always concerned with the *Christus pro me*. Christ "encounters me as the Word," and is "realized invariably and solely *in concreto* here and now, where the Word is proclaimed."⁴ For Bultmann Christology is not important as the study of an impersonal history in the past but only as referring to the Christ in the history of one's own existence. To carry out this interpretation Bultmann uses categories derived from Martin Heidegger's existential philosophy. Heidegger's analysis of being "would seem to be no more than a secularized, philosophical version of the New Testament view of human life;" man stands in the moment of decision, "at every moment he is confronted with an alternative."⁵ This decision can never be understood in terms of supernatural relations and events. It can never be verified

⁴ Bultmann, Rudolf, in *Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate*, ed. H. W. Bartsch, The Macmillan Company, 1953 (London: S.P.C.K.), p. 208f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

in terms of the miraculous. It must always be seen in the natural context of human existence.

Both Bultmann and Heidegger see man in a state of "fallenness." But whereas Heidegger was convinced that man can redeem himself by understanding his condition, his death, Bultmann maintains that man's condition of forlornness can only be redeemed through faith. "That is why faith for the Christian means faith in Christ, for it is faith in the love of God revealed in Christ. . . . We are free to give ourselves to God because he has given up himself for us."⁶

The problematic aspect of Bultmann's Christian-existential position arises from the fact that he does away with all historical (*historisch*) elements in the New Testament. "That God has acted in Jesus Christ is . . . not a fact of past history open to historical verification," but is to be understood as "*the* eschatological event."⁷ For Bultmann all factual events in New Testament Christology are definitely the "husk"—the "kernel" is a particular aspect of existence (*Dasein*), man's relation with the Christ.

Though there certainly exists a close relationship between certain biblical terms and Heidegger's philosophical presentation of human *Dasein*, and though there cannot be any doubt of both biblical and Christian influence on Heidegger's philosophy, it must be recognized that Heidegger's approach is bound to destroy what is essentially Christian. This he does, not only by stating that man can redeem himself from a state of fallenness by his own effort, but also by demanding that the "historical" (*das Historische*) should be replaced by an "ontological" analysis of human existence. Heidegger's existential philosophy is concerned with the whole human existence. Death is its center, and the understanding of death means the true fulfillment of man's existence through self-understanding.

It is interesting to note that Heidegger himself never took part in the controversy stirred up by Bultmann's existential interpretation of the kerygma. Perhaps the reason for this is the change in his own philosophy. Heidegger's earlier work, *Sein und Zeit*, can be understood as an ontological philosophy of death. Death, nonbeing, *das Nichts*, is seen as the only absolute which is able to give man self-consciousness. Today Heidegger no longer relates man's existence to death, but to the contemplation of absolute being. Heidegger himself has undergone a fundamental change which is reflected in his method, conception and terminology.

In spite of his radical New Testament criticism Bultmann maintains

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 32f.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 207f.

that God has done something all-decisive for us in Jesus Christ. In order to emphasize the "Christ-event" he introduces into his "existential" Christology the two terms "*historisch*" and "*geschichtlich*." The first term refers to factual data in the light of historical authenticity, as the object of scientific investigation; the second, to the same data as historically significant with a continuously effective impact upon the present. This is the distinction which produces Bultmann's ambiguous attitude in Christology. For Bultmann the kerygma must never be implicated in the relativity of all our historical knowledge; it always represents the events of the past in such a way that it renews them and becomes a personal encounter.

Bultmann is highly ambiguous when he interprets the cross of Christ from his existential point of view. When he asks whether we must go back to the Jesus of history to understand the significance of the cross, he finds that an affirmative answer can only be given in the case of the first preachers of the gospel. "For them . . . the cross was an experience of their own lives. . . . But for us this personal connection cannot be reproduced."⁸ According to Bultmann, history can never be the scene of Divine revelation; it can only be the scene of human decisions. Thus "the saving efficacy of the cross is not derived from the fact that it is the cross of Christ; it is the cross of Christ because it has this saving efficacy. Without that efficacy it is the tragic end of a great man."⁹

Bultmann's terminology here, his two conceptions of history, do not enable him to resolve the tension between *Historie* and *Geschichte* or, in other words, between *Heilsgeschichte* (redemptive history) and *Weltgeschichte* (secular history). In the whole New Testament the two are interconnected and interrelated. Bultmann's existential interpretation of Christology lacks the element of paradox, of the "human" and the "transcendent," the *vere Deus, vere homo*, as found in the Christology of the ancient Church.

For Bultmann's existential Christology the Gospels' use of the title "Christ the Lord" has no real importance. "Our interest in the events of his life . . . is more than an academic concern with the history of the past. We can see meaning in them only when we ask what God is trying to say to each one of us through them."¹⁰ For the authors of the Gospels the Lordship of Christ was emphasized in the element of unique and supreme holiness; it meant that between the Father and the Son the mutual

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35ff.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

knowledge was so complete that the Son was wholly drawn into the divine nature of the Father, as the Father was drawn into the life of the Son. For the Synoptic Gospels testify: the man, Jesus of Nazareth, is the Word of God and the Son of God.

Bultmann, the historian, sees only the difference between *Historie* and *Geschichte*. He fails to see the curious interrelatedness of biblical and secular history. To be sure, biblical history—the history of the Divine revelation—has no significance for secular history. It represents at most a collection of news items, of events of local importance. But, as seen from the opposite angle, biblical, i.e. salvation-history claims to be a part of world history and at the same time the very norm which gives world history its direction.¹¹

Cullmann's criticism of all allegorical methods of New Testament interpretation—not only of Bultmann's existential or Tillich's docetic Christology—is based on the fact that all allegorical exegesis sees in history only a symbol and looks for something else behind it. This writer agrees with Cullmann, who points out that Bultmann does not appreciate the kind of distinction which the Bible makes between *Heilsgeschichte* and secular history. According to Cullmann, the former stands in a double relationship to the latter. On the one hand the secular history serves as background to *Heilsgeschichte* (note the reference to the emperor Augustus, Luke 2:10f); on the other hand, secular history is wholly determined by the criterion of biblical history.¹² There is, says Cullmann, a real difference between biblical and secular history. This difference, however, "has no bearing upon the historical character of facts which are common to the two kinds of history, nor yet upon the temporal character of the connection between the facts." Its bearing is restricted to "the choice of the facts and the perspective in which the New Testament sees them by reason of the central place occupied there by the death of Christ."¹³

Bultmann ignores this very important distinction.

III

We have now discussed the predicament by which Bultmann's existential interpretation of Christology is confronted. Before we expound the mythological element—an essential factor of all New Testament Christology—we have once more to draw attention to the fact that *Heilsge-*

¹¹ Cullmann, Oscar, *The Early Church*, The Westminster Press, 1956, p. 7.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 8f.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

schichte which is "liberated" from factual history is no longer Christian *Heilsgeschichte*.

Gospel history (the four Gospels) and the Christology of the early Church emphasize the appearance of the historical man, Jesus of Nazareth; and it is here that any attempt to solve the fundamental paradox of Christianity—*vere Deus, vere homo*—is doomed to failure. It is impossible to separate the particular from the universal, the human from the transcendent.

It is possible that the attempt must be made to figure out the meaning of the Christian faith in the terminology appropriate to each era; but to the present writer it appears absolutely essential that every terminology and every apologetic interpretation should, as far as feasible, be related to the fixed centers of reference which are the essence of the Christian faith.

One of these centers of reference is the Johannine doctrine of the Incarnation: the Word became flesh. The Johannine pronouncement suggests a certain amount of mythological thinking. John made use of the Logos concept which was familiar to both Greeks and Jews. If it is understood as a purely mythological assertion, it is unsatisfactory for modern ways of thought. Says Bultmann, "That Jesus Christ is the Logos of God can never be proved by the objective investigation of the historian."¹⁴ However, the Fourth Gospel does not ask the question of the early Church: who is Christ? It asks: who was Jesus? The Fourth Gospel is not concerned with a cosmological myth, but with a Christological mystery, viz., that in Jesus the Divine appeared under conditions of humanity. The most important name given Jesus is "the Son of God," or "the only Son of God," or just "the Son." The Fourth Gospel does not separate the "Jesus of history" from the "Christ of faith." Its central theme is the unity and permanent relationship between the Father and the Son, even during the earthly existence of the Son.

The obstacle confronting modern man is not the mythological elements in New Testament Christology (modern man often makes use of symbolic language), but rather the acceptance of the revelation itself, which is as much of a *scandalon* for modern man as it was for his ancestors. In fact, as Geraint Vaughan Jones points out, the nonmythological, nondogmatic forms of Christianity have not shown themselves "conspicuously successful" in attracting modern man.¹⁵ A book like Julian Huxley's *Religion Without Revelation* (1927) has shown that the radical demythologizing of all

¹⁴ *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 207f.

¹⁵ Jones, G. V., *Christology and Myth in The New Testament*. Harper & Brothers, 1957.

symbols and doctrines ends up in the dissolution of religion into vague emotionalism.

What are the mythological elements which are explicit or implicit in the Christological testimonies of the New Testament? They are the ideas of the pre-existence of Christ and his incarnation; of the atonement and redemption of the sins of humanity through Christ's crucifixion and resurrection; of Christ's ascension to heaven and his *parousia* at the end of history together with the last judgment.

As the Christological problem is the main concern of this paper, we have to deal with the mythological content of the titles given to the man, Jesus of Nazareth. John, Paul, and Hebrews all speak in various ways of him who "came down," died, rose and was exalted to the highest place of honor in the creation. All three speak of the cosmic function of the Son and Logos, the pre-existent being (John 6:38, 1 Cor. 15:24 ff., 1 Cor. 8:6, Heb. 1:2-3). The Synoptic Gospels contain no suggestion that Jesus attributed to himself a real pre-existence. The Synoptic testimonies point to the man, Jesus of Nazareth, who as an earthly human being will be revealed as "the Son of Man" at God's right hand. According to the testimonies of the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus also applied the term "Son of Man" to himself while he went about preaching, in every way a man among men (Mark 8:31, Matt. 13:37, Luke 9:58). In Paul's Christology the humiliation of the Son of Man, even before his rejection and suffering, is particularly evident. Paul speaks of him as he "Who, being in the form of God . . . took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men" (Phil. 2:6 ff.).

There are in the New Testament two converging testimonies, two variants of Christological conviction; both are affirmations of faith. According to both, the man Jesus of Nazareth is the Word of God and the Son of God (Synoptic Gospels); and the Word of God and the Son of God was made flesh in the man, Jesus of Nazareth (Fourth Gospel and St. Paul). The Christological myth of the pre-existent Son of God and Word of God cannot be eliminated from the Christian story without eliminating the central New Testament statements that "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" and that "I and the Father are one." For the kerygma of the Synoptic Gospels testifies only to a gospel of Jesus which is identical with the gospel of Christ. Nowhere is there to be found in the New Testament a gospel of Christ which can be separated from the gospel dealing with Jesus of Nazareth. The converging Christological statements coincide in the title "Lord," *Kyrios*, the one most frequently applied to Jesus.

IV

The question where the term *Kyrios* first originated is still under dispute. One school of exegetes, the best known of whom are Bousset (*Kyrios Christos*) and Bultmann, believes in the Hellenistic origin of the term; another school assumes that the title originated soon after Pentecost in the Jerusalem community.¹⁶

In the Synoptics *Kyrios* is usually not a Christological title, but a form of polite address. After the Resurrection it becomes a regular Christological title. In Acts (2:36, 10:36, etc.), it is said, "God has made Jesus Lord and Christ" or "Lord of all."

The Fourth Gospel uses the title rarely. Its emphasis is on Jesus' Sonship rather than on his Lordship. Paul speaks of the Lord Jesus Christ, but always refers to him as a historical person, even though his conception of the Lordship of Jesus Christ is of such magnitude and significance that at times he uses mythological terms. As far as *Kyrios* is used as a Christological title, it always means the Risen Lord.

More than any other Christological title, the title *Kyrios* emphasizes the bewildering quality of otherness which the New Testament tradition wants to express. On the one hand it is applied to Jesus of Nazareth, a historical person; on the other hand it refers to Jesus the Lord, the *Kyrios*, and includes the apocalyptic title of the Son of Man, the man from heaven whose parousia will coincide with the last judgment. All these conceptions are summed up in *Kyrios*, which refers to the historical and more than historical personality. The Lord Jesus Christ is the Lord of all men.

The title *Kyrios* includes both, the *Christus pro me*, the Lord who calls me to decision, and the *Christus extra me*, the Lord of all. Only the *Christus pro me*, the Christ of my own experience, is accepted by those theologians who advocate a demythologized interpretation of Christology.

V

The study of mythology has discovered two basic types of myth, the literal and the symbolic. In his book, *Dynamics of Faith*,¹⁷ Paul Tillich makes a distinction between "unbroken myth" and "broken myth." On the one hand he identifies unbroken myth with the literal approach of primitive consciousness (*mythical*), which resists the attempt to recognize any symbolic context; on the other hand he uses "broken myth" for the symbolic

¹⁶ Kittel, Gerhard, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, Stuttgart, 1932-, Vol. III, pp. 1094ff.

¹⁷ Harper & Brothers, 1957.

form of myth, and calls the language of the broken myth *mythological language*. But all mythological thinking has its own dialectic and, as Cassirer points out, it is therefore able to see its mythological content in a metaphorical and analogical form. Symbolical understanding replaces the identity of form and content, so that "unbroken myth" becomes "broken myth."¹⁸

All New Testament myth and all mythological elements in New Testament Christology are, if we adopt this terminology, "broken myth." They are not so much statements about cosmology as affirmations of faith in Jesus Christ. The concepts of the pre-existent Son of Man, the Logos, or just the Son, are in themselves not cosmogenic statements but Christological titles. They express in symbolic-mythological language the relationship of God to man through the relationship of Christ to man. The divine-human encounter is affirmed in the symbol of the Incarnation. The world, as conceived in the New Testament, is not the mythical world of unbroken myth which is to be found in all primitive religions. Nowhere can we discover a direct relationship to the "genuine mythical mind," to the mode of thought, contemplation, and life of primitive man, that Cassirer calls *Denkform, Anschauungsform und Lebensform*. Biblical language is not based on mythical but on mythological and symbolic thinking.

The concluding pages of this paper will therefore have to deal with the relevance and importance of the mythological language and thought which are to be found in New Testament Christology.

Let us point out once again that the mythological constituents of New Testament Christology are not cosmological statements but affirmations of faith concerning the Lordship of Christ as conferred on him by God. As far as an absolute cosmology is involved in any Christological statement, it certainly does not play any significant role. As Karl Barth points out in his *Kirchliche Dogmatik* III, 2, the Gospels have never been affected by a changing cosmology or world-picture. The validity of the Gospels is independent of any cosmology, be it Ptolemaic or Copernican, Newtonian or post-Newtonian. But to limit all Christological interpretation to existential self-understanding, as Bultmann does, is to limit the Lordship of Christ to the *Christus pro me*. By emphasizing so heavily the subjective factor at the expense of the objective factor expressed in the mythological language, one is perilously near seeing the Lordship of Christ mainly from the point of view of "*Existenzgefühl*."

¹⁸ Cassirer, Ernst, *Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen*, Vol. II, *Das Mythische Denken*, Berlin, 1923 ff.

The use of symbolic language is indispensable where men speak about the divine-human encounter. It is the only language whereby men can convey the "Word of God." This is the reason why mythological language has to be retained, why it is not merely a primitive type of mentality which can be outgrown and should therefore be demythologized. Religious consciousness requires mythological language. This is its only appropriate form of expression.

If one deprives the New Testament, or any other religion, of its mythological language it loses its dynamic force. If the New Testament testifies to the Kyrios and to the history of salvation by saying that history without Christ is totally different from history with him, then a form of language must be chosen by which those insights may be expressed. The gospel would still be the stumbling block, the *scandalon* it has always been, even if it were possible to remove all mythological language. For it is not the mythological language but the Gospel testimony, "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life," which will always be the *scandalon*. No amount of cutting loose from the foundations of the New Testament can change this. In fact, if theology tries to do this, it declines, as C. H. Dodd says, into insignificance, "and has in fact nothing to say to the world which the world may not learn elsewhere."¹⁹

¹⁹ Dodd, C. H., *According to the Scriptures*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953, p. 138.

Meditation on a Particular Death

A Fragmentary Adventure in Grace

I believe in . . . the communion of saints.

—The Apostles' Creed

Neither shall there be any more pain . . .

—Revelation 21:4

Greater love hath no man than this, that a man
lay down his life for his friends.

—John 15:3

The peace of God, which passeth all understanding . . .

—Philippians 4:7

THIS IS AN INADEQUATE labor of love. It is an attempt to set down, while the experience is still fresh with me, something of the impact which a particular death, D.'s death, has had upon me. It is a rather personal testimony, but it somehow seems to me terribly important to try to record it, in the faith that it may be an act of love to share what one has learned, even though, or perhaps particularly because, the learning has been very painful. I want to try to capture something of what has been going through my heart, so that others who have been affected by D.'s death may perhaps be able to say, "Yes, I felt that too!" or more important, "There was more to it than that!" and then be empowered in the Spirit to continue the process or sharing in the community of faith.

D. taught me many things by living, and these I shall presuppose. It is the things he taught me by dying that I shall describe here. I need say of his life only that I had heard him laugh, I had seen him in pain, I had sought his counsel, I had looked forward to a lifetime of work with him—so that it is clearly the case that it is *who* D. was in his lifetime that makes his death so important for me. It is not death in general, then, or the death of x , which has touched me. Something much more intimate, much more precious than that is involved. It is his particular death which has helped me to know that many things, which heretofore were only words, are triumphantly real, and for these things I must give thanks.

Because of the personal nature of this account, the author has desired to remain anonymous. He lives in an academic community and is writing about the death of a colleague.

I

The most significant thing D. has done for me by dying has been to make real for me the meaning of the affirmation, "I believe in . . . the communion of saints." Other deaths in the past gave me resources of faith; I can believe in "the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting." These I could muster to meet the shock of D.'s death. But never before he died had I been truly aware of the almost incredible depth and splendor of the affirmation, "I believe in the communion of saints." This, more than anything else, has taken away the sting of D.'s death, insofar as that is possible. I do no more than record my new-found conviction, given me by the grace of God and by D., that the occasional sense of communion I had with D. in his former life has been replaced by an almost piercing sense of his nearness in his new life. The fact that we are no longer related at particular points in time somehow means now that we can be related at every point, at all times. I used to be conscious of him in his office, or his classroom, or as he sat in chapel—now I am conscious of him in my office, in my classroom, as I sit in chapel. I do not mean this in any ghostly sense; I lay claim to no visions. I do mean that my relationship with D. has incredible new dimensions.

This I have discovered to be both a terrible and a wonderful thing. It is terrible in the sense of the poignancy and bereftness with which it invests almost every moment of the day and night, since this new relationship is (at least so far) too intangible to have the same kind of total meaning as was possessed by the relationship we used to have. But it is a wonderful thing also, and in this very important sense, that it invests every moment of time with a sense of the dimension of eternity. I am simply not alone. I am surrounded by "a cloud of witnesses," D. most pre-eminently among them. D.'s death brings me into an awareness of eternity that makes eternity (for the moment at least) wonderfully real. This is true on several levels.

On one level it means that certain specific times and places will always have special meaning—here a joke was told, here a pipe was lit, here Berdyaev was explained, here a child was kissed. But it means much more than that. For it also means, on another level, that when another joke is told, another pipe lit, another philosopher explained, another child kissed, this is somehow related to, and done in the presence of, eternity. D. is now "present" in a way he never was before. I have the strange and wonderful feeling that I get to know him better each day, and that far from

his death diminishing his influence over my life, his death means that his true and lasting influence has just begun to be felt. So that whatever the communion of saints means, it means at least this—that the fellowship of believers in Christ is not limited to time and space, nor do those believers in time commune only with believers in time, and those believers beyond time commune only with those beyond time. For me such distinctions have now become quite inadequate—a new dimension has entered into my life, making every moment momentous with sacramental quality.

I am told that this sense of the immediacy of the presence of one who has died will fade or diminish with the passage of time. And I rather imagine that the *intensity* of the experience will suffer some diminution. But if in any really significant way I lose, or become dulled to, the dimension of eternity in my heart which D. by his very act of dying has introduced, then, hard as it is to say it, I will have to ask God through some other experience of pain to make me aware once more of his "terrible goodness," and I will have to look upon that pain, as I have tried so desperately to look upon D.'s death, as "the pain God is allowed to guide."

What I am so gropingly trying to express has been put in better words by C. S. Lewis, in an essay in which he describes the impact which the death of Charles Williams had upon him. (Williams, like D., cast his influence over many lives; he was the kind of gay, sparkling conversationalist that D. was. And I am just unsophisticated enough to rejoice in what I feel sure is the joyous acclaim with which Charles Williams and D. have recently "discovered" one another.) Lewis talks about "the ubiquitous presence of a dead man," of whom one is constantly reminded by almost everything that happens, with whom in a real sense one shares everything that happens; and he concludes: "No event has so corroborated my faith in the next world as Williams did simply by dying. When the idea of death and the idea of Williams thus met in my mind, it was the idea of death that was changed."¹

I first read those words five years ago. I thought they were very interesting, and rather stirring. Now, substituting for "Williams" the name "D.," I know that they are true. No event has so corroborated my faith in the next world as D. did simply by dying. When the idea of death and the idea of D. thus met in my mind, it was the idea of death that was changed. He, by dying, has taught me that.

There is another level still. The "communion of saints" is now real for me not only as something which bridges and in fact destroys the dis-

¹ In Lewis' introductory article to *Essays Presented to Charles Williams*, Oxford University Press, 1947.

tion between eternity and time, or to put it another way, invests every moment of time with the splendor of eternity. The communion of saints has come alive for me in the sense of the new bonds of sheer love and tenderness which D.'s death has forged among those who loved him. Never again can I be satisfied to describe this community as a "community of scholars," or "an institution of higher learning." D.'s death has brought to me a realization of the wondrous concern that men and women can have for one another, of the devotion which can spring to the surface in the most unexpected places. When I think of the "bands of love" which I have felt surrounding D.'s family, D.'s friends, D.'s students, my final response, even in the midst of pain, must be one of gratitude to God.

II

A second phrase has come home to me with particular meaning during these days when D.'s presence has been almost as heart-rendingly real as his absence. And these words *have*, by virtue simply of who D. was and what he had been through, helped me greatly to come to honest terms with his death. These are words at the end of the Apocalypse, describing the new heaven and the new earth, "Neither shall there be any more pain . . ." (Rev. 21:4). This was the thing for which I could be grateful, in the first stunned moments when I learned of D.'s death and knew that in a few moments I was going to have to force myself to go downstairs and give a lecture. "Neither shall there be any more pain"—these words told me that the last and most significant word about a human being is always *God's* word. God knows D. had suffered pain of an intense physical sort for almost the last two years of his life. And there had been other pain too, at other times—pain of doubt, pain of tragedy, pain of despair. And D.'s death could be a blessing at least to this extent, that the pain was gone.

It may be that other parts of the total verse are more important: "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away." But in terms of D.'s particular death, I must assert that the pain he bore became sacramental for me, as his death shouted forth to me the assurance that the writer of the Apocalypse was speaking truth, and that D.'s pain has at last been given up to God, taken away by God, and healed by God. It will always remain a sorrowful mystery to me why the pain could not have been taken away on this side of death, but I will accept that mystery as one that God in his own good time will make plain; and rather than looking in self-pity

at my loss, I will try to rejoice with D. in the fullness and freshness of his new-found life.

I must make one comment about the place of pain in D.'s *life*—a fact of which his death helped to remind me. I am sure that one of the reasons why D. was so extraordinarily effective as a pastor and counselor to this community, was because of the pain which he himself had known. I think, for example, of the pain of doubt. At one time, at least, during the years I knew him, this was very real. And it was precisely because he had known for himself in such an agonizingly real way what doubt was, that he helped so many students to work through their own doubts. One friend of mine, after consulting several people about a particularly baffling problem, made the comment later, "D. was the only one who really understood the questions." Of course he understood the questions. For at one time, at least, in his own life, they had been *his* questions.

III

D.'s death has opened up for me another meaning of the gospel. Even to state it may seem to verge upon the sentimental or the idolatrous, but I mean it in a way which I think is safely removed from either of those sins. During the reading of the Scripture Lesson at the funeral service, it hit me with almost physical force, that in the most literal sense of the words it was true that D. had "laid down his life for his friends." It was precisely because he had given himself so totally and so lavishly to generations of students and faculty, that his body was broken. To the extent that I made demands upon him, D. died for me. One remembers, with a kind of wistful sadness, his efforts finally to guard some time for his family and for a margin of health, and how he was yet always being battered upon from without, as person after person made claims upon his energies. And so the truth that there is no greater love than to lay down one's life for his friends comes home with a peculiar poignancy in the fact of D.'s death.

I realize that the full significance of this phrase of our Lord's should have long since come home to me as I contemplated and tried to involve myself in the event of his crucifixion. But I shall always owe to D., by virtue of the very fact of his dying, the immediacy for my own faith of this truth which his own life and death incarnated. And I do not fancy that God is ill pleased, if through one of his children we come to see more clearly than we had before, the meaning of what happened to his own Son. In making me aware of the depth of the greatest love, D., by his death, has opened for me one further window into eternity.

IV

Finally, D.'s death has helped to transform from a phrase to a reality "the peace of God, which passeth all understanding." Until his death I had always known that there were many things about God which passed particularly *my* understanding, but I did not know the extent to which this peace of God, even though it passed understanding, could be real. And D.'s death has illumined for me at least two aspects of the peace of God.

One of these I have hinted at in writing about his pain. It is clear to me that D. now knows the peace of God in a full and ultimate way. For him the ambiguities are passed, the paradoxes are resolved. He can, perhaps, say, "Why, of course! I should have known all along it was this way!"

But there must surely be more to the peace of God than that. That which D. knows in its fullness must in some measure be a possibility for us as well as for him. There is no thing for which I have prayed more earnestly for those close to D., than that somehow the peace of God which he knows can be increasingly real for them.

And I now know that this *can* be real. I know it, to be sure, only fragmentarily, and I doubt that it is given to many people fully to experience it in this life. The peace is not an easy peace, or a static peace, but it *is* a kind of peace. It is a peace which we find not in the absence of pain but in the midst of pain; not in pure joy but in a joy which is imbedded in sorrow; not in unruffled calm but in a calm which rests secure in the center of enormous turmoil. These are not "dialectical statements" for a technical discourse on "the peace of God"—they are only descriptive, *merely* descriptive (one might say) of what D.'s death has taught me about how the peace of God comes to us. It is a peace for which a heavy price is paid; it has cost me D.'s death to find it. (To know resurrection, it is quite clear, one must first know death.)

And I am quite sure that God somehow also knows *this* kind of peace which he grants *us*, as well as the peace he has granted D. For the most adequate description of it would be found by pointing to the figure of the Crucified One in all his agony, saying in perfect serenity, "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit." If that is truly the peace of God as men experience it in history, then I have discovered what it is only since, and because of, D.'s death.

Man was made for Joy and Woe;
And when this we rightly know
Thro' the World we safely go.

Joy and Woe are woven fine,
A Clothing for the Soul divine. . .²

I am sure that "the peace of God," in the sense in which I know that D. knows it, will gradually become more real for those who love him, and that even though joy and woe will remain "woven fine," some of the woe will be suffused by the deeper joy which D. now has.

V

It may be that in time I will be able to make an act of thanksgiving to God for D.'s death, in this sense at least—that he permitted D. by his very death to bring me closer to God, by dying, than anyone else has or could, by living. I have the strange feeling that the things I learned from D. in his lifetime, important as they are, are not worthy to be compared to the things that he has taught me in the space of one long, terrible and wonderful week since his death. And I know too that the things he has helped me to learn in that one week are only the beginning of the things which I shall continue to learn from him.

I could never say that this "justifies" D.'s death. But I do say that in these ways, his death, which at first seemed to me totally bad, has become a sacramental means of grace for me, and in that sense at least has shown forth the love and the goodness and the mercy of God, so that I can be filled with gratitude to God for D.'s life, short as it was, and also be filled with gratitude to him that in the midst of the deepest sorrow I have yet known in this life, God has been pleased to reveal to me something of his love and grace.

The moments when I can say this with utter conviction come and go, to be sure, but I know at least that *they* are the real moments, and I can live between them in faith that they will return. I know in an unutterably real way, how true are the words which were sung at D.'s funeral, to the almost unearthly beauty of Bach's music, words which go like this:

My faith is still secure
And still I love my God,
For all my pains and fears
Are chastenings of His rod.
With God I am at peace:
No more will I repine.
God is my strength and shield
Protecting me and mine.

² Blake, William, *Auguries of Innocence*.

Whate'er my God ordains,
Though I the cup must drink,
That bitter seems to my faint heart,
I will not faint nor shrink.
My tears shall pass away
When dawns again the day,
Sweet comfort then shall fill my heart
And care and pain depart.

And so my God I thank
And love Him truly still.
On earth the only law
Is to obey His will.
In Him I put my trust,
In His I place my hand.
Thru pastures green I'm led
Unto the promised land.

Biblical Theology and the Church's Point of View

MACK B. STOKES

I

THE CONVERSATIONS AND DEBATES on the unity and authority of the Bible have come to be the most lively and productive within the whole range of Christian theology today. With very appropriate insight, *RELIGION IN LIFE* has contributed to these discussions by offering a series of stimulating articles on the subject of Biblical Theology.¹ These articles, which were presented for the most part in the form of statements by one author and rebuttals by others, are themselves an illustration on a small scale of the keenness, excitement, and differences of opinion which characterize the current conversations on biblical interpretation. Dr. James R. Branton directs attention to the "present situation in biblical theology"; Dr. Millar Burrows comments on Dr. Branton's statement with appreciation and yet with some differences of insight; and, from a point of view which is much more sympathetic with the neo-orthodox perspective, Dr. James D. Smart writes brilliantly on the "need for a biblical theology." Dr. Robert McAfee Brown, addressing himself to the question, "Is There a 'Biblical Theology'?" moves in a direction that was not intended to make any immediate contact with the foregoing discussions, but he attempts, nevertheless, to grapple with some of the same problems.

In the belief that these articles have contributed significantly to the continuing and lively interest in biblical theology, and in the conviction that theological debates of this kind should continue, the present article is designed to take a second look at these discussions, to restate some of the basic issues, and to suggest a theory of the unity and authority of the

¹ See *RELIGION IN LIFE*, Winter 1956-1957, pp. 5-39.

MACK B. STOKES, B.D., Ph.D., is Associate Dean and Parker Professor of Systematic Theology at the Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Georgia. He continues in this article the discussion of Biblical Theology begun in our issue of last Winter.

Bible which attempts to do justice both to the findings of biblical research and to the requirements of the Church.

From these conversations and many others which are taking place in books, articles, and professional meetings, it has become increasingly clear that there is no way of avoiding theoretical interpretations of the Bible which imply or aim toward some kind of biblical theology. As Dr. Branton says, even the utterances of the liberal school, which prided itself on its objectivity in biblical studies, disclosed the use of theoretical constructions which were afterwards found, very conveniently, in the Bible. For example, Jesus came to be pictured as "an ethically-minded social prophet-reformer whose message challenged the modern man to a nobler life" (p. 6). But more recent biblical scholars saw this liberal picture of Jesus as one fabricated by men who interpreted Jesus in terms of the preconceptions of the modern world rather than in terms of the eschatological perspectives of the first-century Christian community.

When the question was raised as to what the historical Jesus was like, the answers became increasingly diverse, until some biblical scholars adopted the strange theory that the Gospels were primary sources for the study of the faith of the earliest Christians but not for the understanding of the life of Jesus. After countless books, debates, and conversations on these themes, some outstanding biblical theologians within Protestantism today have attempted either to bypass or to minimize the question of the historical Jesus by urging that the answer to it is both inaccessible and unimportant. It is inaccessible because the Gospels are not historical documents, but faith-documents; it is unimportant because the primary thing in Christianity is either the encounter with God through the Christ of faith or the New Being in Christ. From this point it was but a step to the efforts to discover or restate the *kerygma* of the earliest Christian communities. It was felt that if this could be clearly identified, the want of materials about the historical Jesus would become relatively unimportant; and besides this, the biblical theologian would be relieved of the necessity of answering some embarrassing questions of a historical nature.

Man's existential situation, whether in the first century or the twentieth, came to be stressed, and the *kerygma* was increasingly understood in relation to man's desperate needs, on the one hand, and God's living redemptive Word, on the other. Biblical theology was thus given a new impetus because it seemed possible to find the unity of the Bible in the message of salvation and of the kingdom of God. This general approach was given momentum by its refusal to be weighed down with

the analytical and sometimes stultifying biblical studies of previous scholars and by its efforts to give the Church something to say in a world that was unmistakably in despair.

But the debate continues. Can there be a biblical theology? This is another way of asking whether or not there is a basic unity in the Bible. Dr. Branton speaks for many biblical scholars today when he warns against premature and patented schemes for the unity of the Bible (p. 12). He insists that the evidence does not warrant speaking of the *kerygma* in the singular (p. 13), and he urges that there is no consistent Christology in the New Testament. Dr. Burrows declares that Dr. Branton has gone a little too far here (p. 20); and Dr. Smart says that an essentially unified theology *is* to be found in the Bible and that such a theology is called for by the Church (pp. 27-28). Though with greater caution and less effort to clarify his thought, Dr. Brown also affirms the need for and possibility of a biblical theology, and he suggests some boundaries within which it might be worked out (pp. 38-39).

II

From the standpoint of the systematic and historical theologian, at least two developments of overarching importance emerge out of this kind of conversation. The first of these is the renewed interest in the crucial questions pertaining to the historical Jesus. Dr. Branton addresses himself to this much-discussed problem when he says that the current effort to find a biblical theology has moved forward at the expense of a "real rootage in history" (p. 10). The Christ of faith has been so emphasized that "the revelation of God cannot be in the historical Jesus at all" (p. 11). Dr. Smart agrees that this thought has some validity with reference to Brunner, but denies that it holds against Barth (p. 29), and tends to minimize the difficulties which Branton has, in my judgment, rightly stressed.

From the standpoint of the systematic and historical theologian, as well as from that of the biblical theologian, the role of the historical Jesus is of commanding importance. The Church can never rest content with any view which minimizes the role of Jesus of Nazareth. Dr. Smart reveals his want of adequate seriousness here when he asserts that Barth's thought is free from Branton's attack. The very fact that Barth could deliver his much-quoted utterance, to which Branton refers (p. 11), stands before us as a warning; for if the historical Jesus actually lived the kind of life that the apostles affirmed that he did, such a statement as Barth's would be out of the question. There is bound to be something disturbing when an

outstanding Christian theologian announces that Jesus impresses us as a little commonplace beside other founders of religions and even alongside some of his own later representatives. Certainly the apostles would have been incapable of such a remark.

The question is not, Does Barth believe in the humanity of our Lord? Everyone knows that he does.² The question is: What role does the humanity of Jesus play in his theology? From quite different perspectives, both Barth and Brunner, though affirming the fact, are in constant peril of neglecting the full import of the humanity of Jesus as a medium of divine revelation. This is seen not only in their remarks here and there which belittle Jesus as an historical figure, but also in their doctrine that the humanity of our Lord conceals the divine revelation; God is in Christ incognito; God manifests himself by "veiling himself."³

Barth's view winds its way in keeping with its own presuppositions until at last it comes out with the eccentric conclusion that the humiliation of the cross was that of God alone and not man.⁴ In Barth's doctrine of reconciliation there is a clear and persistent tendency to lose sight of the temporal aspect of the humiliation of Jesus Christ and thus to be driven toward what Barth himself recognizes as an innovation,⁵ and toward what the New Testament does not permit. Any effort to secure a unified interpretation of the message of the Bible which places in jeopardy the significance of history as a medium of God's redemptive revelation and work, and which especially leaves the historical Jesus and the *kerygma* in only tenuous relations to each other—any such effort is surely suspect not only before the systematic and historical theologian but more especially before the Church itself.

The current debates along this line have raised serious questions about how free a Christian theologian is to offer theoretical interpretations of the Bible which are governed by presuppositions other than those which have come out of the mind of the Church. It has become increasingly clear that there is no biblical interpretation which does not involve presuppositions that must be carefully studied. For example, some of the current efforts toward a biblical theology, though sincerely striving to express the spirit of the apostles, are governed by assumptions and insights which are at best questionable as directives for biblical interpretation. Just as theologians of the liberal school often interpreted the Bible as running

² Cf. *Church Dogmatics*, I, 2, ed. Bromiley and Torrance, Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1956, 132-202.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 1, 184-198.

⁴ See, for example, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, IV, i, 271.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 145.

interference for human values discoverable in the historical Jesus, certain theologians of the present day are in danger of using the Bible to run interference for current intellectual fads.

It seems clear to many Christian thinkers, particularly in the United States, that the effort to reach a biblical theology by stressing the "message" and minimizing the historical facts affirmed in the Bible is basically attributable to intellectual fads. An intellectual fad may be defined as a theoretical viewpoint which has attractiveness for a time, by virtue of its function as a corrective or because of other contingent factors, but which cannot stand before a sustained intellectual challenge which is informed by the theological insights of the centuries. Two such fads, which have figured prominently in recent efforts to develop biblical theologies, may be mentioned here.

The first is the fad of the eternity-time contrast. This is the unfounded assumption—which nevertheless expresses a truth—that there is an absolute contrast between God and the universe, grace and nature, eternity and time. If this idea alone were subjected to the most careful scrutiny and thereby rendered suspect, much current biblical theology, with its eschatological exaggerations, would be subject to radical revision.

The second fad is often intimately associated with the first. It is the fad of subjectivity. Kierkegaard said, "Truth is subjectivity." The subject-object relation is tabu. Existence is not known objectively but experienced subjectively; and nothing is genuinely real except as we, in our own vital striving, find it so. Man, in this sense, participates in the creation and meaning of reality; and history is dead except as it is recovered in a living present. Man's involvement in things and events is the genuine reality. According to this perspective, whether this or that happened in the earthly life of Jesus is of little consequence so long as there is, through the leap of faith in Jesus Christ, the living encounter, or at least the New Being in Jesus Christ. The Gospel materials and the New Testament as a whole, when properly interpreted, present the double revelation of man's hopelessness in himself and in nature, his *Sein-zum-Tode*, and of the marvelous triumph of God's Kingdom now. Since this general but exceedingly complex approach to the Bible stresses the message and the encounter, it is easy to understand how the questions pertaining to historical facts, the life of Jesus, the sayings of Jesus, the death of Jesus, lose a large measure of their relevance. The subject-object mode of thought, it is supposed, is devastating to passionate subjectivity.

Is this way of thinking true to historic Christianity? Does it do

justice to man's real situation? Can it stand before the challenge of a sustained attack? This is not the place for a detailed refutation, but several thoughts may suggest the line of attack which needs to be followed.

First, there is no way of avoiding the subject-object relation. Man is the subject, what he knows is object. A past event can never be recovered, literally or existentially. It is past; and the mind of man cannot help but hold this to be the case. If someone says that this is true but not redemptively relevant, the answer is that the genuine contemplation of what Jesus said and did has been and always will be redemptively relevant. The mind of man cannot help thinking of the world around it as object and of itself in distinction as subject; and while this work of the intellect is not its only function, it is indispensable to sanity and to entering into any genuine encounters or living relationships. Man is subject who, through God's initiative, knows God.

Moreover, to turn in a slightly different direction, any experience of the New Being in Jesus Christ which does not involve a dynamic relationship between the man who knows and the God who responds in keeping with what the man through revelation knows, cannot be in accord with the plain reports of the witnesses in the New Testament. The Holy Spirit did not just come without the aid of a known historical background about Jesus. Without this remembered background, coupled with the appropriate and God-appointed revelation of its true meaning, Christianity would be reduced to the merely religious and would lack that sense of the genuine continuity and organic unity of the redemptive Purpose of God.

Another difficulty has also appeared in the course of this discussion of the relevance of history in biblical theology. Those biblical theologies today which minimize the historical Jesus in order to offer the world an unassailable *kerygma*, in stressing at the same time the principle of subjectivity, run the risk of leading people into a kind of religiosity which is essentially alien to Christianity. The full significance of this can be grasped only when we rebel with all the force of our intelligence against the existentialistic tendency to wrench the individual from his historical bearings and to ignore the profound meaning of his social relationships, past and present.

Though claiming to enter into the depths of the human situation, this perspective, even though it is clothed in biblical language, fosters self-centeredness of the most intractable sort; and it misses the profound biblical affirmation that man is what he is because of his relationships to God and to his fellowmen and to the past. There is not and cannot be anything

genuinely deep about a self-understanding that misses the full and mighty impact of history upon life. Twice ten thousand memories, thoughts, sentiments, experiences, hopes, fears—out of past person-to-person relationships—color and shape the present moment. No one can understand an old man merely by analyzing him for what he now is; this would be to assume that he was never young and that the attachments and relationships of a lifetime had nothing to do with his present existence. A trip to the Holy Land cannot be measured by the last few miles of the journey home. The plain fact is that the relations between the past and present are too complex, baffling, and mysterious, to perceive and understand with complete clarity. This circumstance leads some to minimize their tremendous significance.

When we tie this to what we have already said about the historical Jesus and the experience of the earliest Christians, we begin to understand the intimate and inevitable connection between Jesus Christ and the experience of dynamically belonging to God. It was precisely the cumulative impact of the marvelous memories of their life with Jesus, together with the only appropriate interpretation of his life and the faith that followed, that made possible their tremendous experience at Pentecost. Similarly, today, Christians who seek to recover the realities of the historical Jesus by reading the Gospels, and by meditating on them, and by having a faith that is awakened, with the aid of the Holy Spirit, through such reading and meditating, come to know what it is to probe the depths of the Christian life and to experience the transforming grace of God.

From the Christian standpoint, we understand our existence in its deepest dimensions not so much by brooding upon our existential situation as solitary individuals as by identifying and feeling the profound relationships between ourselves and God which have been illuminated and made real for us through Jesus Christ. Our existential situation must be seen for what it is, not prior to confronting Christ but after doing so. Then sin, fruitlessness, and death are seen in their proper setting. Deeper than everything else is the fact that we are loved by God and that therefore we ought, in our intention, to belong to him. Whatever concretely and causatively communicates this life-giving relationship and thus awakens in us the only appropriate response is of supreme significance in the history of religion.

The Church affirms that Jesus Christ, rightly interpreted through faith, does precisely this, not by inaugurating a merely vertical relationship between God and man but by disclosing God's love in and through the total social life.

It is not just any history, not just any memory, not just any community, that can open the portals of the grace of God. It is the memory of Jesus of Nazareth, of his temptations, of his deeds of love and mercy, of his ministry of healing, of his courage, of his compassion, of his prayers, of his sayings, of his crucifixion, of his resurrection, of his promised presence—it is the cumulative power of these things, working mightily within our spirits, which at last leads us into repentance and trust and which makes us cry from the depths of our being and in the company of our fellows, "Abba Father." The Gospels, then, so mirror and reflect the unutterable glory and wonder of the life of Jesus as to recover for us the nearest approximation to walking with the apostles in his presence. The preaching of the Word becomes the more fruitful in proportion to its effectiveness in lifting up the majestic splendor of the life of Jesus and in understanding Jesus Christ in terms of the everlasting redemptive Purpose of God, not merely for this isolated individual or that but for all people. (See Romans 10:17.) The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper takes on its full meaning only when the significance of the historical Jesus is recovered within the total fellowship of believers. The humanity of Jesus, far from concealing God's redemptive Purpose, reveals it, expresses it.

It is these considerations that illuminate the traditional determination to hold fast to the humanity of Jesus as a primary factor in christological construction. The Church could not repudiate the reports of its earliest witnesses; nor could it go against what it experienced; nor could it push aside the theology that grew out of this dynamic divinely-appointed connection between Jesus Christ and the life of the Church. The Church could never adopt a view of the person and importance of the historical Jesus which would be incommensurate with the Christ of faith.

III

The second development which comes out of the current debates and which is of special importance to the systematic and historical theologian is the recovery of interest in the unity of the Bible as a demand of the Church. The question naturally arises, Are we to follow the lead of gifted theologians here and there in interpreting the Bible? Except for the stimulation and guidance which they provide, the Church must answer this in the negative, because theologians of equal competence offer conflicting interpretations. Besides this, eminent theologians are involved in the constant and laudable process of revising their previous statements. Can

the Church wait for these men to bring to a halt the varied windings of their thoughts? To ask these questions is to answer them.

It was somewhat surprising that the articles in *RELIGION IN LIFE* previously referred to made very little mention of the Church in relation to the question of a biblical theology. Dr. Smart touches on this when he suggests that the Church has now directed its biblical scholars toward the search for a Scriptural foundation for the faith (pp. 27-28). It would be truer to say that the Church, except for moments of weakness, has always affirmed such a foundation. Since there is no possibility of approaching the Bible without prior principles of interpretation, the only sound procedure is to strive for an understanding which is informed not so much by the perspective of this gifted individual or that, but by the recurring sense of the organic unity of the Church's point of view which has itself come out of the Bible.

Freedom of speculation has been of priceless value in stimulating the mind of the Church and in adding richness to the understanding of the Bible and in the all-important efforts to show its relevance in the various epochs of history. Yet, in the last analysis, it is safe to say that no point of view about the Bible can hope to gain any permanent footing in history which cannot commend itself to the continuing judgment of the Church when it clearly identifies its heritage in the light of the Bible. Without this, at best, a theologian's utterances will be, in addition to sources of stimulation, merely bones over which other theologians who are interested in the fashions of the times can contend.

It is always possible to assert that the Church has been engaged in a colossal blunder throughout the centuries; and if this is true, the Church not only has no reason for being—it has every reason for not being. It is also possible to insist that the Church's gospel must be modified in keeping with the turns and changes in history and culture; but if this is true, the Church has no ageless gospel and no sufficient principle of continuity. Without here engaging in any detailed defense of the point of view of the Church relative to the Bible, it must be urged that the Church stands or falls upon that point of view which has persistently maintained its organic unity and continuity within Christendom.⁶

This does not mean that the Church is committed to the position that everything mentioned is necessarily an organic part of its essential teaching. We must distinguish, on the one hand, between those utterances which

⁶ There have been and are theological rifts within Christendom, but deeper than these is the organic unity which, if clearly and steadfastly identified, becomes the only genuine basis for ecumenicity.

crop up here and there without exhibiting a genuine development as a part of the total biblical insight and, on the other hand, those affirmations which not only recur but which develop in clear outline and which absolutely persist in maintaining their identity of type against all assaults.

For example, it is beyond question that in many passages the Bible says that natural calamities are the products of man's sinfulness. But throughout the Bible a damper is put upon this idea until at last the life and teachings of Jesus reveal that it cannot maintain itself, without qualification, as a genuine and organic feature of the living Word of God.

So is it regarding the doctrine of God's absolute sovereignty and foreordination in the affairs of human history. Many passages can be selected to show that God alone predetermines the course of all historical events. But again this idea is repeatedly qualified by the resurgence of affirmations pertaining to man's God-appointed freedom and accountability. In that austere rugged form it cannot and does not maintain itself before the tribunal of the total and developing teaching of the Bible. The mighty redemptive Purpose of God is greater than the dialectical materials of history which he uses to communicate that Purpose. The unity of the Bible is not found without these dialectical materials, nor is it found merely within them.

The boundary lines within which the Church's thought can move, in its understanding of the Bible, have been established by its own historical development under the directives of the Bible. Though there have been and still are many debates within the Church, there is nevertheless an organic unity and continuity of utterance which comes to supreme expression in Jesus Christ and which has maintained itself with remarkable resilience throughout the centuries. At times some organic feature of the Church's message has been forgotten, only to be recovered again. In the form of a bare outline, the indispensable affirmations of the Church's point of view may now be stated. The one affirmation which presides over all others is that of the reality, effectiveness, and finality of the supernatural initiative of God, manifested historically and finally in Jesus Christ, in behalf of all mankind.⁷ The Church has always held fast to at least four affirmations which are involved in this; and these in their togetherness must direct the theologian as he does his significant work of formulating a unified interpretation of the Bible.

⁷ The word "supernatural" indicates an order of divine activity which can be fully grasped neither by the usual categories employed for understanding the physical universe nor by those usually employed in understanding human history and culture.

1. The first affirmation is this: From the beginning, the God, the Creator, Provider and Adorner of the universe has taken the initiative in man's behalf. In his infinite love and wisdom, God wanted to communicate himself to people and so to act in their behalf that they might fulfill the true import of their lives.

2. The second affirmation growing out of the Church's understanding of the Bible is that God has spoken and acted—expressed this marvelous initiative—in and through the contexts of earthly settings and historical situations. For example, the Church has persistently maintained that, under the inspiration of the living God, through Moses and the prophets, the earthly contexts, historical contingencies, and even borrowed elements were turned into vehicles for communicating the eternal Purpose of God. From this total point of view the Church has been willing to recognize that the Bible discloses certain limiting factors that go with involvement in history. Yet at the same time, the purity of the divine Word has remained intact.

3. A third affirmation that characterizes the Church's continuing point of view is that God has spoken and acted in a special way through a people. On one level, God has spoken in the rich language of nature and made himself known in galaxy, planetary system, snowflake and flower. On another level, God has spoken and acted through the dim gropings and universal longings of mankind. God has spoken in the language of every tongue and acted in the impulses of every heart. But beyond these levels, God wanted his children to receive all that was needed for their true happiness here and for their eternal salvation in the world to come. This required more than a word here and there; it required a historical epic. The all-pervading need of people led God to speak a divine word and to make a divine covenant which, like a profound book or a great epic, moved from level to level until it told the full story of God's Purpose and Strategy for man's redemption. This required a long and continuous line of divine utterance and commitment which through the centuries preserved its unity of type and which exhibited its authenticity as it came to final and complete fulfillment in Jesus Christ the Savior of the world. God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

4. A fourth affirmation of the Church is that man cannot in his own strength alone solve his own most pressing problems. Sin, the despair over ineffective living, the sense of futility before the fact of death, these together with man's total being, require the crucified and risen Savior who

alone, through the power of the Holy Spirit, can affect that relationship of dynamic belonging to God without which there is nothing but endless loneliness and frustration. The Church has always insisted that no one can approach the Bible properly without the profound sense of absolute dependence upon God which is awakened in us through the Holy Spirit. This is not the end but it is the beginning of salvation.

In the Bible itself there is a God-appointed balance between past, present, and future, and no biblical theology can command the sustained allegiance of the Church which does not maintain that balance. It was supposed by some that the neo-orthodox movement would bring about a resurgence of genuine Christian evangelism both in Europe and in the United States. This did not happen. It could not happen, because there was too much of a tendency to get lost in the present and the future without an adequate sense of the divine redemptive initiative in the concrete stuff of history. Mere traditionalism is too much immersed in the past; existentialism is too much immersed in the present; and eschatologism is too much immersed in the reference to the future. In the Bible these belong together in a divinely appointed balance which it is the responsibility of the biblical theologian correctly to assess.

Our Obligation to the Gospel

EUGENE L. SMITH

I

THE PURPOSE OF THEOLOGY is communication. That fact is often forgotten. The very word has sometimes seemed a synonym for obscurantism. Some scholarly pundits seem to believe that the most dangerous heretic is the theologian who writes so that he can be understood. For good reason was the comment made after one of the theological papers at the Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches, "The Word became theology, and did not dwell among us." However, the fact remains that the purpose of theology is communication. Its responsibility is to give reasoned expression to the faith within us. Christian theology is called to bridge two worlds: the unchanging truths about the Triune God in his creation and redemption of man, and the changing cultures in which man tries to find vehicles to express those truths. That task was difficult enough when cultures were largely isolated from each other. Today, however, they are in swirling conflict.

The difficulty we confront, however, is more than that of finding a changing cultural vehicle for an unchanging truth. It lies also in the pervasive influence our cultural experience has upon our understanding of God. Sociological factors influence deeply our theological beliefs. There is more than coincidence in the close relationship between authoritarian culture patterns and strong theological emphasis upon the exceeding sinfulness of sin. Domination by an authoritarian regime often produces in strange, deep interrelationship: (1) a paralyzing sense of dependence, (2) resentment of that dependence, and (3) a pervasive sense of guilt because of that resentment. How can such a pattern produce any theological emphasis except the "otherness" of God and the helplessness and sinfulness of man? On the other hand, how can such an emphasis seem aught but tragically

EUGENE L. SMITH, B.D., Ph.D., is the General Secretary of the Division of World Missions of the Board of Missions of The Methodist Church. His article is a somewhat abridged version of his address to the Seventh Annual Assembly of the National Council's Division of Foreign Missions at Buck Hill Falls, Nov. 26-30, 1956; material also used in the Fondren Lectures at Southern Methodist University and at Scarritt College, Nashville, Tennessee.

mistaken to those trained from childhood in more democratic patterns, the more responsible use of freedom, and deeper self-respect? How can people raised at the extremes of these two patterns understand adequately either, in the former instance, the love of God or, in the latter instance, his wrath?

These psychological factors work so deeply in the unconscious that oftentimes those whom they influence most are least aware of them. To use this single illustration is not to suggest that other theological positions are less influenced by sociological factors. It does, however, point up our problem of finding a theological expression of the truths of God adequate for a day when the cultures of mankind are caught in conflicting cross-currents.

A clue to the effective procedure in this problem may be found in an experience of the writer. It differs only in detail from that of any missionary moving from one culture to another. Therefore it may be revealing in our situation. Called from a pastorate in metropolitan New York with the Methodist Board of Missions, the writer was sent to visit Africa. It was his first glimpse of "foreign" missions, of any culture patterns other than those of western Europe and North America. What should I preach about? Ninety-eight per cent of the illustrations usable in New York would have no meaning in an African village. How can any local Brooklyn pastor preach for four months without dwelling on the glories of the Brooklyn Dodgers? I was going from Brooklyn to a people many of whom did not know that the world is round, and most of them whom had never even heard of our beloved "Bums." With real concern I wondered how any vital contact would be possible.

The answer was found in a leper colony. It was, perhaps, the most shocking place visited in months of travel. Illness had forced for two years the absence of the missionary in charge. No replacement was available. A missionary nurse, already overburdened with work in a hospital and leper colony many miles distant, visited one day each month. No responsible African leadership was available. The local chief, not a Christian, was systematically exploiting the lepers. Medicines given for certain patients never reached them, but were sold to those who could pay, whether those medicines would help them or not. There was much drinking, immorality, fighting. We visited hut after hut. Sorrow, suffering, and sadness were everywhere. They called a church service, and asked me to preach. What do you say to such people? The best educated was illiterate; the healthiest was sick; the finest seemed immoral.

I found myself driven back upon the basic elementals of the Christian Gospel. I told them simply: "All of us are in trouble. God knows our troubles. This knowledge is a heavy burden to him, for God loves us. Out of his love and his sorrow for our troubles, God sent his Son to us. His Son lived among men. He healed them of their diseases. He cleansed them of their sins. But there were some men who did not like his Son. They did not like him because he spoke always the truth. So they killed him. They killed him as a criminal. This caused the greatest sorrow that God has ever known. But God still was not through. He raised his Son from the dead. Because he still loved us, he sent his Son as a Spirit. So his Son lives among us now. He walks the paths where we walk. He comes to us to cleanse us of our sins, to heal us of our diseases. He comes to each of you every day, to give you life, if you will open your hearts to him." When I finished, the missionary who was interpreting asked how many of them would like to become Christians. Every single one raised his hand.

From the human side, the barriers to communication seemed almost insuperable. I was brand new to Africa. I did not know their language. I did not know their customs. I did not know their habits. We were strangers. Yet, within the Gospel, there is a power for communication far surpassing any human abilities or limitations.

II

Herein lies one of the sources of hope for our day. The Christian Church is being driven to a deeper understanding of the essential elements of the Gospel. It is hard to realize how far the optimistic liberalism of an earlier day, in which I once believed, had taken us from the realities of the Christian Gospel. We made our exodus from that Egypt only under storm. Its flesh-pots so allured us that we forgot that we were slaves. In that semipagan world we labored not for the Triune God, and many devoted souls not even for themselves, but for false and despotic deities. We thought we were "religious," but many believed more in science than in God who created the scientist. We spoke of "social action," which was often only a busyness because we were too nervous to be still and know that God is God. We talked of Christian faith when our real confidence was actually a pagan trust in materialistic progress. We preached about Jesus because we doubted the deity of Christ. We labored and some died to make bricks without straw, for we were trying to build the Church

without some of the vital elements of the Christian Gospel. Exodus from that Egypt was essential if the Church was to survive. History forced us to depart.

The exodus alone, however, does not solve the problem. Many are still wandering in the wilderness of neo-orthodox pessimism. Neo-orthodoxy was a corrective needed by modern Protestantism as the Israelites needed the discipline of the desert, but like the desert, it is still outside the boundaries of the Promised Land. Many are still trying to build the Church without some of its foundation truths. We cut the Gospel down to a size that fits smoothly into our culture, and then wonder that the Church does not have room enough to grow. We expurgate the Gospel. We omit those elements which embarrass us by their radicalness, their grandeur, their terrifying purity. Pray God that we may soon cross the Jordan. That is the river where John cried his message of repentance. This is our need. The fundamental problem is not intellectual but moral, not our awareness but our sin.

What difference would it make if we were truly to enter the Holy Land in our theological formulations? The struggle would not be over, but we would then operate from the base of the homeland of our Savior. Truly to operate from that base would mean, I believe, a fundamentally important development in the theological content of our contemporary missionary activity.

Because I have been so critical of the liberalism of which I was once an advocate, it perhaps may be necessary, for the sake of clarity, to state explicitly that I do not advocate now any rigid fundamentalism. The rigid fundamentalist, so faithful in so many little things, is unwittingly guilty of a serious heresy. That heresy is unwillingness to trust to the freedom in which Christ sets us free. From that rigidity comes, oftentimes, a tragic lack of charity in dealings with his fellow Christians. This lack of charity has contributed greatly in recent years to divisions within the Christian Church and a further wounding of the unity of the body of Christ. Herein lies one of the chief weaknesses today of the Christian world mission.

To return to our figure of speech, we ask what it would mean theologically to enter the Promised Land, to make our operating base to be in the homeland of our Savior. The simile is surprisingly helpful. The homeland of Jesus was a crossroads of history. Here the clash of cultures has been felt since Abraham immigrated from Mesopotamia. Here

is a historic meeting place of the nations, one of the vital bridges between the East and the West. Perhaps herein lies one of the secrets of the universality of the Christian faith, its amazing applicability to all cultures.

My plea is that we should realize our obligation to deal with the full Gospel of Jesus Christ; with those elements which fit our specific culture pattern and with those which do not. We need to realize that the criteria of truth we present is the Gospel, rather than the specific needs of a specific people at a specific time and place. There is today in Protestantism a characteristic "European" theology, and a predominant "American" theology, with "British" theology somewhere between the two. This is true even though there are very great differences within the characteristic theologies of each of these countries. Increasingly there seems to be also a Protestant "Japanese" theology which differs in some regards from any of the others. This fact is in one sense a healthful sign. It indicates that Christians in each area have discovered an expression of their faith deeply rooted in their way of life, and therefore having its germinal influence upon that way of life.

The danger, however, lies at two points. One is the failure by exponents of each such point of view to recognize that it is a cultural, as well as a theological, manifestation. From that failure comes the lamentable but widespread tendency to take a culturally rooted, and therefore limited, theological formulation to be the full range of Christian truth. This is theological parochialism at its arrogant worst. In it lies the cause of the second danger: cultural imperialism disguised as theological "orthodoxy." From such aggressive blindness the world mission of the Church has suffered deeply. From it has developed many of the deepest divisions between Christians.

The confusion it causes is suggested by the story of George McLeod, who recounts that he saw on a railroad platform in Southern India, as he was en route to the Madras Conference of the International Missionary Council, a box upon which were written these instructions: "This box to be carried top downward. To avoid confusion the top has been labeled 'bottom.'"

III

Consider the process which so often takes place in our established churches. In the comfortable, well-to-do congregations, which easily become so much like middle-class clubs, we select those elements in the wide spectrum of Christian truth which seem most attractive to us. From them we form our theology. In doing so, however, we neglect or repudiate

those elements less congenial to our situation. To the very degree that we become successful, influential, established, we move away from the radical, and therefore the disturbing, elements of Christian truth.

In the Christian ethic we tend to emphasize generosity but neglect justice. The power of the Holy Spirit is interpreted increasingly in terms of alleviating anxiety and bringing peace of mind, and less and less in terms of conquest of sin. We shy away from the subject of faith healing. We cannot deny the evidence, but we are afraid that if we try it nothing will happen. So it seems wiser to protect our professional reputations and concentrate on other matters. The question of eschatology especially we avoid. American history has had its upheavals, yet by and large it has been a story of the gradual achievement of a life which is more and more secure and satisfying. Thus the radicalism of New Testament eschatology becomes less and less understandable to us, more and more threatening to our material abundance. We are at ease in Zion and any abrupt termination of the life we enjoy is to us unthinkable. We point out with accuracy how European theology has been influenced by a succession of enormous tragedies. We fail to realize how our theology is moulded by our gradual achievement of a fabulous and unmatched prosperity.

Herein lies one of the deep dilemmas of contemporary missions. North America has become the major "sending" area of the world Christian mission, just at the same time when its life is most sharply contrasted to the rest of mankind. To a world vividly prepared to understand the radicalness of the New Testament, we send missionaries untrained to understand, much less proclaim it. Our expectation of the future, of course, is shaped by our experience of the past. When our past stands in such vivid contrast to that of most of our fellow men, our capacity to express to them a meaningful interpretation of the future is severely limited.

This is not the place to enter into the complex intricacies of the eschatological question. I do wish, however, to record my growing conviction that the New Testament interpretation of the consummation of history as an event in which Jesus visibly demonstrates his Lordship of history is a truth so vital to Christian faith that to ignore it is ominously to weaken the Christian Church. The major factor driving me to that belief has been the observance, in so many quarters of the world, of the unmistakable spiritual strength such a faith gives to those who, for the sake of Jesus Christ, live on the trembling edge of martyrdom.

For vivid illustration of what such a faith can mean, let me refer to a conversation with Principal C. T. Huang of Taiwan Theological College

on Formosa. We were riding in a bus to one of the meetings of the Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Evanston. He said to me: "I want to tell you how grateful I am for the eschatological emphasis in the discussions here at Evanston. All my life I have lived amidst great uncertainty. I can never know from one day to the next whether all that I have done in the theological school may be destroyed by an act of war. If I had to depend upon the results of my work for my morale, I could not continue. I am so grateful to God that my morale does not depend upon the results of what I do. Rather, it depends upon the clear knowledge that my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, in his own time and in his own way, will come and take what I have done and structure it into his kingdom. This certainty is what makes my work possible. Then, if there are any good results of my work, that is just an additional blessing that God in his goodness gives to me. It is like gravy on my meat. It is nice to have, but I don't have to depend on it for my strength."

Principal Huang is one of the ablest Asian Christians. He taught for a time at the University of London, and you can see the British influence in the figure of speech that he uses. One American churchman protested, when I used this illustration, that we can hardly expect the experiences of those so far away to determine what our attitudes toward theological issues should be. I can only answer that when the testimony of the martyrs seems irrelevant to us in our security, we need to ask ourselves how far we have departed from the way of the Cross.

Our obligation to take seriously the eschatology of the New Testament is not based merely on the need of the Christian world mission at some distant point of peril. It is founded rather upon the nature of the Gospel itself, and the fundamental needs of people in whatever culture they may live. It may well be that those who need such a message most are we who so love the luxuries of this world that we are least willing to hear the announcement of the unpredictable nearness of the New World.

IV

One of the factors contributing seriously to disunity among Christians is neglect by the established churches of these radical and disturbing elements in the Gospel. There is an unquenchable vitality in the Christian teaching of the Second Coming, of the transforming power of the Holy Spirit, of healing by faith. Those ideas are picked up by people not vitally served by the churches. Groups arise which live mainly by the power of one such idea—notably, Christian Science. Christian Science would never

have developed had the major churches been faithful to the facts about faith healing. So, groups such as the Christian Scientists take their key idea and lift it out of the context of the whole Gospel. Thus they distort it until it becomes actually a heresy. The body of Christ is divided again. Vast numbers of people, within both the churches and the sects, are fed upon half-truths, and both suffer from spiritual malnutrition. This tragic process will not cease until we begin to take seriously our obligation to declare unto our people the whole truth of the Christian Gospel.

St. Paul declared unto the elders of the Church at Ephesus, "I did not shrink from declaring to you the whole counsel of God." How many of us can say that in truth to our churches? How many of us feel a real obligation to proclaim not only those elements of the Gospel which we happen to like, but those which we dislike—not only those which fit easily into our culture, but those which do not?

In my last pastorate I developed the custom of memorizing the Sunday morning Scripture. Actually, I got trapped into that custom by my vanity. The first Sunday I used a Scripture which I knew so well that it was easier to read it without holding the Book before me. I was anxious as a preacher usually is during his first Sunday at a church, and after the service I listened eagerly for any word of praise that I might hear about the sermon. Those kindly people, however, said almost nothing about the sermon, but said much in appreciation for the way the Scripture had been read. I understand them a little better now. I reread that sermon again the other day! I think the Scripture was perhaps the only thing about which they could speak kindly.

So each Sunday thereafter I memorized the Scripture. Few things I did at that church were more appreciated. I often had the open Bible before me during the lesson. The manner of reading was not important. What was important was that studying the Scripture long enough to memorize it caused the reading of it to have meaning and vitality. On Monday morning I would type out the next Sunday's lesson on three-by-five cards. I would carry them in my pocket, especially when sick-calling. The memorizing was done in the odd moments of the week—usually when walking between calls.

The most amazing result to me was the way it forced me to become so much more a biblical preacher. Having lived with a Scripture all week, I had to preach about it on Sunday. The process was painful and vastly enriching. I found myself aware of the way I had expurgated the Christian Gospel. I was giving my people the RSV, but that meant the

"Revised Smith Version," not anything too standard. There were significant sections of the New Testament I avoided like the plague. The eschatological passages did not fit my theology as it then was, so my people had no chance to hear anything about that from my pulpit. I really could not understand why those embarrassing statements about "election" should ever have been included in the Scriptures, so I just preached about other things. Slowly it began to dawn upon me that, when there is a theological disagreement between me and the New Testament, the odds are rather on the side of the Sacred Book.

Now, I am not naive about this. I know there is no theological uniformity in the New Testament. I know that the Scriptures have to be interpreted. I know that the very claim to present the Scriptures as they are, without interpretation, is of itself an interpretation. What I am concerned with here is the complacent assumption, which I believe to be sinful, which I believe to be widespread among our clergy, and which I believe to be the most dangerous practical heresy of our day, that a preacher has a right to limit his preaching to those ideas which he happens, personally, to enjoy.

In actual fact, the church year most of us observe is determined in many ways by secular sources. Let Mother's Day and Pentecost fall on the same Sunday, as they often do, and which do we observe in our churches? Money-making agencies have magnified Mother's Day until the rather sickly sentimentality of its usual observance seems to us more important than the observance of the action of God in the establishment of the Christian Church. Most preachers have a rather thick file on gratitude. The President of the United States declares a day each year when we have to preach on that virtue. How many pastors have a file on repentance which is usually thick? How different would be our preaching if we could learn the sense of obligation to the full revelation of God in Jesus Christ which led Saint Paul to exclaim, "Woe is me if I preach not the Gospel"?

I realize it would be impossible to make a formula of prescribed content for Christian preaching or for Christian witnessing in any form. Could such a formula be made, it would do more harm than good. We do, however, need a sharpened sense of obligation to deal with the whole range of truth in the Christian Gospel, not just the familiar ideas, but also the unfamiliar; not only the easy but also the difficult subjects; not only those which fit our theology but those which challenge it.

V

At least four benefits would accrue to the Christian Church from the deepening of this sense of obligation. In the first place, and perhaps most important, is the fact that our people would have a better balanced theological diet. Their spiritual needs would be more adequately met. In the second place, the Christian Church would gain greatly in stability. There have been major changes in emphasis in Christian theology within just the past century. Each of these changes has been the result of helpful response to real need. Yet, how much more effectively would we have served our people if each change in its turn had been set more solidly within the framework of the whole Gospel of Jesus Christ!

In the third place, the Church would produce better missionaries. We are raised in one culture and then go to another culture to proclaim the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Often we take the form of truth which means most in the culture of our birth and try to apply it unchanged to the culture of our adoption. If, within both cultures, we had a sharper sense of our obligation to all of the elements in the Christian Gospel, we would be much more helpful in the culture of our adoption. It is a major weakness of the missionary movement that the Younger Churches, with the possible exception of Japan, have produced many theologians but no indigenous theologies. We have trained our theologians so thoroughly in Western thought forms that many seem incapable of expressing Christian theology in ways that are really meaningful in their own cultures. We will not really set the theologians of the Younger Churches free to develop indigenous theologies, until both we and they are trained in a fuller sense of our obligation to all of the truth in the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

In the fourth place, the Christian Church would gain greatly in unity through such a deepened sense of obligation. As the theological horizons of each group would broaden, knowledge of our essential agreements would greatly deepen. In short, a clearer recognition of our obligation to the full Gospel of Jesus Christ would produce a deeper spiritual rootage in the life of the Christian Church, thus a closer unity among Christians, a fuller ministry to those within the Church and a clearer witness to those without.

The Personnel of the Twelve Disciples

CHARLES F. NESBITT

LISTS OF JESUS' DISCIPLES are given in all the Synoptic Gospels. There is exact agreement as to the number of persons concerned, but no such agreement as to the names or the order in which they appear—facts which are often puzzling and sometimes disconcerting.

Even Luke's two lists, in the Gospel and the Acts, are not quite the same, much as we might expect them to agree. In the Acts list there are only eleven names, since Judas Iscariot is no longer among the living; but the Gospel list also differs from the Acts version in the order of names and in the rather redundant identification of "Simon whom he called Peter," instead of the simple "Peter" in the Acts.

These are minor differences and may seem of little consequence; but the further one pursues this interesting matter the more numerous and complex the differences become. Where there are so many variations, in what is assumed to be a matter of common knowledge, there must be something more complicated in the background of this familiar tradition of "twelve" disciples.

I

Assuming the priority of Mark's Gospel, we are doubtless justified in thinking his list the earliest record in the history of the emerging church. Matthew's list agrees with Mark's as to the number and names, but not in their order. Both agree with Luke in the double name of Simon-Peter, and these three agree with the Acts in putting him first in all four lists; but the simple agreements end here.

The name of "Matthew" appears in all four lists, but not in the same order or position. In the Gospel of Matthew, the disciple of that name is listed in eighth place among the Twelve, but in Mark he is in seventh position, and likewise in Luke; in the Acts, again in eighth place.

In the earlier story of the selection of this disciple, he is called

CHARLES F. NESBITT, B.D., M.A., Ph.D., is Chairman of the Department of Religion at Wofford College, Spartanburg, South Carolina. His article was read as a paper (1) before the Southern Section of the Society of Biblical Literature at Guilford College, North Carolina, Mar. 20, 1956, and (2) before the Biblical and Patristic Section of the Kentucky Foreign Language Conference in Lexington, Kentucky, April 27, 1956.

"Matthew" only in the Gospel of that name, whereas in both Mark and Luke he is named "Levi." The Synoptics describe him uniformly as "sitting at the tax office" (Revised Standard Version), and that phrase has usually been taken as sufficient identification, but who knows? If both names had been given the same person, why not another doublet, Levi-Matthew, like the similar case of Simon-Peter? Levi does not appear in any of the formal lists, and it is hardly likely that he would have had two Jewish given names!

Sherman Johnson suggests that in the Gospel of Matthew, "Matthew" may have been substituted for Levi by an early copyist;¹ but S. MacLean Gilmour thinks the author of this Gospel has confused "Levi" and "Matthew," substituting the latter name at 9:9, and describing him at 10:3 as a "tax collector."²

In Mark's account, Levi is introduced as the "son of Alphaeus." There is a "James the son of Alphaeus" in all the Synoptic lists, and in some ancient manuscripts there is a similar James at Mark 2:14 instead of Levi, but the weight of evidence favors Levi. It is thought improbable by Frederick C. Grant that "James" and "Levi" were two names for the same person.³ So the problem remains—are Levi and Matthew one person, according to popular tradition? or are they two separate persons whose identities have been confused or forgotten from the earliest days of the church? The latter alternative must be held as a distinct possibility, at least.

II

Another major difficulty in the Synoptic lists is the name, "Thaddeus," in Mark and Matthew, which appears nowhere else at all. In Luke there is a "Judas the son of James" as distinguished from Judas Iscariot, and the "Judas (not Iscariot)" of John 14:22 is perhaps rightly identified with this Judas the son of James. But is this Judas to be properly identified with Thaddeus? Again, tradition has done so, but on what grounds is not clear. The problem becomes more serious as we note other complexities in the total personnel of the Twelve.

The textual evidence for Thaddeus varies. Some manuscripts read "Lebbaeus called Thaddeus," as translated in the King James Version but not in the Revised Standard or in the better ancient texts such as the Vaticanus, Sinaiticus, and some others. Branscomb thinks that "Lebbaeus"

¹ Johnson, S. E., *The Interpreter's Bible*. Abingdon Press, 1951, Vol. VII (Matthew-Mark), pp. 351-52.

² Gilmour, S. M., *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII (Luke-John), p. 108.

³ Grant, F. C., *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 672.

is possibly a Hellenized form of "Levi."⁴ It is more probable that ecclesiastical tradition has simply confused two or even three names here in an obvious attempt to protect the integrity of the mystic "Twelve."

It is quite possible that the personnel of this group may have changed from time to time during Jesus' ministry, or that the complete list of disciples' names was forgotten before it was ever reduced to permanent record. Further, it is hardly likely that the entire group of men was ever together except in rare instances. It may be that certain men were present on certain occasions, and others on other occasions, so that the total number of disciples was never carefully preserved in oral tradition, but somehow the familiar figure of Twelve persisted. Whether the lists were correctly preserved or not, it is quite certain that only a few disciples made any lasting impression on the life of the early church. Other than Peter and James and John, who else of the so-called Twelve is known for any important contribution to the ongoing church? It is also interesting to observe how little is known about so few of these men in the Gospels.

Fewer than half the names are ever mentioned again outside the conventional lists. Of course, Simon-Peter is the most prominent in all the Synoptic accounts, appearing alone on six different occasions, and in company with James and John on five others. One of the latter incidents includes Andrew for his only Synoptic appearance. James and John appear together three times, and John alone once. Judas Iscariot appears but three times in the Synoptic narratives. Thomas appears twice in the public ministry and twice more in the resurrection stories, but only in the Fourth Gospel in all these instances. Beyond these six disciples, the others of the "Twelve" are mere names in the lists, a fact that tells us very little about the number or character of the men concerned. Even Eusebius' passing comments about their later activities, written in the early fourth century, add little of importance to this body of information.⁵

III

The problem assumes still larger proportions as we continue into the Fourth Gospel, where there is no formal list of the Twelve, and where the disciples most often named are a different group generally from the ones familiar in the Synoptic stories, with the single exception of Simon-Peter. He appears in the Fourth Gospel in fourteen incidents, more than

⁴ Branscomb, B. H., *The Gospel of Mark*. Harper & Brothers, n. d., p. 65.

⁵ *The Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius Pamphilus*, translated by the Rev. C. F. Cruse. London: Bell & Daldy, 1866 edition, III, 1.

twice his total appearances in the Synoptics. Judas Iscariot is found on six occasions, double the number of his Synoptic appearances. The inferences are quite clear—Simon-Peter is the greatest of the disciples, in the role of leader, but Judas Iscariot is the most infamous of the lot, in the role of betrayer.

The other disciples in the Fourth Gospel create still other problems concerning the personnel of the Twelve. Andrew is named in three separate events, in contrast to a single case in the Synoptics. Philip and Thomas appear on four separate occasions, but not all in the Synoptics outside the formal lists. Nathanael appears twice in the Fourth Gospel, but who is "Nathanael"? No such name occurs in the Synoptics. He is first named in conjunction with Philip, but in the Synoptic lists Philip is grouped with Bartholomew, or with Thomas, Bartholomew, and Matthew. This curious fact has given rise to the view that Nathanael and Bartholomew were one and the same person, on the grounds that Bartholomew was the "son of Tolmai" in Aramaic and that "Nathanael" was perhaps his given name.⁶

On the other hand, MacGregor thinks that Nathanael is a "purely ideal figure," the representative of the "true Israelites" who have professed faith in Christ as opposed to "the Jews" so sharply censored later in John 8:44.⁷ Neither of these views seem satisfactory to the serious student. The familiar attempt to identify Nathanael and Bartholomew seems another pious effort to protect the traditional integrity of the mystic number "Twelve" at the expense of the obvious conclusion that the disciples made up a larger group than can be contained in this simple mathematical mold. This was hinted at as long ago as 1871 by the late A. B. Bruce.⁸ It seems more probable that Nathanael was another real disciple of Jesus, whose biographical data were lost in the uncertain history of the early church, as indicated by the Synoptic silence about him.

In the opening scenes of the Fourth Gospel, when the first disciples are mentioned, two of John the Baptist's followers were standing with him when Jesus came by. They joined Jesus as his disciples from that moment, and "one of the two" men is plainly identified as Andrew; who was the other? Uncritical opinion often leaps to the conclusion that it was his brother Simon, since they are listed in close conjunction in the Synoptics. But it cannot be so, as the author states clearly that Andrew then went and found his brother Simon and brought him to Jesus.

⁶ Howard, W. F., *The Interpreter's Bible*, Vol. VIII, p. 488.

⁷ MacGregor, G. H. C., *The Gospel of John*. Harper & Brothers, n. d., p. 45.

⁸ Bruce, A. B., *The Training of the Twelve*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871 (6th edition, 1908), p. 32.

Who was the other "one of the two"? It has been thought by some that he was John, the brother of James and son of Zebedee, since James and John are introduced in the older Synoptic tradition along with Simon and Andrew, as pairs of brothers engaged in the fishing industry. It is sometimes submitted as an argument from silence for the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel, but neither assumption seems justified. MacGregor confesses that "such exegesis could hardly have occurred except to one already biased in favor of the traditional theory of authorship."⁹ It seems a much sounder conclusion that the unnamed person was another of the followers of Jesus, whose identity was probably lost in the mists of time, especially in the light of another similar incident.

When Jesus was arrested and brought before the priests early in the morning of that fateful Friday, the author of the Fourth Gospel said that "Simon Peter followed Jesus, and so did another disciple. As this disciple was known to the high priest, he entered the court of the high priest along with Jesus, while Peter stood outside the door. So the other disciple, who was known to the high priest, went out and . . . brought Peter in."¹⁰ Who was this "other disciple"? He must have been one of the regular followers of Jesus because of his close association with Peter, the leader of the group. But why the mystery about his identity? Could he have been the same unnamed person of the passage above, 1:35ff? If so, why the mystery of his identity on two widely separate occasions?

It has been argued that this is the author's way of validating the Gospel, implying his own intimate relations with the events reported, but such a view still lacks convincing support. If the Johannine authorship depends on this kind of validation, it rests on pretty weak grounds over against an abundance of literary and historical evidence opposing it. John and his brother James are notable in the Fourth Gospel for its silence about them—they are not even named; the only exception being the phrase "sons of Zebedee" in the Appendix at 21:2. It is quite different from the Synoptics, where they are among the familiar leaders, along with Simon-Peter.

Moreover, there is often a tendency to link this unnamed person with the traditional "Beloved Disciple" as further evidence of the Johannine authorship. The difficulty with this view is twofold. (1) There is the lack of specific identification of the so-called Beloved Disciple with John, the son of Zebedee, or with any other known member of the Twelve. The

⁹ MacGregor, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁰ John 18:15-16.

phrase is usually the "disciple whom Jesus loved," instead of "Beloved Disciple," and it occurs but three times in the Gospel proper and twice more in the appendix (chapter 21). He is never named anywhere in the Gospel, so that his actual identity, contrary to popular opinion, remains a mystery. Of numerous efforts to identify this strange figure, none have been altogether satisfactory, and he remains one of the enigmas of the Fourth Gospel.

(2) The second difficulty here is the multiplication of the personnel of the Twelve to such an extent that efforts to preserve the mystic number begin to appear somewhat ridiculous. If Levi and Matthew are two different persons, and Thaddeus and Lebbaeus are also different, as has been shown highly probable in both cases, the Synoptic lists yield a possible fourteen men making up the so-called Twelve. Then if Nathanael is another disciple known only in the Fourth Gospel tradition, and if we add the unnamed companion of Andrew at the beginning, as well as the unknown companion of Simon-Peter on the night of Jesus' arrest, the total figure becomes sixteen or seventeen. The further addition of the "disciple whom Jesus loved" brings the list to a possible eighteen, and the end is not yet.

In the story of Lazarus' death, the sisters, Martha and Mary, sent an urgent plea to Jesus with the message, "Lord, he whom you love is ill." This phraseology immediately suggests the further possibility of Lazarus being identified with the Beloved Disciple, which identification is sometimes made.¹¹ This addition of Lazarus to the list of disciples in the early traditions of the church should surprise no one who is familiar with the nature of these traditions.

In Luke's well-known story of the walk to Emmaus (24:13-35), after the resurrection news had become known, "two of them" were on the road to Emmaus together, one of whom was "Cleopas" and the other unnamed. This fact raises speculation as to his possible identity with the similar mysterious references in the Fourth Gospel, but there is no further verification. However, Cleopas is a definite name and the story clearly implies that he and his companion were disciples, though not especially identified with the Twelve. Attempts are often made to relate this Cleopas with the Clopas who was the husband of Mary, considered to be identical with "Jesus' mother's sister" in John 19:25. It would be strange indeed had there been two sisters in the same family named Mary, and it is

¹¹ Filson, F. V., "Who Was the Beloved Disciple?" in *The Journal of Biblical Literature*, June, 1949, pp. 83-88.

stranger still that the further identification should be made; for the names of the men differ more in their native Greek than in their English equivalents—*Κλεοπάς* and *Κλωπᾶ*.

In the story of Jesus' burial, Joseph of Arimathea is mentioned in all four Gospels. In John 19:38, he is "a disciple, but secretly." In Matthew 27:57, he is reported as wealthy and "a disciple," and Luke follows Mark in listing him as a member of the Council, who was "looking for the kingdom of God."¹² So it appears that he was generally thought of as a disciple but not necessarily ranked with the Twelve.

In John's version of the same story, Nicodemus is also mentioned as having brought a hundred pounds of spices to anoint the body of Jesus, according to Jewish burial customs (19:39), but the enormous quantity of spices excites speculation as to why such seeming extravagance. It must have been the result of great love and deep respect for his departed friend, which perhaps meant discipleship in the same general sense as that of Joseph of Arimathea. In Nicodemus' second appearance in the Fourth Gospel, he demanded of the Pharisees a fair hearing for Jesus instead of indictment without it (7:50). Perhaps it is not too much to infer that his first visit to Jesus under cover of night had eventually borne significant fruit in this last act of devotion as a real disciple.

IV

What more shall we say? Time and patience might fail if we persist much further, but this is not the end. What of John Mark, and Simon of Cyrene, and Bartimaeus and Zacchaeus, and the many faithful women disciples noted in the Gospels, especially in Luke? Since all these have little direct association with the Twelve we may reluctantly leave them, with one final incident which cannot be omitted.

In the Acts' story of the choice of Judas' successor, two men were nominated, whom Simon-Peter described as having "accompanied us during all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day when he was taken up from us—one of these men must become with us a witness of his resurrection" (Acts 1: 21-22). It is curious how this incident is overlooked in the studies concerning the Twelve. If Peter's words mean anything, it is clear that he was aware of other disciples being directly associated with the so-called Twelve all along, whether named in the traditions or not. We never heard of Joseph Justus or Matthias before this incident, and after Matthias'

¹² Mark 15:43, Luke 23:50-51.

selection to fill the vacancy we never hear of him again; in much the same way as most of the others he disappeared into obscurity. This story seems to point toward even Peter having a concern for the preservation of the mystic number "Twelve."

It must be obvious by this time that the term "disciple" was used in a very loose sense; it was certainly not confined to the Twelve. A check of the references to "disciple" (μαθητής) in Young's *Analytical Concordance* (21st edition) shows a list of 231 uses of the word in the Gospels and 30 more for the Acts, a total of 261 times the word is used by these four authors. On the other hand, the term "apostle" (ἀπόστολος) is used only eight times in the Synoptics and not at all in the Fourth Gospel, but it occurs 30 times in the Acts. The word "disciple" clearly meant the followers of Jesus in a very wide and informal sense, as well as those more or less formerly appointed; while the term "apostle" was evidently the creation of the early church and not necessarily dependent on the number of Jesus' actual followers.

The term "Twelve" is used less frequently in the Gospels, but apparently in equally loose manner. Statistics show its use ten times in Mark, eight each in Matthew and Luke, and only four times in John. When parallel stories are omitted, the term occurs only ten times in the entire course of Jesus' public ministry, and thrice more in the resurrection stories. Only occasionally are any members of the Twelve identified, and when they appear separately or in small groups, it is usually in some particular incident, of such an impressive nature as to become firmly fixed in the traditions. Otherwise, it was the simple designation of "the twelve," or more generally, just "the disciples." Further, the duties or functions of this group are practically impossible to define in any clear manner. In general, their work as followers of Jesus seems rather obvious, but in particular detail just what they did is not quite certain. There is not enough data in the traditions to warrant any satisfactory conclusion on this point.

Nor is the evidence very impressive for any clear concept of the Twelve as a mathematical unit; it is rather an ecclesiastical symbol. It is almost impossible to conceive this group as a definite unit of church organization as early as the second and third generations, when the Gospels were written. It is possible that the early church clung to a lingering hope that somehow a new Israel, based on the familiar pattern of the ancient "twelve tribes" of Israel, would emerge from the new Christian movement. But even the traditional designation of the twelve tribes was also a very general term, all but devoid of mathematical certainty, and this loose symbolism

seems to have carried over into the new Israel, remaining equally uncertain in numerical content.

John of Patmos would have inscribed the walls of the new Jerusalem with the "twelve names of the twelve apostles," but he did not preserve those names for posterity in his famous Apocalypse.¹³ It seems that he was familiar with the tradition of the twelve apostles, but he was probably ignorant of the names of the men who composed the group—so imperfect were the historical records even then, near the end of the first century.

A generation earlier, Paul of Tarsus was also familiar with the traditional Twelve, as noted in certain of his Letters, but nowhere does he betray any knowledge of who they were, other than Peter, James, and John.¹⁴ Since Paul was so close to the very days when the "pillar apostles" were still alive and actively promoting the Christian mission, it is strange indeed that he knew so little of the personnel of this group. Even though he had little to do with the Twelve as such, and even less need for being especially concerned with their identification, one wonders whether already, at this early date about the middle of the first century, the names of the men who made up the Twelve were even then disappearing into the mists of uncertainty, and therefore lost to history.

In summary then, it seems that our traditional concept of but "twelve" disciples, as a sort of closed corporation, is mistaken. On the contrary, there were already in Jesus' day "many disciples," in the most comprehensive sense of the term. So it has ever been, and ever shall be—the number of his faithful followers is multitudinous in every age of the church, and no less so even today!

¹³ Rev. 21:14.

¹⁴ Gal. 1:18—2:9, I Cor. 9:5, 15:5.

Book Reviews

The Christian Scholar in the Age of the Reformation. By E. HARRIS HARBISON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. 177 pp. \$3.00.

Most of us were probably raised on the view that Christian scholarship (or at least scholarly Christianity) did not begin till the eighteenth century; and that it consisted of the Quest for the Historical Jesus, from Reimarus to Schweitzer. But, rightly or wrongly, that view is now out of fashion. For there has been a revival of both Catholic and Protestant scholarship—in such volumes as W. E. Campbell's study, *Erasmus, Tyndale and More*, and W. Schwarz's analysis of Reformation *Principles and Problems of Biblical Translation*. And the special merit of Professor Harbison's new book is the success with which he brings to our attention the kinds of scholarship which were not merely Catholic and not merely Protestant but distinctively *Christian* in the age of the Reformation.

Confining himself to the first two generations of the re-formation of the Church, he shows the resemblances and differences between an Erasmus and a Jerome, a Luther and an Augustine, a Calvin and an Aquinas. The chapters on Luther and Calvin are the climax of the volume and may profitably be read in connection with J. S. Whale's recent treatment in *The Protestant Tradition*. Whale is perhaps fuller and better on Luther as a biblically professing Christian, and Harbison on Luther as a Professor of Bible. Luther's lectures, as Harbison well says, tended to be sermons; he respected the grammar of Holy Writ in the original tongues but used every advantage in his native language to make even more forceful what he believed to be God's Word to man:

"To make the Psalms more vivid to the reader (like most men of his day he took them to refer to Christ Himself), he changed preterite and future tenses to the present. To be sure, he gave this up when it was pointed out to him that it was grammatically untenable. But he stoutly refused to remove the famous added word in Romans 3:28 where he had written that man is justified 'ohne des Gesetzes Werke, allein durch den Glauben' (without the works of the law, *only* by faith). His critics stared at it, he said, 'like a cow at a new door.' But he was writing German, not Latin or Greek, and in German *allein* is used along with the negative to admit one thing and exclude another, as in 'I have only eaten and not drunk.' To make Paul's meaning 'clear and strong' in German, he insisted, the extra word must be there. 'We must ask the mother in the home, the children on the street, the common man in the marketplace about this, and look them in the mouth to see how they speak, and afterwards do our translating,' he argued."

And as Harbison comments (with equally balanced scholarship and faith): "He had a perfectly good case, as a matter of fact. But it was not entirely coincidence that the translation helped make the case for justification by faith alone still 'clearer and stronger.'"

The treatment of Calvin is perhaps not so cogent as that of Luther, the difficulty being that the parallel with Aquinas is something less than fortunate. It was not till the third generation of the re-formation of the Church that biblical faith was once again fructified by philosophy and vice versa. So that only in the emergence of Protestant Scholasticism, as at Basel under Polanus and Wolleb, is there a just parallel with the Aquinian synthesis. On the other hand, the analysis of Calvin's unique moti-

vation as a Christian scholar, the account of his "calling," is penetrating and valuable.

Professor Harbison has some concluding observations on the nature of Christian scholarship today (in the light of its history and development) which are of great importance and relevance. He asks: what should be the relation of the university and the seminary in our pluralistic culture? And, rightly accepting the Christian wall of separation between Church and State, he stresses the need for a fruitful tension between religion and culture:

"Colet and Erasmus, Luther and Calvin, knew nothing of 'secular' universities and 'denominational' seminaries, although Calvin's Academy at Geneva foreshadowed the later separation. The danger is that our seminaries will become mere ministerial 'trade-schools,' cut off from all fruitful contact with higher learning in other fields, and that our universities will become purely secular centers of research and vocational training, divorced from all contact with religious scholarship. The solution is not to attempt to restore the medieval university in twentieth-century society. Secular university and denominational seminary can hardly be reunited in a pluralistic society. The only possible solution would seem to be the deliberate development of more fruitful contact between the two sorts of institution through their members. The danger of final separation between sacred and secular learning can only be avoided if more men and women in both seminaries and universities acquire the vision of scholarship as a calling worthy of a Christian, and of Christianity as a commitment worthy of a scholar."

THOMAS S. K. SCOTT-CRAIG

Professor of Religion, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.

Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace. By PETER A. BERTOCCHI. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957. 110 pp. \$2.00.

Multitudes of people—including most college students—feel in their bones (but not in their minds) that Christianity is the most desirable path of life. Christian ethics they accept as an approximate guide to their own conduct. But they are wary of Christian doctrine, and refuse to participate in the Christian fellowship. One reason why many of them are resistant is that they have never read a guidebook that leads them step by step into the logic of the Christian position. Instead of starting with faith and doctrine they would do well to start with experience, evidence, coherency, and psychological fact.

Professor Bertocchi's hundred-page essay is such a guidebook. You will not encounter a better. The author ties his forthright argument at one end to psychological truth and at the other to a basic, if somewhat liberal, theology. The intervening exposition has a classic quality of clarity, trenchancy, and scope. There is more unity in his theory of the moral and religious foundations of life than the book's somewhat disjointed title implies.

No review can do justice to the tightly woven argument. It starts with the case for the freedom of the will. Bertocchi does not claim for man a large measure of freedom (too many acts are manifestly determined), but he insists nevertheless on the central and portentous fact of freedom. Some of his evidence is convincing, some not so convincing. Particularly cogent is his point that "impartial thinking" always requires freedom. Unless man can will to weigh the evidence, unless he can control his beliefs in the interests of truth, then even the assertions of the deterministic scientist are invalid. Thinking is not always free; but whenever we gather our wits and say

to ourselves, "On the whole this is the best thing to do," we are exercising our agency of will. This agency, the author makes clear, is not determined by wants, desires, external forces, or by anything outside of itself.

Less convincing to me is his argument that many human practices and ideals would be senseless without true freedom. Thus, praise and blame, freedom of press and of conscience, he thinks, imply volitional freedom. I cannot agree, for blame might be a useful social corrective (as is punishment in training a dog) without the will being free; and society might need freedom of press and of worship even if the individuals involved merely represented a multiplicity of determined beliefs. But if the author inclines to over-argue his case, he leaves us none the less with a residue of unassailable points. And he shows how freedom is entirely compatible with order, how it operates effectively within the confines of a personality structure.

The author turns next to the unique experience of "oughting." Moral obligation is not the same as tribal pressure ("must"). Nor does it depend on wants or desires. That one ought to do the best one knows is a universal imperative in human experience. But left to itself, this sense of imperative would not provide standards of value. Moral life needs objective standards, and these are anchored in the creative capacities of man. The growth of the individual requires risk; it requires love of persons as persons; it requires the will to forgive, care for the needy, and all other virtues set forth in the Sermon on the Mount.

"Selfishness is the abortive use of creativity." "The sin of sins . . . is to make creativity serve only security, and to make freedom encourage safety at any price" (p. 71). At the same time, "To love another person is to will for him, as far as one may for another, *at his point of development*, a fuller range of achievement in value experience" (p. 79). Now, to understand another's point of development requires psychological knowledge. We dare not love him by rule of thumb, nor apply a prefabricated notion of what is necessary for his salvation. "We do a disservice to God when we clamp his creative work into fixed, detailed affirmations, or when we are satisfied with pious generalities . . ." (p. 90).

With such a broad and open theological point of view—one that allows for the accumulating insights of psychology and philosophy—the author inevitably comes to a somewhat liberal interpretation of Christian doctrine. Man is neither a higher animal nor a fallen god. He is simply man, a unique creation. God's grace is God's co-operation with man in a project of mutual creativity. The best proof of grace lies in the common experience of people who find divine help in their creative efforts, and who suffer nakedness and alienation when they break the bond. The doctrines of Atonement are attempts to interpret the total meaning of this situation. In the last analysis God makes more effort than man to repair the breach in their co-operative venture.

All in all, our author is more rationalist than mystic, more liberal than orthodox, more philosopher than theologian. But he is above all fundamentally Christian and compassionate. He is too broad-minded to exclude other avenues of truth, provided they are faithful to man's demonstrated nature. Nor does he brush aside the doubter's difficulties. I repeat, this is a classic guidebook for adults who wish to follow a reasoned road into the Christian faith, and to understand its compelling coherence with human experience.

GORDON W. ALLPORT

Professor of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Modern Science and Christian Beliefs. By ARTHUR F. SMETHURST. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957. xx-300 pp. \$4.00.

It is an essential tenet of Christian belief that creation reveals its Creator and that God so loved that which he had created that he became a part of it. Thus the story of the Incarnation with all of its implications and consequences must not be inconsistent with the story of creation and its revelation. The trouble is, in this day of specialized scholarship, that few are competent to discuss the relations between these modes of revelation. Happily we are beginning to find scientists subsequently trained in theology, or theologians who have taken the time to acquaint themselves with the teachings of modern science, who will communicate their thoughts to us. Canon Smethurst has an honors B.Sc. degree in chemistry and a Ph.D. degree from London University at the Imperial College of Science and Technology. He also has received an honors degree in theology from Oxford. He is thus well qualified to discuss the tensions which arise between theology and science, and he has done so in this book.

He has divided his subject into four main sections. Part I deals with certain general questions. Although many people seem unaware of it, modern science is based upon certain presuppositions. Simply stated, these are: belief in the orderliness of the universe, belief in the principle of causality or intelligibility in the natural world, and belief in the reliability of human reason. A little reflection will show that these presuppositions have a theological basis and that, in historical fact, modern science had its birth in a Christian culture where these presuppositions are central. Whether it could have developed in a non-Christian environment or whether it can flourish in a wholly atheistic atmosphere, are questions not susceptible to provable answers; but Canon Smethurst gives many examples from the seventeenth century showing the Christian faith of the pioneers of modern science. It was much later that the quarrels between science and religion arose as between two incompatible absolutes. But science no longer claims the absolutism that has often been declared in its name, and the section closes with a discussion of the limitations of modern science.

Section II presents the fundamental problems that exist when the theologian and the scientist face each other with their doctrines and their theories. In this section science is conveniently subdivided into three major categories: the physical sciences, the biological sciences, and those sciences (such as psychology) which deal with the nature of the human mind and character. It should be made immediately clear that in the 125 pages devoted to this discussion there is insufficient space to do much more than raise the important issues and suggest the proper approach to them. However, the author has given many references to permit the reader to pursue the individual topics to any extent that he desires.

It will, perhaps, come as no surprise to learn that the physical sciences provide the least difficult problems and those dealing with human personalities the most. For one thing, the physical sciences touch largely on inanimate matter, and for another, the revolution which modern physics has undergone in the last fifty years has removed nearly all the obstacles that once existed to a mature Christian faith. On the other hand, biology is the study of life and its origins and it thus impinges more directly on the problem of man, his existence, and his purpose. Finally, it has been only recently that psychology and related fields of inquiry have achieved the status of a science, and theories in this area are not nearly as well codified and generally accepted as in the physical realm. It will be some time before we can come as

closely to grips with these problems—problems which are only now being formulated. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that they exist, but it is also significant that outstanding authorities here, as in other scientific disciplines, see complementarity rather than fundamental disagreement with Christian doctrine.

Part III may prove to be the most unsatisfactory section of the book for some readers. Here the author undertakes to discuss two specific ways in which science and religion may come into conflict. It is all very well to say that "in principle" science and religion are not out of harmony; but what about the conflicts which arise in details such as one finds in the miracle stories (particularly those in the New Testament which seem less likely to be simply folk lore) and in the creeds? Can a scientist honestly accept a faith with these details?

The neofundamentalist reader may regard the author as too liberal in his point of view, and the modernist may accuse him of too much literalism. The present reviewer has been accused of both tendencies, so he feels sympathy with the author. But if the reader will remember that it is in this section that the author speaks out of his own personal beliefs, he can read these pages with value, and he is under no obligation to accept them for his own. In fact, Canon Smethurst acknowledges that disagreement is possible and that one's claim to be a Christian does not rest or fall upon the acceptance of a given interpretation. The significant and essential features of both miracle and creed are their theological messages. We perhaps do wrong to subject them to scientific scrutiny if by so doing we mask or destroy what they seek to communicate.

The final section of the book is actually a series of short appendices on modern philosophies arising from science. There is little question that a major problem today is one of communicating the Christian message to a world steeped in the study of scientific principles and molded by the so-called scientific point of view. Canon Smethurst feels that of those who have attempted a real synthesis of scientific philosophy and theology, Karl Heim has been the most successful.

This volume is highly recommended, not for its depth or profundity, but for its challenge to the reader. Basic questions are asked and at least the approach to a Christian answer is given. The reader should be stimulated to continue the inquiry; but this book should reassure him that no fundamental incompatibility exists between Christianity and science. Creation and Incarnation both reveal the same God.

RICHARD K. TONER

Associate Professor of Chemical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

Science and Christian Belief. By C. A. COULSON. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. 127 pp. \$2.50.

The McNair Lectures at Chapel Hill grow in distinction year by year. In the series given by Professor C. A. Coulson of Oxford the theme may be described as the rethinking of natural theology in a Christian light by way of a meticulous recognition of the personal concern and religiosity which animate the scientific tradition.

In drawing widely upon the sciences, the author's stress is less upon the findings of science, more upon the motives of finding. Kant-like, his conception of truth in the sciences is a function of the "interlocking" of parts of experience in a whole, of "patterns of relationships" open to indefinite extension, within which the literal and discrete facts are "secondary" (p. 40). What a satisfaction it is, in this day of positivists, to find a mathematical scientist renewing our latent conviction that beauty

is a relevant determinant of scientific truth (pp. 49-51). There is here, too, a particularly fine sense of the "ethos" of science—the intellectual and moral virtues, if you will, by which its life is lived in blended devotion and austerity. (Cf. esp. pp. 54-57.)

In the early part of the book the word "metaphysics" is used now and again, much as Kant uses the word "dogmatism," to refer to an unbecoming set of mind. The text is read more easily once this verbal point is clear. The crucial idea to grasp is that "either God is in the whole of Nature, with no gaps, or He's not there at all" (p. 22). The scientific enterprise is not to be fenced off into nonreligious and religious portions. One recognizes kinship with Whitehead in this insight, borne out by a number of explicit references to Whitehead. Reflection upon the scientific dimension of human creativity yields the final equation: "the splendour, the power, the dynamic and progressive character of science are nothing but the splendour and the power and the dynamic character of God progressively revealed to us" (p. 63). The transition is from "science as having religious quality" to religion as including science in its total "stereoscopy" (p. 84). The Cartesian *cogito* is founded in a more profound "encounter" (pp. 65, 113) and "response" (93, 106). Thus the full "act of reflection" is existential (pp. 84-86, 96), though Professor Coulson does not use this term.

Is science particularly Christian? Yes. Once one sees that the real world proves itself to be progressively known on precisely the same terms which enhance the personal worth of human existence, then "every experience is an encounter" in the religious sense (p. 65). It follows that the story of the world has incarnation as its milieu and the Incarnation as its intelligible completion (pp. 62, 112). Here one recalls the canticle in the Prayer Book which starts, *Benedicite, omnia opera Domini—all his works, from the sun, moon and stars through the whole scale to the "spirits and souls of the righteous."*

In reading the book, follow its promptings to further reading, particularly those given in the list of notes and references.

RICHARD HOCKING

Professor of Philosophy, Emory University, Georgia.

Toward a Christian Philosophy of Higher Education. Edited by JOHN PAUL VON GRUENINGEN. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957. 191 pp. \$3.50.

That many leaders of church-related colleges have a new concern for the distinctly Christian orientation of these institutions is one of the encouraging signs of our time. Such interest comes none too soon, for many church-related colleges have already succumbed far too much to the sub-Christian forces at work in our nation. During the last decade or so, an increasing number of thoughtful discussions have been carried on in an effort to reverse this trend, and out of this inquiry has also come a considerable amount of useful written material.

Toward a Christian Philosophy of Higher Education is the result of such a meeting of concerned people, this one being comprised of some three hundred delegates from fifty-eight colleges, seminaries, and universities and held at Jamestown College, North Dakota, in June, 1955. The book consists of eleven papers presented by the principal leaders of the conference. The four sections deal with theory, personality, method, and goals, all related to Christian higher education.

In view of the diversity of authorship, the chapters have a surprising amount of unity. It is to be hoped that this is due to a growing sense of agreement concerning

the directions in which we must move. The following summary statements give some indication of the emphases evident in the papers.

1. All of the writers agree that there is an urgent need for continued conversation on the nature of a Christian philosophy for higher education and the implementation of that philosophy.

2. A recurring emphasis is that the Christian faith must provide the framework in which learning takes place in the Christian college. Courses in religion, the appointment of chaplains, and the like are not sufficient.

3. It is generally agreed that sound learning and the Christian faith are quite compatible, and thus the Christian college must make sure that it provides the most adequate learning-teaching situation possible.

4. The most common solution offered to meet existing difficulties consists of a more adequate teaching staff. The teacher is rightfully held to be the key, though little help is given with respect to recruiting and training such personnel.

5. The philosophy of education most often implied or stated is one which might be called "liberal" or "essentialist." There is an encouraging recognition that education must be "existentially" oriented and not merely academic or professional. Rather it must be aimed toward a complete view of life.

6. There is a conscious effort on the part of most writers to verbalize their faith. This is both encouraging and at the same time somewhat disappointing, since some of the words tend to be clichés. Much additional work is obviously needed as to what is meant by teaching from a Christian "perspective," or in a Christian "atmosphere."

Several chapters may be chosen for special commendation: Dirks' on the relationship of faith and reason, Hulme's on the learner-teacher relationship, Cuninggim's on curriculum, and Kretzmann's on administration. Perhaps the most pleasant surprise of all is the effort of Joseph Haroutunian, a theologian, to delineate a philosophy of education consonant with Protestant theology. He does an amazingly successful job, too.

The book serves as an introduction to the issues in Christian higher education, and will thus be useful for the 'layman' who needs to know the issues and to have some directions for improvement indicated.

HOWARD GRIMES

Professor of Christian Education, Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

The Christian and the World of Unbelief. By LIBUSE LUKAS MILLER. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957. 240 pp. \$4.75.

The object of this book, says Mrs. Miller, "is to help the Christian realize that the life of faith must be lived in two worlds—the world as seen through the eyes of faith, and the world as variously deciphered or undeciphered by the unbelievers" (p. 7). Instead of presenting a book on apologetics, she attempts to take up where apologetics leave off and to aid the Christian in coming to terms with the non-Christian world in which he has to live and do his thinking. We can be thankful to the author for reminding us that, despite the revival of religious interest in colleges and among intellectuals, the Christian still has to swim against a secularist tide in the world of thought today.

After an introductory chapter on the world of unbelief, Mrs. Miller devotes chapters to Knowledge, Philosophy, Social Science, Ethics, Culture, and History. In each chapter she presents a lucid description of the situation in the field under study,

its challenge to Christianity, and then she presents a Christian's view of the problems. In each case she finds that although objective facts are the same for believer and unbeliever, the Christian has a particular perspective from which he views the problems and which throws a particular illumination upon them. The result is that, despite the modest claim that the book is post-apologetic, it does serve as a valuable apologetic for Christianity.

I found particularly interesting Mrs. Miller's comments upon the current debate between defenders of philosophical views of God and those who argue for theological views of God. This debate got off on the wrong track, she believes, when both sides assumed that the difference between the viewpoints was entirely the result of sin and thus proceeded to argue about the degree of man's sinfulness. But Mrs. Miller argues that man's finiteness is also a major reason for differing views of God. The fact that man's knowledge is necessarily limited by man's nature is not blameworthy. Sin only comes in when man refuses to admit his finiteness and idolatrously claims too much for his knowledge. Man is thus always tending either to fall into irresponsible skepticism or else to make preposterous claims for his knowledge. In place of these, the Christian ought to face and accept the natural limitations of his knowledge and then dedicate his knowledge to the service of God.

The author has a vivid way of driving home her points. For example, she says, "Man does not want to be what he really is, and yet what he really is does not permit him to be what he wants to be, or not for long" (p. 187). Or, "History is a failure, not because men did not know what God wanted, but because they did not want what God wanted for them" (p. 226). And how many of us are taken to task by her comment, "Many Christians think that the solution lies in putting on a terrific act of Christian brotherliness, which by its very enthusiasm and indiscriminateness convinces everyone that it is nothing but an act, and which offends every particular Thou that it encounters" (p. 96).

A weakness in the book is that the key term, "believer," is not used precisely. On page 7, Mrs. Miller says that she is using the terms "believer" and "unbeliever" not in an evaluative sense but "in the statistical sense in which all the inhabitants of the planet could be counted one way or the other, by their own admission." Yet on page 19, after a searching criticism of the present revival of religion, she tells us that the "believer" will find "unbelief" in "the most unlikely places." That is, "unbelief" will be found among those who, "by their own admission," would be counted among the believers. This dual use of "believer" leads to a certain amount of confusion and even weakens some of the arguments as it recurs throughout the book.

On the whole, the book achieves its purpose of showing the position of the believer over against the secular world. It is written quite definitely for the college-trained reader, and it should be a highly useful book to put into the hands of any intellectual who is prepared to wrestle with ultimate questions. The book's value would be enhanced by an index.

WILLIAM HORDERN

Associate Professor of Theology, Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois.

The Call of the Minaret. By KENNETH CRAGG. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. xv-376 pp. \$6.25.

To the thoughtful Christian who holds deeply to the universality of his faith, the existence of Islam offers a perpetual problem and an insistent challenge. "Not to care about Islam," says the author of this book, "would be not to care about Christ."

When all religions, and the meaning of religion itself, are menaced by the forces which are relentlessly driving them from their traditional positions, there are many who proclaim the need for mutual understanding and tolerance between their adherents. Dr. Cragg agrees that "the obligations of religious systems to the contemporary malaise is inevitably an obligation toward each other. They can no longer remain physically sheltered in an alienation bridged only by the curious and the aggressive." But at the same time "the meeting of faiths is not to be seen as a prudent conformity to external necessity." The question which he poses and seeks to answer is the nature of the Christian response to this obligation, the demands which it makes upon the Christian in his attitude toward and in relation with Islam.

The answer cannot be given solely in terms of preaching Christian doctrine, however gently or patiently. The one thing the Muslim cannot stand is patronage, and there are unhappily few men or women in our Western world who do not unconsciously introduce some patronizing note or other into their attitudes toward the Muslim world. They might themselves even be surprised at the accusation. But the Muslim has grown so accustomed to expect it from the West that he is hypersensitive in mind and ear. Even sympathy is suspect. The first obligation on the Christian is to seek a patient understanding of what Islam is, and the ideals for which it stands, not judging the faith by the human shortcomings of its adherents.

This is the test which the first part of Dr. Cragg's book, the four chapters setting out the doctrines, rituals, social order, and something of the history of Islam, is required to pass. The Muslim reader may detect a critical note in some explicit or implicit contrasts with their Christian counterparts; but the presentation is not only reasonably objective, comprehensive, and accurate in its detail, it bears witness to a sincere effort to enter imaginatively into the religious life of the Muslim and its motivations. Perhaps one may ask of the Muslim critic whether he knows of any such sincere effort by a Muslim scholar to present the religion and the religious life of the Christian. But if the question is put to him, he is entitled to reply, "For what purpose?"

It is in this light that the second part of the book must be read and perhaps judged. Dr. Cragg rightly points out the suspicion with which all Christian endeavor is watched in Muslim countries, but insists, surely again rightly, that Christian service is still urgently needed in many fields and that, irrespective of the difficulties involved, there is a continuing Christian duty to render service in these fields in "loyal and discerning partnership with national leaders." But he carries his argument far beyond this point. "The objective is . . . restoration to Muslims of the Christ whom they have missed." This means "to present Christ as . . . the place where the Divine mercy fulfills itself in history, through One who is both its pledge and its means, One in whom we know God as forgiving and ourselves as forgiven." Yet he repeatedly asserts that such an acceptance of the universal Christ need not mean a total breach with Islam: "becoming a Christian is not ceasing to belong with Muslim need, Muslim thought, and Muslim kin."

To this writer, any such solution seems, if not a contradiction in terms, at least an impracticable confusion of opposites. In this age the West may have the right to ask that the leaders of Muslim religious thought should make an effort to understand the significance of Christ in *Christian* life and thought as they really are, not in terms of Islamic attitudes. But a religious belief, to be meaningful in any profound sense, must surely be related to the entire philosophical and cultural ethos of the community to which the believer belongs. Beliefs and attitudes from other faiths cannot be

superimposed on this structure. They remain accretions, or at a popular level and more bluntly, mere superstitions. To ask a Muslim to adopt a Christian view of Christ, with all the soteriological and sacramental implications which this involves, is either to invite him into the full cultural fellowship of the Christian church or to make of Christ a quasi-Muslim saint. Perhaps the final question is to be addressed to the Christian missionary himself—a question recently put by a colleague to the writer—"What did God mean by Islam?"

HAMILTON A. R. GIBB

Professor of Semitic Languages and History, Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Advancement of Theological Education. By H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, DANIEL DAY WILLIAMS, JAMES M. GUSTAFSON. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. xii-239 pp. \$4.00.

Under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation and in close co-operation with the American Association of Theological Schools, the authors of this book have spent two years in conducting a survey of Theological Education in the United States and Canada. The first volume of the survey appeared in 1956: *The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry: Reflections on the Aims of Theological Education*, by H. Richard Niebuhr in collaboration with Daniel Day Williams and James M. Gustafson. A companion study, *The Ministry in Historical Perspective*, edited by H. Richard Niebuhr and Daniel Day Williams, gives background material in the form of essays by eight distinguished writers.

These three volumes contain a vast amount of material on the whole subject of theological education. The American Association of Theological Schools, under a grant from the Lilly Foundation, is organizing and conducting a series of regional conferences in which representatives of theological faculties will discuss the findings of the survey team. It is hoped that these groups will result in provocative discussion and the stimulation of self-examination by large numbers of theological faculties. Certainly the two volumes of the report furnish much factual material and interpretative suggestions.

The first volume of the survey is the work of Dr. H. Richard Niebuhr. It sets the tone and attitude of the survey and may perhaps be described as the philosophy of the study. This little book should be read and reread before and after the second volume if the latter is to be thoroughly appreciated. Within the limits set for this review, justice cannot be done to the vast amount of material presented and analyzed: only a close reading, and study, of the two volumes will suffice for an understanding and appreciation of the work of the team. This reviewer pays sincere tribute to the earnestness and devotion of the surveyors, to their sympathetic approach to theological problems, and to the value of many of their suggestions. The final value of the book will be shown in the next decade by the extent to which this work is found useful and serviceable in the theological schools.

The volume now under review is crammed with statistical tables, charts, and analyses. Only a close and careful study can do justice to this well-documented work; individual and group study are necessary. With full recognition of his inadequacy the reviewer can only point out some items that particularly attracted and interested him. There is, first, applause for the point made in the opening pages that previous studies have quite overlooked the fact that the so-called "revival" churches, and not New England Puritanism, have dominated nineteenth- and twentieth-century church life

in America; therefore, the former and not the latter should attract our attention in studying theological education.

The next point, and this of dissent, is the overemphasis upon the interdenominational seminary to the disparagement of the denominational school. The interdenominational schools are not numerous, and enroll about fifteen per cent of all B.D. candidates. The report admits that the growth in schools and attendance in this century is found in the "denominational" schools. It is regrettable also that no surveyor visited the Southeastern territory. Methodist theological education appears to have been relatively ignored, and in the final analysis some dozen schools (seemingly mostly interdenominational) furnished the bulk of the material utilized.

Each of the surveyors was primarily responsible for certain chapters of the book. The meat of the volume to this reader lies in chapters four, five, and six, though none of the chapters should be neglected or discounted. The chapters indicated deal with "The Theological Faculties," "The Course of Study," and "Theological Teaching in Classroom, Field, and Library."

The knotty problem of extending the B.D. course from three to four years is treated fully and fairly in chapter nine, with the conclusion that the solution does not lie in a fourth year "of the same" nor in the "interne year," but in regular summer terms for persons already holding the B.D. degree with emphasis perhaps on special "practical fields." On many grounds this would seem to be the preferable solution. Here it might be remarked that a suggestion in the first volume that the term "pastoral director" be used for the present day "preacher-in-charge" (to use Methodist terminology) does not seem to have "taken on."

This review should close with an expression of hearty thanks and sincere appreciation to the surveyors, in which every harrassed theological dean and perplexed theological professor will join. It is the spirit of the survey and the fair appraisal of all aspects of each problem which stand as the main impression of this exceedingly valuable study.

JAMES CANNON

Dean, The Divinity School of Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

The Doctrine of Reconciliation (Church Dogmatics IV, 1). By KARL BARTH.

Translated by G. W. Bromiley. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. xi-802 pp. \$12.50.

The translators and editors of Barth's mammoth theological system have made a very strategic move; they have suddenly jumped ahead from the early volumes which they were translating in order, to a volume only recently issued in German. This not only enables the English-speaking world to "keep in touch with the more recent development" of Barth's thought (p. vii), but to go to the very heart of Barth's system, without reference to which all the earlier volumes are out of perspective. The British admirers of Barth were quite right when they entitled their recent (1956) symposium in his honor, *Essays in Christology for Karl Barth*. Christology is in fact the heart of his system—more especially the Work of Christ that centers in the atoning Cross.

Here we arrive at the point, *the covenant fulfilled in the atonement*, from which Barth has always viewed all other doctrines, according to the "Christomonistic" method he has consistently followed. In some of the previous volumes, this method has often seemed forced and unreal—as when the Doctrine of Creation was discussed without reference to the observable world, solely on the basis of the Book

of Genesis viewed in the light of the Cross of Christ! In this new volume the method is more persuasive. Barth convincingly insists that the Old Covenant was from the beginning a covenant of grace, and not merely of "works" (as the old "Federal Theology" called it), because God's attitude toward man has always been (1) *undeserved*, (2) *beneficent*, and (3) one requiring *gratitude* (pp. 39-41). Thus man's sin is not merely one of disobedience to law but one of ingratitude to grace. "Radically and basically all sin is simply ingratitude" (p. 41).

When man breaks covenant through ingratitude, God the Reconciler resolves in his eternity upon a stupendous act of self-humiliation, toward which all history moves. He goes "into the Far Country" in search of his lost son, taking the form of an obedient servant without ceasing to be "very God," and accepting the judgment due to man's sin while still remaining the Judge—so that man may be justified and transformed by entering into the new God-man relationship thus established. Barth lays great stress on the amazing paradox of "an obedience which takes place in God Himself" (p. 195), implied in this reconciling act of God in Christ.

Docetic and modalist views of the person of Christ evade this paradox by denying the depth of the divine Savior's humiliation; subordinationist views, by too sharply distinguishing the Man Christ Jesus from the God who sent him and whom he serves. "Can the one God command and obey?" such views asks. "Yes," answers Barth, for otherwise full salvation is impossible. This implies a conception of the Trinity as one God in three "modes of being," God above, God below, and fellowship between the two, such as Barth has previously stated, and a doctrine of the Church which he has not previously stated in systematic form. Avoiding docetic and subordinationist views of the Church, Barth is led to stress her unity and catholicity as much as any Catholic, and her need of constant repentance and reformation as much as any left-wing Protestant. "Apostolic succession" is sharply denounced (p. 112).

Those who think of Barth as perpetually thundering judgment will be surprised by his constant emphasis in this volume. Those who think of him as stiffly and narrowly orthodox will be surprised by his decided "free church" trend. An illuminating book to have *now* in our hands.

WALTER MARSHALL HORTON

Professor of Philosophy of Christianity, Oberlin Graduate School of Theology,
Oberlin, Ohio.

New Testament Theology. By ETHELBERT STAUFFER. Translated from the fifth German edition by John Marsh. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. 373 pp. \$4.50.

The clue to the intention of Professor Stauffer in his *New Testament Theology* is given in the title to the second and longest part of his compact work: "The Christocentric Theology of History in the New Testament." This section of the book, although it is divided into many short chapters—sixty-six in the entire book—unfolds before the reader like a great spectacle, tracing the history of the universe from the creation to the consummation. Drawing on his broad knowledge of ancient Near-Eastern history, of the history of religions, of the Church Fathers, of early Christian art, as well as the history and theology of the New Testament itself, Stauffer traces with great vividness the divine plan of redemption from its conception in eternity, through its enactment on the stage of human history, to the fulfillment of its predetermined end in the age to come.

Before the drama begins, the scene is laid and the *dramatis personae* introduced in Part One of the *Theology*. The background for the drama is neither the Hellenistic world of Philo Judaeus nor the rabbinic world of the Talmud, nor the thought world of Gnostic syncretism, but the apocalyptic thought patterns of the intertestamental period. The main actors of the drama are John the Baptist (who provides the link between Jewish apocalypticism and early Christianity), Jesus (who identifies himself with the apocalyptic Son of Man), and Paul and John the apostle, who unfold for the early Church the redemptive meaning implicit in the ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus.

To aid the witness of the drama of redemption, Stauffer describes in Part One the three major themes which flow throughout the whole history of salvation: (1) the doxological motif, which relates redemption to the glory of God; (2) the antagonistic motif, which relates redemption to the defeat of the demonic powers at work in the universe to thwart the purpose of God; and (3) the soteriological motif, that relates redemption to man and the saving benefits that Christ has brought.

Part Two, the drama proper, opens with an illuminating discussion of the theological presuppositions of the New Testament. These include the sovereignty of God over history, the freedom with which God has endowed the creation, the presence and potency of the Adversary, the way in which the destiny of the cosmos is bound up with man's sin and redemption. The Word of God, which creates and redeems, has been at work since primordial time, and has become incarnate in Jesus at a time when natural theology had failed, the inadequacy of legalism had become apparent, and the old covenant was manifestly ineffective. Although the coming of Christ has rough parallels in the other religions of the Near East, his role is unique in that all the redemptive offices anticipated by the other religions focus in him, and in him God himself—not merely one of a series of intermediaries—is at work. He fulfills the hope for redemption which saw that only God himself could redeem, and that redemption must come through one who is truly man. "Jesus in calling himself Son of Man (took) the decisive step in claiming cosmic history as his own" (p. 111).

Following a historical-chronological sequence, Stauffer points up the redemptive meaning of the cross (along the lines of Anselm's forensic doctrine of atonement), the descent into hell, the resurrection (stressing both the empty tomb and the spiritual-body theory of Paul), the ascension, and the coming again. As a major factor in the redemptive scheme stands the church, whose origins are traced back formally to the synagogue and historically to Jesus himself. The final act in the salvation drama ends with the revelation of Christ, the judgment, and the final glory of God. The themes of conflict and redemption, which created "the antiphony of universal history" lead finally "into a symphonic doxology" (p. 231).

In an epilogue, Part Three, the author shows how the redemptive motifs which were disclosed in Jesus and progressively better apprehended in the New Testament church achieve definitive formulation in the creeds of the post-apostolic period.

Although there are differing emphases in the New Testament, there is no real diversity. Nor is there any development; there is only growing comprehension of what was present from the beginning. "The theology of the church was a process of ordering. What went on was not the making of metaphysical concepts, nor yet the construction of a system, but an ordering of thought, that sought to discover the actual relationships between the different elements of the world of human experience. . . .

The theology of history is the primary and canonical form of Christian thinking and of all 'systematic' theology. . . . The whole of history is ordered christocentrically . . . and the world of our experience must be accommodated to our understanding of Christ." (pp. 173-174.)

Stauffer's *Theology* is a marvel of compactness. The text proper covers only 257 pages, although his arguments are supported by 838 footnotes (printed after the text) and seven appendices. His purpose is not merely to describe the theology of the New Testament, but to affirm it and its claim on man's understanding of history and of himself. He has no interest in apologetics, nor in relevance. No attention is given to discovering the essential core within the New Testament; conversely, there is no interest in demythologizing. Although relevance is not discussed in the book, no reader can fail to perceive the relevance which this work must have had for Christians struggling to maintain their freedom against a demonic Nazi tyranny. Even in affluent, apathetic America, Stauffer's descriptions of the consummation of the Kingdom are stirring to read. Stauffer's readers cannot question the breadth of his learning, but they will likely take issue with the conservative nature of his critical conclusions and the capricious quality of some of his exegesis.

At the end of his description of Paul (p. 39), Stauffer remarks that it was not until Luther that the church really understood Galatians, and that no one yet has really entered into the potentialities of Colossians, with its christocentric scheme of cosmic redemption, for reconstructing a theology of history. If this statement is accurate, then it will have to be amended immediately to read "No one, except Ethelbert Stauffer."

HOWARD C. KEE

Assistant Professor of New Testament, Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.

Christian Personal Ethics. By CARL F. H. HENRY. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957. xii-603 pp. \$6.95.

The author of this exhaustive work, for some years professor of Theology and Christian Philosophy, Fuller Theological Seminary, is now Editor of *Christianity Today*. He writes under the conviction that mankind has lost its moral rootage and that "apart from a new hold on biblical realities, there seems little moral hope. We may soon find ourselves past the ability to break with evil, if we ignore biblical Christianity's known way of severance." (p. 15.) By way of introduction to his restatement of biblical ethics, Dr. Henry reviews the historic answers to moral questions, and criticizes three forms of existential ethics: Elemental, Philosophical, and Revelational Existentialism. From his rather extended survey, he selects Nygren's distinction between Eros and Agape as perhaps the most significant contribution to the understanding of Christian ethics.

Whereas this is an attempt to reinstate biblical ethics as finally normative, the book is written in an irenic spirit. Henry is perhaps most vigorous when he criticizes men like Kierkegaard, Barth, and Reinhold Niebuhr because they find revelation in the personal encounter with God in the here and now. In other words, they are insufficiently biblical to be sufficiently Christian.

The influence of his graduate work at Boston University may be detected in his insistence upon rational coherence as the test of ultimate judgments concerning the nature of the good, and upon the rational or systematic character of the ethics of both

Old and New Testaments. The combination of an idealistic epistemology with the finality of biblical ethics is perhaps the most distinctive feature of this work.

It is evident that Dr. Henry is familiar with the literature of the field in which he is writing. His interpretations of the many authors whose works he has examined are normally objective and possible. One may question his basic presupposition that only an absolutistic ethic can serve as the basis of social existence, and this reviewer does question it. One of the major difficulties which we confront today is precisely the absolutizing of ethical systems—the Marxist by the East, and Free Enterprise by the West. If we are to resolve the dangerous tensions which endanger us, we shall have to adopt a more flexible attitude toward divergent views of man and human behavior. There is little in this volume which will provide for this more appreciative approach.

WILLIAM H. BERNHARDT

Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Christian Ethics, The Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colorado.

Integrity and Compromise. Ed. by R. M. MACIVER. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 150 pp. \$2.50.

Religion and Social Work. Ed. by F. ERNEST JOHNSON. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. ix-194 pp. \$3.00.

Professor MacIver has been a faithful editor for many years of the symposia published by the Jewish Theological Seminary of New York. A Jacob Ziskind Memorial has provided for an annual series of luncheons for "The Institute of Religious and Social Studies," and the publication of papers and speeches delivered at the luncheons. The volume *Integrity and Compromise* contains the talks given in the 1955-1956 series, dealing with real or supposed dilemmas and problems in the areas of public and "private" conscience. One useful result, at least for the series' sponsors, is the dawning realization that conscience is, after all, never a "private" matter!

Francis Biddle, former U.S. Attorney General, sets the tone of the whole volume at the outset with a vigorous defense of compromise as a constructive necessity of conscientious action in all human affairs. Inevitably his talk, and some of the others', appeal for support to Lord Morley's classic treatise on compromise. In the main the contributors are agreed that integrity can and sometimes must compromise with the workable, and that there is a vast difference qualitatively between compromise and appeasement. As Briand put it to the French Deputies, "With whom should we try to get along except with our enemies?"

A Roman Catholic priest, a Protestant minister, a politician, physical and social scientists, an artist, a lawyer, a doctor, a publisher, and a writer make up the entire panel. Except for a couple of chapters, they all carry the unmistakable air of rather informal postprandial addresses. Serious students of ethics and social philosophy will find little that is profound, carefully tailored, or fresh. But for the intelligent, thoughtful, and appreciative reader there are many passages of wit and none too common common-sense.

To turn to F. Ernest Johnson's symposium, *Religion and Social Work*, we may remark that the United States is the scene of much more active and vital co-operation between the churches (organized religion) and social agencies (organized welfare) than most people realize. Yet there is extraordinarily little literature produced describing or analysing it. Therefore the Jacob Ziskind Memorial of Jewish Theological

Seminary has made a noteworthy contribution with its publication of this volume in its *Religion and Civilization* series.

In recent years social services, of both the case work and the group work kinds, have moved away from the churches to government and nonsectarian agencies. This makes it necessary for the churches to review and readjust their own performance in the welfare field, and for the agencies to do the same. Both are concerned for the personal values at stake, for the interests of real people. In this book fourteen leaders have focused their attention on the mutual interests and problems of religious and social service, but each from within his or her own context of administration, child care, family welfare, public agencies, city parishes, and the like.

There is a striking measure of "overlap" in these addresses, but it appears to be due not so much to the repetitiousness of symposia as to the common mind and residual central concepts which are an inevitable product of knowledge and experience in the field. A short review cannot begin to itemize the enlightening results of reading this book, but it is worth noting that there seems to be a trend in Protestantism toward the social service patterns established by Roman Catholicism and Judaism, i.e. toward church-related agencies like the Catholic Charities and the United Jewish Agencies.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

Professor of Christian Ethics, The Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Church, the Ministry, and Reunion. By W. NORMAN PITTENGER. Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1957. ix-147 pp. \$2.75.

Dr. W. Norman Pittenger is a distinguished churchman. He is Professor of Christian Apologetics at the General Theological Seminary. He has participated in a notable fashion in ecumenical discussions. The present volume is a high Anglican interpretation of the Church, seeing the ministry and the sacraments from this position. The author attempts to bear witness to his own position in such a fashion as to win friendly interest from those who approach the subject in an entirely different way. He deals with the New Testament materials with great candor and is careful not to claim too much. The book is written with the greatest possible urbanity, and when the author has things to say which will make difficult reading for those who belong to different schools of thought, he says them with disarming friendliness.

One notices his frequent disagreement with Anglican authorities whose position is not so high as his own. He is friendly to the Church of South India, with one or two qualifications. He can be sharp with extreme expressions used by members of his own party in such a fashion as to make the path of reunion difficult. He makes much of the increasing interest in Eucharistic thought on the part of those who belong to another tradition. He has appreciative remarks about the importance of preaching, and admits that this emphasis has not been found so fully in "Catholic" communions. On the whole he sets forth an unflinching high church position in the politest phrases. That those holding the position of Dr. Pittenger will have a gladly recognized place in the United Church (if and when it comes to be) goes without saying. A good many careful Christian thinkers would question the idea that it will be a dominant place.

In reading some writers regarding these matters one has to be careful because a sharp style may tend to hide underlying agreements. In the case of Dr. Pittenger's book, the infinite graciousness may turn the reader's attention from deep-seated dis-

agreements. This book, however, will have its good and important place in ecumenical discussion.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

New York City. Formerly Dean of Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.

The Messiah in the Old Testament. By HELMER RINGGREN. Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 18. Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, 1956. 71 pp. \$1.50.

Early Israel in Recent History Writing. By JOHN BRIGHT. Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 19. Alec R. Allenson, 1956. 128 pp. \$1.75.

The Servant of God. By W. ZIMMERLI and J. JEREMIAS. Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 20. Alec R. Allenson, 1957. \$2.25.

This series of studies continues, from the point of view of quality, manageable length, and price, to be an excellent and practical means of keeping abreast of current trends in biblical scholarship.

The volume by Ringgren relates itself to a problem raised for theology and faith by the rise of modern biblical criticism. How is it possible, in the light of the results of literary and historical investigation of the Old Testament, to retain the Church's traditional interpretation of the "Messianic passages"? Ringgren attempts to show how certain lines of contemporary research have gone beyond the positions of earlier critics to a point where they can help to recover the traditional messianic meaning of such passages in terms compatible with thoroughgoing scholarly investigation. He is dealing mainly with the work of the Scandinavian scholars.

The relevant "royal psalms," the principal "messianic passages" in Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and Zechariah, the Servant Songs, and certain so-called "servant psalms" are treated. Certainly the results of much modern work that have to be taken into account are here presented conveniently for the reader of English. The difficulty is that the book is so short that it does not show how the results have been reached and does not relate the work on which it is based to previous work. Many of its conclusions, therefore, may strike the reader as excessive and somewhat cavalier. It may, nevertheless, serve as an introduction to the possibilities of such study.

Bright's book is more important. The problem to which it addresses itself is one of method. How are the historical traditions of the Old Testament to be evaluated and used, in connection with other evidence, in the reconstruction of Israel's history? This is no academic question, but one relevant to biblical theology which is based on events.

Bright's way of getting at the things involved, once he has outlined the problem and its importance, is to describe and evaluate the methods and results of the school of Alt and Noth, great contemporary German scholars. It is the basic contention of this school that the J and E narratives of the Old Testament are based on a common tradition of Israel's origin and history which was the confession of faith of the old tribal confederation which preceded the monarchy. That there was such a confederation and such a tradition we can know, and we can see what the tradition was and expound its theology. But to go back of that is to enter the realm of uncertainty. Bright feels that this method is ultimately nihilistic and destroys the foundations of a faith which professes to rest on events.

As a sample of positions different from the one of Alt and Noth, Bright surveys the work of the Israeli scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann, who insists on the reliability of

the witness of the biblical traditions to historical events. Bright shows, in a most telling way, how the results of Kaufmann are based on many *non sequiturs*, on a rather eccentric literary criticism, and on what seems to be a compulsion to bend the evidence in the direction of the conclusions.

Bright's own position is essentially that of Albright. If one feels that his criticisms of Alt and Noth and the method he advocates rely on a too uncritical use of archeological evidence to support the text as it stands, one must nevertheless acknowledge the debt we owe him in this masterful summary of important scholarly work not available in English.

The last book is an English translation of the article, *Pais Theou*, from Gerhard Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, first published in German in 1952. The format of this study and the high quality of its contents will be familiar to those already acquainted with the *Wörterbuch* or with the articles from it already translated into English. Harold Knight and the editorial staff of the Student Christian Movement have produced a first-rate translation.

Zimmerli has done the first two sections which discuss the use of the phrase, "Servant of God," in the Hebrew Old Testament and the translations of the phrase in the Septuagint. In both these sections, profane as well as religious usage of "servant" is thoroughly described, and a great deal of attention is given to the Servant passages in II Isaiah.

Jeremias has written a section on the interpretation of "*Pais Theou*" in late Judaism, in which he discusses its double meaning in Greek, the continued religious uses of the phrase, and the various messianic and other interpretations of the Servant of II Isaiah in Hellenistic as well as Palestinian Judaism. Jeremias' final section is on the New Testament uses of the phrase as a title of Jesus, on New Testament Christological interpretations of the Isaianic servant, and on the question of Jesus' own application of the phrase to himself.

The book is amply noted with references to the relevant literature, mostly in German. The publishers are to be commended for making it available to us.

HARVEY H. GUTHRIE, JR.

Instructor in Old Testament, The General Theological Seminary, New York City.

The Message of the Fourth Gospel. By ERIC L. TITUS. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957. 253 pp. \$3.50.

The Gospel Jesus Preached. By S. MACLEAN GILMOUR. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957. 238 pp. \$3.75.

These two books both deal with the Gospels; that of Titus with John, that of Gilmour with the Synoptics. Yet it is inevitable that Titus should make some contrasts with the Synoptics and that Gilmour, though he finds Jesus' gospel preserved almost entirely in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, should take some side glances at John.

Titus definitely states that the Fourth Gospel is not to be distinguished from the first three as interpretation from history, since all the Gospels are interpretative and John as well as the rest has real history behind it. Gilmour, on the other hand, though admitting that much in the Synoptics represents later interpretation of Jesus by the church, considers John to contain little or no actual history of event. Titus contents himself with presenting the Synoptics as compilers of earlier traditions and glories in the author of the Fourth Gospel as an original and creative interpreter. Through

mystic contemplation and the use of symbols John has remoulded actual history so as to make it far more significant than it appears in the first three Gospels.

Titus believes that the dominant theme of the Fourth Gospel is not the Logos but the Spirit. This, of course, is an amplifying of the point of view which he expressed earlier in his work issued jointly with E. C. Colwell, *The Gospel of the Spirit*. The Spirit is eternal, but was merged with the flesh in the incarnation. Indeed, Titus can say that Jesus "became God's Son" at the incarnation, for it was then that the Spirit descended upon him (p. 208). John's philosophy is a dualism; flesh is not evil *per se*, as with the Gnostics, but it must be regenerated by the Spirit. Indeed, the point at which the cross becomes significant for salvation is this, that the death of Christ liberated the Spirit which until then had been imprisoned within him. This is the reason for John's saying that Jesus breathed on his disciples and gave them the Spirit. The Spirit bestows eternal life now; hence John is able to reconcile Paul's insistence on the Spirit with an eschatology that does not depend (as Paul's does) on an imminent event. For Gilmour, all this is second-century interpretation.

Titus stresses the nonsacramental nature of the Fourth Gospel. John is not thinking of water baptism even in the Nicodemus scene, and he disavows the Eucharist by making the Bread of Life entirely spiritual and the last supper a fellowship meal. The risen Lord is known to his disciples by intimate personal relationships, not through ritual emblems.

John ignores problems of moral living. Here Gilmour would not only agree, but would point to the ethicism of the Synoptics as one of their most distinguishing features. Both stress also that faith plays a different role in the two kinds of Gospels: in the Synoptics it is prerequisite to healing; in John it results from healings and from other "signs." Gilmour would not go so far as Titus in admitting John to be the most universalistic of the Gospels, though who can deny that in the early Samaritan mission and the later coming of the Greeks John intends to stress a Christ for all the world? Nor can Titus' claim be gainsaid that the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel is not a Galilean Jew but a world Redeemer, constantly one with God, not so much calling disciples as attracting them like a magnet. To reject such a one is not a mere matter of choice but a calling down of judgment.

The methods of the two writers are quite different. Titus devotes less than a fourth of his space to what he considers the three most important problems of the Fourth Gospel: the literary method, the Logos, and the Spirit. The remainder of his book is commentary of an interesting variety—done not by words or phrases but by sections of thought. Thus he preserves throughout something of the topical approach that he has used in the first part, and is effective in returning repeatedly to John's peculiar characteristics of literary style, such as the employment of many synonyms, of dramatic situations, of stupid characters as the vehicles of Jesus' revelation of the truth, etc.

Gilmour proceeds entirely by the topical method. His intention is to write, not as Titus for the more scholarly, but for the average layman. He accomplishes this purpose at a number of points: in making clear the power of oral tradition and the early use of the gospel for evangelization, in his reproduction of Mark's picture of Jesus' humanity and his urgency about living, the centrality of the kingdom to Jesus' thought and the stress on individual virtues, in Jesus' unique thought of God and his insistence on absolute loyalty to that God.

On the other hand, Gilmour leaves some things rather obscure or unproved for the untrained churchman. His discussion of text and sources of the Gospels requires

some previous knowledge. He leaves the impression of the validity of Christian insertions in the writings of Pliny, Tacitus, and Josephus. He identifies the kingdom too closely with the church. He degrades too easily the apocalyptic elements in the Synoptics. He too readily pictures the Gospel writers as misrepresenting Jesus. Astounding is his claim that Jesus himself did not teach a God of love, that this was the later working out of Paul and John. His greatest extreme is his assertion that the scene of Pilate's washing his hands is "the most unchristian passage in the New Testament" (p. 162). He denies ethical idealism to Jesus, and his attempt to paint the relevance of Jesus' social ethic does not come very clear. He surprisingly interprets the role of Peter from a high Anglican, almost a Romanist point of view (pp. 57, 138). And since he is writing to lay folk, his use of such words as "tannaitic" (p. 64), "indorsation" (p. 144), or "ancillary" (p. 208) is hardly in good taste.

In general, each of these books makes a positive contribution to the purpose for which it was written, but each is somewhat extreme without adequate justification. In the mind of the present reviewer, the work of Titus is the better of the two.

JULIAN PRICE LOVE

Professor of Biblical Theology, The Louisville Presbyterian Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky.

The Pauline View of Man. By W. DAVID STACEY. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. xv-253 pp. \$5.75.

Body and Soul. By D. R. G. OWEN. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956. 239 pp. \$3.75.

It is fitting to review these two books together, since the basic problem is the same. The approaches, however, are radically different. There is a common excellence in the thoroughness with which each deals with the biblical material. Each author claims that this is an age marked by biblical emphasis in theology. Mr. Stacey sees quite clearly the really relevant point when he declares in no uncertain terms our freedom from the necessity to follow biblical conclusions. How welcome to hear him say we need not accept Pauline views just because they are Pauline! But we need to know Pauline views, and there is no better book than this one by Mr. Stacey. Affirming the creative genius of Paul as a religious man, he shows how Paul absorbs both Hebraic and Grecian patterns in anthropology and yet emerges with his own view, marked by the coherence and consciousness of personality as the key to the nature of man. His summaries are superb.

Mr. Owen attempts to set his study of anthropology (both authors claim to be working in "anthropology," but this is questionable) in the framework of Science and Religions. He makes the fundamental error of calling all religion but his own "pseudo-religion," and all science but his own "pseudo-science." The book is perfect "scholasticism." It assumes the validity of the author's Christianity and then does an admirable job of harmonizing the body-soul problem with it. The main question is begged, i.e., where does study in the body-soul problem really lead us? The answer is known here, even to "the resurrection of our Lord," before the investigation begins.

Both these books are commendable in that they are valiant efforts to modernize theology to save it from science. Stacey succeeds quite clearly in historical understanding of Paul, but Owen is still in the throes of the struggle, and has forgotten Dean Inge's statement that Christian theology must align itself with Platonic (not Aristotelian) philosophy if it is to survive the attack of science. Both authors narrow the

Logos doctrine much too strictly, and thus both miss much of the value of the Greek influence.

Mr. Stacey's book should be read by all religious leaders.

EDWIN P. BOOTH

Professor of Historical Theology, Boston University School of Theology, Boston, Massachusetts.

Freud or Jung? By EDWARD GLOVER. New York: Meridian Books, 1956 (paper, reprint from edition of W. W. Norton & Co.). 207 pp. \$1.25.

Dr. Glover has written a polemic against Jung from the point of view of Freudian analysis. A leader among British medical psychoanalysts, he takes a strictly partisan stand, in a manner familiar to readers of sectarian religious writings. He has read Jung widely and quotes him both liberally and accurately. The evidence of scholarship loses much because he gives no references, except when quoting from some of Jung's allegedly pro-Nazi articles. His vituperative vocabulary will repel Jung's followers, as well as those not involved in either side. He often uses words such as "illogical," "slipshod," and "absurd," and calls Jung's goal of individuation "a phantom carrot to be dangled before the nose of the inadequate and dejected" (p. 181). As is common in polemical writing, he often quotes out of context, but nevertheless seems to have tried his best to understand what Jung means.

Unfortunately his best understanding is not good enough. A number of times he has completely misconceived some of Jung's most important views. For example, he says (p. 145) that the expressions (of the Collective Unconscious) must always be regarded as "positive manifestations," and with reference to the anima (p. 50) he states: "One cannot help wondering why a structure that has such terrifying potentiality is represented as being polite, platonic and Tennysonian." Jung repeatedly emphasizes the potentially dangerous and horrifying aspects of the collective unconscious as revealed both in schizophrenia and religious experience. In fact, he warns that these manifestations can be much more devastating than anything that may rise out of the personal unconscious. Dr. Glover seems to have had no personal knowledge of (or feeling for) numinous experience.

Some of his criticisms are well taken, and deserve the serious attention of Jungians. Since the original work on "Psychological Types," Dr. Jung has been more concerned with other subjects. This early work should be re-examined and brought into better relationship with current theories of the ego and the unconscious and with considerations of practical treatment. Though Dr. Michael Fordham and Mrs. Frances Wickes have published some fine work on child psychology and psychotherapy, Jung's followers do need to develop this field more thoroughly. Dr. W. Zublin, of Zurich, is one of the few now carrying on psychotherapy with children according to Jungian methods.

Rather than polemics by fanatical partisans, what we need are impartial studies from both sides of the fence. Fortunately two such studies have already appeared: Ruth Monroe's *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought* and Ira Progoff's *Death and Rebirth of Psychology*. To those who wish to find presentations of both sides of the controversy I recommend these two books. Ultimately, may it be devoutly hoped, a unified corpus of analytic theory and practice will be arrived at. One fears that a generation or two will be needed to bring this utopia to reality.

ROBERT A. CLARK, M.D.

Friends Hospital, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Faith in Conflict. By CARLYLE MARNEY. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957. 158 pp. \$2.50.

Whatever else one may say about this book, it is neither dull, prosaic, nor run-of-the-mine. After the first reading of the first forty pages or so, I had two reactions. First of all, I was dizzy and partially blinded. What was this I had got into? A fireworks display—with exploding firecrackers of unusual phrasing, sparkling similes, pinwheels of whirling metaphor, and Roman candles and rockets of brilliant quotes snatched from everywhere and taking off simultaneously in all directions?

Secondly, I was by this time slightly out of breath, like Alice in Wonderland, who had to keep running to stay in the same place. The author—to change the figure—was a veritable whirling dervish with words, and I was in the dance with him. Would both he and I sustain the pace till the end? (We did.)

But after I had got my second sight and wind, and the dizziness had passed, I began to look around with some appreciation. There was more method in this word-madness than at first appeared. There was organization—though as in organic structure and some kinds of architecture, it was hidden so as not to mar the poetic spontaneity of the whole. I found that each of the four sections was going somewhere and got there. The thought led to a definite point or conclusion, though not to a facile or pat answer. Similes, metaphors, figures of speech and symbolisms there were in profusion, and from many sources; but they were never in confusion and usually registered at once.

The central symbolism is most suggestive and suitable to the book. It begins, but does not end, in conversations with a passing friend, an unbeliever, in which both find themselves focusing inevitably on four basic faith-conflicts of our day: religion versus the roaring dragon of science; human goodness in mortal combat with the serpent of evil; personal integrity threatened by the hovering falcon of cultural conformity (perhap the weakest of the analogical devices); and human hopes and values overshadowed by that waiting vulture, death.

The doubts, the fears, the tearing tensions are poignantly stated; there is no glossing over or shirking. They are presented with existential depth and poetic intensity of feeling. So also answers are given, but not easy ones. Like Studdert-Kennedy the author can say, "I am no fool, I have my reasons," but also realizes that no *merely* intellectual answer is enough in these matters. Hence his answers are usually more illuminating insights than systematic arguments.

Now and then this latter left the philosophically-trained reviewer dissatisfied. "The validity of the deed [the crucifixion] lies wholly on the uniqueness of the Person. The genius of the Christian 'specific' for evil appears in the identity of the Person." Obviously this is a faith-identification, not a reason. But again, religious commitment cannot avoid faith. And should a poet give a philosopher's answer?

Finally, does the dervish keep his whirl of words under control? ("Queen bees of the devotional hive," "varicose mental meanderings," "pink-pill mottoes about 'living positively.'") Despite my own predilections to a contrary style, despite the abundant mixture of Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Berdyaev, and Goethe with Marney, the author remains master of the situation. I seldom sensed an unnatural straining for effect. I often found unforgettable illumination, from sources new and old.

WINSTON L. KING

Dean of the Chapel and Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa.

The Holy Fire. By ROBERT PAYNE. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. xxii-313 pp. \$5.00.

In this work Mr. Payne presents popular sketches of ten Fathers of the Eastern Church; and he does so with a vengeance. Holy fire leaps from his pages. The author has an eye for what is arresting, and his characterizations are lively even if they may at times be astonishing. What he lacks in judgment he certainly makes up for in imagination. One paces the early centuries in a pitch of excitement, breathlessly trying to keep up with these Christians, "a hot-blooded and reckless people, bright-eyed and drunk with visions" (p. 9). And what men they are! Origen "walks sure-footed with fanatic and controlled energy" (p. 43); Athanasius has a name whose "dark and heavy syllables" at times "fill us with dread" (p. 67). Basil has a forehead "like the prow of a ship" (p. 112), while Gregory of Nyssa "never raised his voice," but "walked with tenderness through a world which seemed to him too beautiful to be real" (p. 137). Even the anonymous author of the *Mystical Theology* can be conjured up: "the high brows and enormous eyes and sunken cheeks of the dedicated mystic" (p. 235).

That is not to say that Mr. Payne's book altogether lacks a measure of sobriety. For all its faults it contains a good deal of sound information, and the different chapters succeed in bringing these Fathers and their times to life. While much is imagined, much is also correct. The Fathers treated are Clement, Origen, Athanasius, Basil, the two Gregories, Chrysostom, Dionysius, John of Damascus, and Gregory Palamas. The omission of Cyril of Alexandria is startling, though the choice is representative enough for the author's purposes. The writings as well as the lives of these Fathers are described; and while little or no attempt is made to understand their thought in the stream of the Hellenistic and Christian development, their leading ideas are mentioned and frequently illustrated with apt citations.

The work concludes with a somewhat ambitious list of books, which curiously omits reference to the two Catholic series, *Fathers of the Church* and *Ancient Christian Writers*.

The manner of citation from the Fathers is a little distressing. Without any acknowledgment Mr. Payne often takes other people's renderings and makes changes here and there to suit himself. The result is sometimes calamitous. Thus on page 72 he uses Robertson's version of the *De Incarnatione*, omitting "not" in line five to make the sentence meaningless, and changing the following one to alter Athanasius' thought entirely.

CYRIL C. RICHARDSON

Professor of Church History, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

Biblical Theology and Christian Education. By RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. xiv-226 pp. \$3.50.

It is necessary for every adult and child to *grow* in the knowledge and love of God if he is to have life abundantly. Too often our childish concepts stay with us. We think of God only as Creator, or Law-giver, or Savior, or as the Spirit prompting man to go forward. We are generally conditioned by the particular aspect of God seen by our parents and teachers. Dr. Miller's book is an attempt to remedy this condition. He stresses the fact that God reveals himself in many ways. When the Bible is taught as a whole, a divine drama is seen. God acts throughout history; man responds and continues to respond. The drama is still being played, and we are all a part of it *now*.

While to remain here would be an oversimplification, I am of the opinion that it is good to begin in the way described, seeing the drama in five parts: Creation, Covenant, Christ, Church, Consummation. Other contemporary writers have chosen different titles for the acts. What matters is that a greater growth in the understanding of the love, justice, and salvation revealed in the Bible as attributes of the Lord of all mankind be shown to those we teach.

Dr. Miller shows how he would interpret these truths in the light of the age-level needs of various groups of learners, from nursery to senior high school. He takes the "relationship" approach, and maintains that the truth is at first mediated to the child through his relationships with those around him. While we must never limit the power of grace as it reaches into the lives of those who have had the most unpromising first experiences, this approach makes an excellent beginning to Biblical Theology for both teachers and those taught. If it were more widely used, we would have people climbing out of the pitifully narrow glimpse of God caught in the early years and clung to for life, thus affecting and cramping both worship and behavior. As our knowledge of God grows, so our relationship with him and with our neighbor is transformed.

DORA P. CHAPLIN

Assistant Professor of Pastoral Theology, General Theological Seminary, New York City.

Biblical Archaeology. By G. ERNEST WRIGHT. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957. 288 pp. \$15.00.

In this fresh discussion of biblical archeology the author has gathered his materials around the framework of Israel's history and the history of the New Testament and the early Church. Thus, at any one point are to be found the illuminations of archeological findings from a given period conveniently pulled together. The result is a fascinating, and extremely usable, mine of information.

Here will be found instances in which archeology has aided in the translation of the Scriptures. In Lev. 28:30, among other places, for instance, there is a word which has been variously translated as "sun-image" or simply as "image": "And I will destroy your high places, and cut down your *images*. . . ." The Hebrew was thought to be derived from a rare word for "sun," although this was but a guess. Even as modern a translation as Moffatt's uses "sun-pillars" for this word. For some time, though, archeologists have known of limestone altars so small they could have been used only for burning incense; recently one was found with the word in question inscribed on it. We may now translate with confidence, ". . . cut down your incense altars," as does the Revised Standard Version.

Sometimes there is confirmation of a biblical detail. Excavations in the temple at Lachish have uncovered piles of bones; but all are from the upper part of the right leg! This, we are told in Lev. 7:32, was the portion reserved for the priests. The boneless fat was burned on the altar; the rest could be eaten by the worshipers. Naturally, then, only bones from the upper part of the right leg will be found within the temple, where the priest dwelt. It was the sin of Eli's sons that they were not content with the priest's share, as established in the law (I Sam. 2:12 ff.).

There are startling evidences of the high state of Israelite culture during Isaiah's time. Human skulls in the ruins at Lachish show evidence of the operation known as trepanning—the removal of a piece of the skull to relieve pressure on the brain. On one skull the marks of the saw are all but grown over, indicating that the patient was

cured and lived for a number of years; on another the marks of the saw are still clearly defined! This poor patient was not so fortunate.

The New Testament chapter contains an interesting description of the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Essene community at Qumran.

There is a list of Further Readings at the end of each chapter. The author has provided eight maps, and five indexes, which greatly increase the book's usefulness. There are 220 illustrations. The book is not inexpensive, but its purchase will be money well invested. You will find yourself referring to it again and again throughout your ministry.

ROBERT ROY WRIGHT

Assistant Book Editor, Abingdon Press, New York City.

Martin Ruter: Pioneer in Methodist Education. By JOHN O. GROSS. Division of Educational Institutions, Board of Education, The Methodist Church, Nashville, Tennessee, 1956. \$1.00.

From the little town of Charlton that you still almost miss in Massachusetts, Martin Ruter began life in 1785. He was to be instrumental in founding what is now Boston University, serving as the first Methodist president of Allegheny College, as Book Agent of The Methodist Church, and as President of Augusta College in Kentucky, and finally to establish what is now Southwestern University at Georgetown, Texas. He died in 1838.

An amazing man who made of his traveling ministry an evangel of education, he succeeded in penetrating the most hardened opposition and winning their support for these earliest educational ventures of Methodism. As Book Agent he saw to it that books were made available for the struggling pioneers who were busy building America. He developed what was really the first formal training programs for the Methodist ministers.

Dr. Gross has written an exciting story about the amazing accomplishments of Martin Ruter. One of several pamphlets to be published by the Methodist Board of Education as part of the current denominational emphasis on raising funds for its church-related colleges, this story of Martin Ruter will give courage to the faint-hearted who seek ways of penetrating pocketbooks and renewing interest in supporting church-related colleges.

EMORY STEVENS BUCKE

Editor-in-Chief of Abingdon Press and RELIGION IN LIFE.

Book Notices

Robert H. Pfeiffer's comprehensive standard work, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, has now been summarized in an abridged form entitled *The Books of the Old Testament* (Harper, \$5.00). Dr. Pfeiffer describes it as intended "to help the general reader understand, and therefore appreciate, the greatness of the Old Testament. Scholars, who invite the public to partake of their excellent dinners, are not invited to this modest supper. It is my hope that this hasty conducted tour . . . will induce readers to peruse the Bible with some knowledge of its historical background and of its abiding power to guide us to a nobler conduct and a closer communion with our God." Readers will find no evidence, however, of haste or lack of scholarship.

Another important work, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* ("Monotheism and the Historical Process"), by W. F. Albright, has been reissued by Doubleday as an Anchor Book (paper, \$1.45). This is the second edition (1946), with a new introduction by the author explaining that his views on essentials have remained unchanged since his first writing in 1940, but he would now make some changes of emphasis due to recent discoveries.

Sin and Salvation, by Bishop Lesslie Newbigin (Westminster, \$2.00), is a small book written for the use of village teachers in the Tamil dioceses of the Church of South India—people without theological training but with major responsibility for the pastoral care of several thousand villages. One can well imagine that this simple, forthright exposition would have value for lay workers elsewhere in the world.

Two more volumes of *The Library of Christian Classics* have come out: Volume XXV, *Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers*, edited by George H. Williams and Angel M. Mergal, containing "Documents illustrative of the Radical Reformation" by Müntzer, Grebel, Schwenkfeld, Menno Simons, etc., and the "Evangelical Catholicism" of Juan de Valdés. Volume IX, *Early Medieval Theology*, is edited by George E. McCracken in collaboration with Allen Cabaniss. Westminster, each \$5.00.

Charles W. Iglehart has written an attractive little book, *The Cross and Crisis in Japan*, Friendship Press, \$2.50. He shows how "even a tiny minority, given the power of a deep and radiant faith, can rise above statistics," how "the Christian titans of Japan" are working (Western missionaries with them) to reach into every avenue of changing Japanese life "as the nation walks a tightrope between two vast poles of power." Another FP publication is *We Witness Together*, a history of Co-operative Home Missions by Robert T. Handy (\$4.00). He ably traces the growth of organized co-operation from the turn of the century to the date of the organization of the National Council of Churches. "To understand American Protestantism in the twentieth century one must . . . be conversant . . . with the remarkable development of interdenominational movements." The two Home Missions Councils (merged in 1940) embodied three strands: the evangelical missionary motif (win America for Christ), interdenominational co-operation, and the (moderate) social emphasis.

E. H. L.

THE INDEX TO THIS VOLUME
HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS
POSITION AND PLACED AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE FILM FOR
THE CONVENIENCE OF READERS

Book Notices

Robert H. Pfeiffer's comprehensive standard work, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, has now been summarized in an abridged form entitled *The Books of the Old Testament* (Harper, \$5.00). Dr. Pfeiffer describes it as intended "to help the general reader understand, and therefore appreciate, the greatness of the Old Testament. Scholars, who invite the public to partake of their excellent dinners, are not invited to this modest supper. It is my hope that this hasty conducted tour . . . will induce readers to peruse the Bible with some knowledge of its historical background and of its abiding power to guide us to a nobler conduct and a closer communion with our God." Readers will find no evidence, however, of haste or lack of scholarship.

Another important work, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* ("Monotheism and the Historical Process"), by W. F. Albright, has been reissued by Doubleday as an Anchor Book (paper, \$1.45). This is the second edition (1946), with a new introduction by the author explaining that his views on essentials have remained unchanged since his first writing in 1940, but he would now make some changes of emphasis due to recent discoveries.

Sin and Salvation, by Bishop Lesslie Newbigin (Westminster, \$2.00), is a small book written for the use of village teachers in the Tamil dioceses of the Church of South India—people without theological training but with major responsibility for the pastoral care of several thousand villages. One can well imagine that this simple, forthright exposition would have value for lay workers elsewhere in the world.

Two more volumes of *The Library of Christian Classics* have come out: Volume XXV, *Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers*, edited by George H. Williams and Angel M. Mergal, containing "Documents illustrative of the Radical Reformation" by Müntzer, Grebel, Schwenkfeld, Menno Simons, etc., and the "Evangelical Catholicism" of Juan de Valdés. Volume IX, *Early Medieval Theology*, is edited by George E. McCracken in collaboration with Allen Cabaniss. Westminster, each \$5.00.

Charles W. Iglehart has written an attractive little book, *The Cross and Crisis in Japan*, Friendship Press, \$2.50. He shows how "even a tiny minority, given the power of a deep and radiant faith, can rise above statistics," how "the Christian titans of Japan" are working (Western missionaries with them) to reach into every avenue of changing Japanese life "as the nation walks a tightrope between two vast poles of power." Another FP publication is *We Witness Together*, a history of Co-operative Home Missions by Robert T. Handy (\$4.00). He ably traces the growth of organized co-operation from the turn of the century to the date of the organization of the National Council of Churches. "To understand American Protestantism in the twentieth century one must . . . be conversant . . . with the remarkable development of interdenominational movements." The two Home Missions Councils (merged in 1940) embodied three strands: the evangelical missionary motif (win America for Christ), interdenominational co-operation, and the (moderate) social emphasis.

E. H. L.



